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INTRODUCTION
Landmark. Watershed. Seminal. These adjectives routinely
populate legal writing—especially “year in review” compendiums
such as this one. Most readers gloss over them as mere hyperbole. In
2011, however, “landmark,” “watershed,” and “seminal” only begin to
describe the year’s legislative and judicial developments, which will
transform and shape patent law for decades.
First came the Federal Circuit’s en banc ruling in Therasense, Inc. v.
1
Becton, Dickinson & Co., in which the court clarified and tightened
the standard for finding inequitable conduct, “redirect[ing] a
2
doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public.”
The court revamped the elusive and often chaotic standards of
3
inequitable conduct that had prevailed for years. In place of the
“sliding scale” of intent and materiality, the Federal Circuit
announced clearer, more demanding, independent standards for

1. 649 F.3d 1276, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
2. Id. at 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
3. See id. at 1285, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (discussing the court’s reason
for granting Abbott’s petition for rehearing en banc).
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4

proving both prongs of inequitable conduct. Patent holders, who
until Therasense had grown accustomed to facing often tenuous, if not
specious, charges of inequitable conduct in virtually every case, hailed
5
the ruling.
Next, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
6
Trademark Office (Myriad), the Federal Circuit tackled the sensitive
7
issue of whether DNA molecules are patent-eligible subject matter.
The Federal Circuit reversed a controversial district court ruling that
had applied the “product of nature” exception to invalidate patent
claims covering isolated genes used in diagnostic tests for breast
8
cancer. The court concluded that these isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2
9
genes were not the same as those found in the body. This decision
preserved not just Myriad’s patent claims to the BRCA genes, but also
left intact hundreds of other patents directed to isolated, purified
10
DNA molecules. The biotech industry, which has invested billions
in developing diagnostic tests and therapies based on isolated DNA
11
discoveries, breathed a qualified sigh of relief. The sigh of relief,
however, may have only been temporary as the Supreme Court
12
recently vacated and remanded Myriad in light of Mayo Collaborative
13
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
The Supreme Court avoided a seismic shift in the litigation playing
14
field when, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, it reaffirmed the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard for declaring patents
15
invalid for obviousness.
The defendant argued that the lesser
“preponderance of the evidence” standard should apply when

4. See id. at 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (allowing an inference of intent
only when it is “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
evidence” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Brandon Baum et al., Patentees Rejoice—But Will Therasense Stand?,
BAUM LEGAL, http://www.baumlegal.com/blog (last visited Mar. 26, 2012)
(describing how the Therasense ruling has been hailed as “the end to the ‘absolute
plague’ of inequitable claims in patent cases”).
6. 653 F.3d 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
7. Id. at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
8. Id. at 1334, 1342, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401–02, 1408.
9. Id. at 1352, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
10. See id. at 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418 (noting that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has granted an estimated 2645 patents for “isolated DNA”
molecules and over 40,000 DNA-related patents).
11. This sigh of relief was qualified because Myriad’s claims directed to methods
of “analyzing” and “comparing” were held invalid as claiming only abstract mental
processes. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
12. No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
13. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (2012).
14. 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (2011).
15. Id. at 2242, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
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obviousness challenges are based on evidence that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) did not consider when granting the
16
patent. But because patents are presumed valid under the statute,
the Supreme Court held that the “clear and convincing” standard
applies regardless of the evidentiary basis for an obviousness
17
challenge.
As significant as these judicial decisions were, their impact was
18
upstaged by the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA), the first
major overhaul of the Patent Act in the twenty-first century. The AIA
revolutionizes patent law in several ways: it replaces the long-standing
“first to invent” standard for determining invention priority with the
19
“first to file” standard widely accepted by the rest of the world; it
relaxes the standard for invalidating a patent through inter partes
20
proceedings; it gives patent owners a path at the USPTO for curing
21
potential inequitable conduct before bringing suit; it curtails suits
22
for false marking; it expands the standard of “novelty” to prohibit
patents for inventions known and used by others anywhere in the
23
world, not just in the United States; and it eliminates the “best
mode” defense, while paradoxically maintaining the “best mode”
requirement as a condition of the quid pro quo for obtaining a

16. Id. at 2244, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861.
17. See id. at 2246, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (extrapolating from Congress’s
adoption of the common law’s presumption of patent validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 that
Congress likewise intended to apply a heightened standard of proof to an invalidity
defense).
18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
19. § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 285–86 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102); see § 3(p), 125 Stat. at
293 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 100 note) (discussing the harmonization of the U.S.
patent system with those of other countries).
20. See § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 305 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 319(A)) (replacing the
“substantial new question of patentability” threshold standard for inter partes review
with a standard requiring the petitioner to demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood that
the requestor would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
request”).
21. See § 12(a), 125 Stat. at 325 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 257) (allowing the
USPTO to conduct supplemental examinations to “consider, reconsider, or correct
information” relevant to the patent).
22. See § 16(b), 125 Stat. at 329 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292) (limiting false
marking suits under the statute to those brought by the United States, as private
parties may only sue for compensatory damages based on any “competitive injury”
suffered as a result of the false marking).
23. Compare § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)) (“[T]he
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use,
on sale, or otherwise available to the public . . . .”), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)
(“[T]he invention was known or used by others in this country . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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24

patent. These are just some of the important changes to the Patent
Act embodied in the AIA.
While Congress crafted the AIA with the intent of stimulating
innovation and economic growth, it left to the judiciary, and
ultimately the Federal Circuit, the critical task of interpreting and
clarifying several key provisions. For example, the court must decide
when an invention was “otherwise available to the public” and
25
therefore qualifies as prior art. And the AIA prohibits patenting
26
“human organism[s]” —a phrase the Federal Circuit will
undoubtedly be asked to interpret, raising thorny issues of science,
ethics, and public policy. There are also significant procedural
27
changes that will affect the Federal Circuit. Among these is a new
appellate role for the court; all appeals from the AIA’s new postgrant
28
review procedure will be decided by the Federal Circuit.
In short, 2011 will be remembered as a watershed year in the
annals of patent law, a year marked by seminal decisions by the
Federal Circuit, a year punctuated by the Supreme Court’s
affirmation of the bedrock “clear and convincing” standard of
proving obviousness, and a year capped by the landmark America
Invents Act.
I.

DISTRICT COURT PRACTICE
A. Transfer

When a different venue would be more convenient or efficient
than the one in which a patent action is filed, a defendant may move
to transfer the action to the more convenient venue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Section 1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
29
division where it might have been brought.” The Federal Circuit
24. Compare § 15(a), 125 Stat. at 328 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 282) (“[F]ailure to
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be
canceled . . . .”), with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification . . . shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
25. See § 3(b), 125 Stat. at 286 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1))(failing to
elaborate on “otherwise available to the public”); see also § 3(a), 125 Stat. at 285
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 100) (neglecting to define “otherwise available to the
public”).
26. § 33, 125 Stat. at 340 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101 note).
27. See, e.g., §§ 7, 9, 19, 125 Stat. at 313–16, 331–33 (amending 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 32,
35, 134, 145, 146, 293 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1454) (altering provisions regarding
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, venue, and jurisdiction).
28. § 7(c), 125 Stat. at 314 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 141(c)).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
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applies regional circuit law to determine the propriety of a transfer of
a patent infringement action under § 1404(a) because such a
30
determination is procedural in nature.
In 2011, the Federal Circuit addressed four petitions for writs of
31
mandamus to transfer cases, granting three requests for relief. In
32
the first case, In re Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit granted
Microsoft’s petition, directing transfer of the case to the Western
33
Allvoice Developments U.S., LLC, a
District of Washington.
company primarily located in the United Kingdom, sued Microsoft
34
Corporation in the Eastern District of Texas. Although Allvoice had
an office in the Eastern District of Texas, it did not employ any
35
individuals in that office or anywhere else in the United States.
Allvoice’s website directed inquiries to its Texas office, which were
then answered from the United Kingdom, the location of Allvoice’s
36
operations. The office, established in anticipation of bringing suit
in the Eastern District of Texas, existed primarily to give Allvoice an
37
anchor for maintaining venue in that district. Microsoft therefore
moved to transfer the case to the Western District of Washington,
home to its corporate headquarters and “a substantial portion of its
38
employees and its operations.”
Significantly, all of Microsoft’s
witnesses and relevant documents relating to the sales, marketing,
development, product direction, and design of the products at issue
39
were located in Washington state.
The Federal Circuit, weighing the traditional factors of fairness and
convenience of the parties, found that Allvoice’s limited presence in
the forum did not overcome the substantial inconvenience to

30. See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1567, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d
823, 836, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (applying Fifth Circuit
law to a mandamus petition reviewing the denial of a motion to transfer under §
1404(a)).
31. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d
1311, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs.
Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Microsoft Corp.,
630 F.3d 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
32. 630 F.3d 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
33. Id. at 1362, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
34. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
35. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
36. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
37. See id. at 1364–65, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736 (rejecting Allvoice’s claim
that incorporating itself in Texas sixteen days prior to trial and storing documents
for litigation in its Texas office constituted a legitimate business purpose).
38. Id. at 1362–63, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734–35.
39. Id. at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
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Microsoft and the witnesses from both parties. All of Microsoft’s
material witnesses resided close to the Western District of
41
Washington.
Therefore, they would not be burdened with
42
considerable costs and expenses by testifying in that district. They
43
also would be subject to that district’s subpoena powers. And of the
fourteen witnesses Allvoice identified, only two resided in Texas,
44
neither of whom had knowledge of the patent or issues in the suit.
The court rejected Allvoice’s alleged “established presence” in the
Eastern District of Texas, concluding that “Allvoice’s argument . . .
rests on a fallacious assumption: that this court must honor
connections to a preferred forum made in anticipation of litigation
and for the likely purpose of making that forum appear
45
convenient.”
46
In the second case, In re Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., the
Federal Circuit again granted a petition for writ of mandamus,
overturning the Eastern District of Texas’s (Marshall Division) refusal
to transfer a patent infringement case to the Northern District of
47
Texas (Dallas Division) under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Red River Fiber
Optic Corporation sued several communications companies,
including Verizon Services Corp., AT&T Corp., and Qwest
Communications Corporation (collectively the “Petitioners”) for
patent infringement, even though none of the party witnesses resided
48
within one hundred miles of Marshall. A Magistrate Judge found
49
that Dallas would likely be the more convenient venue.
He
nevertheless held that “judicial economy favored maintaining this suit
in Marshall,” because, five years ago, the court had presided over a
50
suit involving the same patent.
The district court affirmed the
51
Magistrate Judge’s decision, agreeing with his reasoning.
The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the passage of time
had eroded any basis for keeping the case in Marshall and for
52
refusing transfer to a “far more convenient” forum.
Given the
passage of time since the previous suit, the Eastern District of Texas
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1363–65, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735–36.
Id. at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
Id. at 1363–64, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
Id. at 1364, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
635 F.3d 559, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 560–61, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id. at 561, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086–87.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
Id. at 562, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88.
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would have to relearn a considerable amount and would likely have
to familiarize itself with new materials that were not part of the
53
previous record. The court refused “[t]o interpret § 1404(a) to
hold that any prior suit involving the same patent can override a
compelling showing of transfer,” emphasizing that it would be
54
inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1404(a). Instead, it ruled
that “the Eastern District’s previous claim construction in a case that
settled more than five years before the filing of this lawsuit [was] too
55
tenuous a reason to support denial of transfer.”
56
In the third case, In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., the Federal
Circuit granted a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to
transfer the case from Delaware to the Northern District of
57
California.
Link_A_Media Devices (“LAMD”) was incorporated
under the laws of Delaware but maintained its principal place of
58
business in the Northern District of California.
Marvell was a
Bermuda-based holding company with a related entity headquartered
59
in the Northern District of California. The related entity employed
the inventors of the patents-in-suit and was presumed to house all of
60
Marvell’s documents relevant to this litigation.
After the district court denied its motion to transfer, LAMD
61
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. Applying
Third Circuit law, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did
62
not properly balance various private and public interest factors.
According to the court, “the district court’s fundamental error was
making Marvell’s choice of forum and the fact of LAMD’s
incorporation in Delaware effectively dispositive of the transfer
63
inquiry.” First, the Federal Circuit highlighted the district court’s
failure to consider two important private interest factors: “the
convenience of the witnesses and the location of the books and
64
records.” Although advances in technology may alter the weight of
53. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
54. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
55. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
56. 662 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 1222, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
58. See id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865–66 (“Nearly all of LAMD’s 130
employees work in its headquarters in the Northern District of California, and none
work in Delaware.”).
59. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
60. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865–66.
61. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
62. Id. at 1222–23, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (citing Jumara v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995)).
63. Id. at 1223, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
64. Id. at 1224, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
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these factors, the court explained that “it is improper to ignore them
65
entirely.” Second, the Federal Circuit determined that the district
court misapplied the public interest factors when it concluded that
they did not favor either forum, and noted that “[t]he defendant’s
state of incorporation . . . should not be dispositive of the public
66
interest analysis.”
Finally, the court rejected the argument that
transfer was properly denied because the District of Delaware was
67
“highly experienced in patent infringement litigation.” The court
reasoned that the Northern District of California could adjudicate
68
such cases because the federal patent laws are uniform nationwide.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit granted LAMD’s writ of mandamus,
ordering the district court to transfer the case to the Northern
69
District of California.
70
In contrast, in Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the Federal
Circuit, again applying Third Circuit law, affirmed the district court’s
denial of Rambus’ motion to transfer the case from Delaware to the
Northern District of California, noting that all relevant factors either
71
favored denying the transfer motion or were neutral.
B. Jurisdiction and Standing
1.

Jurisdiction and standing in declaratory judgment actions
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, in all cases of actual
controversy where there is federal jurisdiction, district courts may
preside over actions for the declaration of rights and other legal
72
interests between parties. In 2011, the Federal Circuit considered
several cases that touched on jurisdictional and standing questions in
declaratory judgment actions.
73
In ABB Inc. v. Cooper Industries, LLC, the Federal Circuit held that
whether a district court has federal question jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action depends on the “character of the
74
threatened action, and not of the defense.” Cooper Industries, LLC
65. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
66. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
67. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
68. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
69. Id. at 1225, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
70. 645 F.3d 1311, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
71. Id. at 1331–32, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2006).
73. 635 F.3d 1345, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
74. Id. at 1349, 1351–52, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888, 1890 (quoting Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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owns patents covering electrical equipment containing dielectric
75
Cooper sued ABB Inc. for infringement based on ABB’s
fluid.
76
BIOTEMP dielectric fluid.
The parties settled the lawsuit and
entered into a nonexclusive licensing agreement that expressly
77
prohibited ABB from permitting any third party to make BIOTEMP.
ABB nonetheless outsourced the manufacture of BIOTEMP to Dow
Chemicals and agreed “to indemnify Dow against claims of
78
infringement by Cooper.” Cooper wrote to ABB and Dow, stating
that any outsourcing of the manufacture of BIOTEMP would
79
materially breach the licensing agreement. Cooper also vowed to
80
“vigorously defend its [patent] rights.”
Based on this communication, ABB sued for a declaratory
81
judgment of noninfringement. Cooper, in turn, moved to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the suit did not raise a
82
federal question. The district court granted the motion, holding
that ABB’s complaint was governed by state law because it depended
83
exclusively on interpreting the licensing agreement.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held there was sufficient
controversy surrounding infringement to support declaratory
84
judgment jurisdiction. The court explained that “a specific threat of
infringement litigation . . . is not required to establish jurisdiction,”
and that Cooper’s warning letters to ABB and Dow reflected an
85
immediate controversy as to infringement. The court also noted
that ABB “had an interest in determining whether it would [be
liable] for induced infringement,” and whether it would be required
86
to indemnify Dow.
Regarding Cooper’s argument that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction because “ABB raise[d] only a state law defense to the
infringement claim,” the court held that federal question jurisdiction
is determined by the character of the threatened action, not the
87
character of the defense. The court noted that “[t]he general rule
75. Id. at 1346, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
76. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
77. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
78. Id. at 1347, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
79. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
80. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
82. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
83. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
84. Id. at 1348, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
85. Id. at 1348–49, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887–88.
86. Id. at 1349, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
87. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
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. . . is that declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists where the
defendant’s coercive action arises under federal law,” and that there
was “no reason to depart from that general principle where the
88
defense is non-federal in nature.” The court accordingly held that
because Cooper’s action for infringement would arise under federal
law, the district court had federal question jurisdiction over ABB’s
declaratory action, even if ABB’s defense (that its actions were
authorized under the parties’ settlement agreement) arose under
89
state law.
The Federal Circuit thus reversed the district court’s
90
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
91
In Radio Systems Corp. v. Accession, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that, to establish specific personal jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action against a patentee, “only enforcement or defense
efforts related to the patent rather than the patentee’s own
92
commercialization efforts are to be considered.”
Radio Systems
Corporation, a corporation that manufactured and sold pet-related
products, including a “patented electronic pet access door,” was
incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in
93
Tennessee.
Accession, Inc., a New Jersey corporation with its
principal place of business in New Jersey, owns U.S. Patent No.
7,207,141 (“the ’141 patent”), a patent “directed to a portable pet
94
access door . . . that can be inserted into sliding glass doors.”
The parties communicated regarding business opportunities, and
Accession demonstrated its pet access door to Radio Systems in
95
Tennessee, subject to a confidentiality agreement.
The parties,
96
Meanwhile,
however, never agreed to a licensing arrangement.
Radio Systems began efforts to patent and sell its own pet access
97
device.
Accession sent cease-and-desist letters to Radio Systems,
which in turn sued Accession in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee for declaratory judgment of
98
noninfringement and invalidity of Accession’s ’141 patent.
On
88. Id. at 1351, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1983)).
89. Id. at 1350, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888–89.
90. Id. at 1352, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
91. 638 F.3d 785, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1485 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 790, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (quoting Autogenomics, Inc. v.
Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1020, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1006, 1012 (Fed. Cir.
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 787, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
94. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
95. Id. at 787–88, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
96. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486–87.
97. Id. at 788, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
98. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
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Accession’s motion, the district court dismissed Radio Systems’
99
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the district
100
court did not have specific personal jurisdiction over Accession.
First, the court noted that Accession’s early communications with
Radio Systems were focused on marketing and commercialization
efforts, which are insufficient to establish specific personal
101
jurisdiction for a patent dispute.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that personal jurisdiction was not
established by the cease-and-desist letters from Accession to Radio
102
Systems.
Nor was jurisdiction established by Accession’s
communications with the examiner of Radio Systems’ patent at the
USPTO, alerting the examiner to the existence of Accession’s
103
patent.
The court explained that those USPTO contacts were
directed at Virginia (the site of the USPTO), not Tennessee, and
“enforcement activities taking place outside the forum state do not
104
give rise to personal jurisdiction in the forum.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that Accession had not consented
to personal jurisdiction by entering into the confidentiality
agreement with Radio Systems, even though Accession agreed to
personal jurisdiction in Tennessee for actions arising under or
105
relating to that agreement.
The court concluded that the
declaratory action did not arise under the agreement or relate to the
agreement because the agreement did not pertain to the ’141 patent
106
or Radio Systems’ potentially infringing pet access door.
107
In Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecommunications PLC, the Federal
Circuit noted that a supplier has standing to sue for declaratory
judgment when a patentee “accuses customers of direct infringement
based on the sale or use of a supplier’s equipment” if: (1) the
supplier must indemnify its customers from infringement liability; or
(2) the patentee and the supplier disagree as to “the supplier’s
liability for induced or contributory infringement based on the

99. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
100. Id. at 793, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
101. Id. at 790, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
102. Id. at 789, 791, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487, 1489 (citing Red Wing Shoe
Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360–61, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1192,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
103. Id. at 791–92, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
104. Id. at 792, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489–90.
105. Id. at 792–93, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
106. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
107. 639 F.3d 1368, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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108

alleged acts of direct infringement by its customers.” A showing of
109
economic injury alone, however, is not sufficient to confer standing.
Arris Group, Inc. sought declaratory judgment that it had not
infringed on four British Telecommunications (“BT”) patents
110
because they were invalid. The district court found that “there was
no Article III case or controversy” between Arris and BT and
111
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because
BT had only alleged infringement by Cable One, one of Arris’s
customers, the district court found that BT had only directed its
actions toward the customer rather than Arris, and, thus, there was
112
no “real and immediate injury for Article III jurisdiction.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that MedImmune,
113
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. broadened the Federal Circuit’s standard for
114
“Under the Court’s new standard,
seeking declaratory judgment.
an Article III case or controversy exists when ‘the facts alleged, under
all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests,’” such that the dispute
is “‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[ts] of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
115
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”
The court rejected Arris’s argument that it had standing because it
suffered economic injury, holding that economic injury alone was
insufficient to meet the “adverse legal interest” requirement of
116
MedImmune. Instead, the Federal Circuit explained that there may
be an implicit assertion of indirect infringement against a supplier
when a patentee accuses a customer of direct infringement by
making, using, or selling an allegedly infringing method or
117
performing an allegedly infringing method. The court found that
BT’s infringement accusations against Cable One carried the implied
assertion that Arris was committing contributory infringement, and
thus created an Article III case or controversy between Arris and BT,

108. Id. at 1375, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
109. Id. at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
110. Id. at 1371, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813.
111. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813–14.
112. Id. at 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
113. 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007).
114. Arris Grp., 639 F.3d at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–16 (citing
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126–27, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229).
115. Id. at 1373–74, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–16 (alteration in original)
(quoting MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229).
116. Id. at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
117. Id. at 1375–76, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
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whether or not Arris had agreed to indemnify Cable One.
119
In Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Laboratories, the court
concluded that, while competing patents can give rise to an
interference cause of action under 35 U.S.C. § 291, their mere
existence does not establish the actual controversy requirement to
120
confer jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.
Creative Compounds, LLC and Starmark Laboratories
independently patented similar formulations of creatine, an amino
121
acid derivative that is naturally present in muscle tissue. Creative’s
patent issued approximately one month after Starmark’s patent
122
After receiving a notice of allowance for the patent,
issued.
Starmark’s predecessor, SAN Corporation, mailed letters to
purchasers of dicreatine malate compounds to advise the industry
123
that its patent would soon issue.
Creative viewed SAN’s letters as
threatening and mailed its own letters to the industry regarding its
own soon-to-issue patent for dicreatine malate compounds, advising
that the SAN patent will not be enforceable because of Creative’s
124
prior inventions and work. Starmark was formed in October 2006,
and all rights, title, and interest in SAN’s patent were assigned to
125
In 2007, Creative sued Starmark, seeking declaratory
Starmark.
126
judgment that Starmark’s patent was invalid and not infringed.
Starmark subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all
127
counts, which the district court granted.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[s]ubject matter
jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions exists when ‘the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between the parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
128
declaratory judgment.’” Starmark argued that Creative could have
brought two causes of action: (1) an action alleging infringement; or

118. See id. at 1381, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
119. 651 F.3d 1303, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1445, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18984 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 2011).
120. Id. at 1316–17, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
121. Id. at 1306–07, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
122. Id. at 1307, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
123. Id. at 1308, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
124. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
125. Id. at 1307, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171–72.
126. Id. at 1308, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
127. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
128. Id. at 1316, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)).
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The court,
(2) an action under § 291 alleging an interference.
130
however, disagreed.
First, the court found that Creative never accused Starmark of
131
infringement.
Because Creative sent letters to SAN’s customers
before Starmark existed, Starmark had, at most, an economic interest
in clarifying its customers’ rights under Creative’s patents that cannot
132
form the basis of an “actual controversy.” Second, Starmark did not
133
assert that the claims of the competing patents in fact interfered.
Thus, without an allegation of an interference in fact, the district
134
court lacked a jurisdictional predicate to a § 291 action.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s
135
determination of jurisdiction.
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
136
Trademark Office (Myriad), the plaintiffs, consisting of an assortment
of medical organizations, researchers, genetic counselors, and
patients (collectively the “Association”), brought a declaratory
judgment action under 35 U.S.C. § 101 against Myriad Genetics, Inc.
challenging the patentability of certain composition and method
137
claims in seven different patents directed to human genetics.
Myriad moved to dismiss, alleging that the Association lacked
138
standing.
The district court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs
139
had satisfied the “all the circumstances” test for Article III standing.
The parties moved for summary judgment on the merits of the § 101
140
challenge.
The district court found that each of the challenged
claims was drawn to “non-patentable subject matter,” and Myriad
141
appealed.
In addressing whether the Association had standing, the Federal
Circuit held that one plaintiff, researcher Dr. Ostrer, had standing
142
based on two findings.
First, Ostrer alleged an injury traceable to
Myriad, which stemmed from Myriad’s demand for royalties at the
129. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
130. Id. at 1316–17, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178–79.
131. Id. at 1316, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
132. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178–79.
133. Id. at 1317, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
134. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
135. Id. at 1317–18, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
136. 653 F.3d 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
137. Id. at 1333, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401–02.
138. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
139. Id. at 1341, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
140. Id. at 1342, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
141. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
142. Id. at 1344–45, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409–11.
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same time Myriad was suing other similarly situated parties for patent
143
Second, Ostrer “alleged a controversy of sufficient
infringement.
reality and immediacy;” he had the intention and resources to
undertake breast cancer diagnostic testing (that Myriad claimed
required a license under its patents) if the patents were found
144
invalid. Myriad argued that its demand for licensing from Ostrer in
1998 was too far in the past to provide a controversy of sufficient
reality and immediacy, but the Federal Circuit concluded that “the
relevant circumstances . . . ha[d] not changed despite the passage of
145
time.”
Having found one plaintiff with standing, the court could
then address the merits of the appeal, specifically, the validity of the
146
claims under § 101.
147
In Powertech Technology Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s dismissal of Powertech Technology Inc.’s
(“PTI”) declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that an Article III controversy did in fact exist
148
between the parties.
Tessera, Inc. and PTI entered into a license
agreement where PTI agreed to pay running royalties for a license
under the asserted patent (and other patents) to assemble, use, or
149
sell certain products. While parallel litigation in the International
Trade Commission (ITC) and the Eastern District of Texas was
underway between Tessera and several PTI customers, PTI made
royalty payments to Tessera for some of its products “under
150
protest.”
PTI believed that the products did not infringe the
asserted patent, the patent was invalid, and royalties were therefore
151
Soon after, PTI filed a declaratory judgment action
not owed.
152
claiming noninfringement and invalidity. Tessera filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the district court
153
granted.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s
154
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
PTI
alleged that two controversies existed in creating declaratory

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1345, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410–11.
Id. at 1345–46, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id. at 1346, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id. at 1348, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
660 F.3d 1301, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1302, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
Id. at 1303, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id. at 1305, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
Id. at 1306, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
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155

First, PTI alleged that Tessera’s allegations
judgment jurisdiction.
against its customers in the ITC and Texas actions created a
controversy as to whether its chips infringed Tessera’s patent, either
because the chips were not within the scope of the claims or because
156
the patent was invalid. PTI further argued that “Tessera’s pending
claims of infringement in the [copending] ITC and Texas
proceedings create[d] a sufficient controversy because they directly
157
implicate[d] PTI’s products and customers.”
Tessera, however,
maintained that there was no controversy because all of PTI’s
products were “‘properly licensed’ and categorically excluded from
158
the enforcement of the . . . patent in the ITC and Texas actions.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that Tessera’s position in the
declaratory judgment action was “inconsistent with its arguments in
159
the ITC action.” In the ITC case, Tessera maintained that products
160
were only licensed if royalty payments were current.
Because PTI
allegedly underpaid their royalties or paid them late, Tessera asserted
that those sales were “unlicensed” and did not trigger exhaustion of
161
its patent rights. According to the court, those allegations “created
a controversy as to whether certain sales of PTI’s products were
unlicensed and infringing,” and thus created declaratory judgment
162
jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit held that resolution of that controversy in the
declaratory judgment case was governed by its decision in the
163
previous ITC case.
There, the court “ruled that ‘Tessera’s patent
rights [were] exhausted as to all products accused of infringing the . .
164
Relying on the
. patent purchased from Tessera’s licensees.’”
Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
165
Inc., the Federal Circuit held that patent exhaustion was, in fact,
166
triggered “by an [initial] sale authorized by the patent holder.”
Because each of Tessera’s license agreements contained an
155. Id. at 1306–07, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
156. Id. at 1307, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
157. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
158. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
159. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
160. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
161. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
162. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
163. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370–01.
164. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (quoting Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370–71, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868, 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2011) (No. 11-903)).
165. 553 U.S. 617, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008).
166. Powertech, 660 F.3d at 1307, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (alteration in
original) (quoting Tessera, 646 F.3d at 1369, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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unconditional grant of a license “to sell . . . and/or offer for sale” the
accused products, the court held that Tessera’s licensees were
authorized to sell the accused products when the licenses were first
167
The court therefore “rejected Tessera’s theory that
granted.
previously-licensed products would become unlicensed when a
168
licensee’s royalty payments lapsed.” Neither party disputed that the
169
accused PTI products were covered by a license agreement.
Therefore, to the extent Tessera’s claims against PTI’s customers
arose from the same set of facts addressed in the previous decision,
the Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds
and remanded with instructions to apply the court’s earlier
170
decision.
PTI also contended that a controversy existed as to PTI’s obligation
“to pay royalties for the sales of its . . . chips under the license
171
agreement with Tessera.” In particular, PTI argued that the terms
of the license agreement did not require it to pay royalties for the
172
chips if those chips did not infringe or if the patent was invalid. In
response, Tessera argued that royalty payments were due regardless
of the patent’s validity and even if the products did not infringe the
173
patent.
Tessera maintained that there could not be Article III
controversy if PTI complied with the license agreement, including
174
the payment of royalties.
The court held that it did not need to decide whether PTI or
Tessera was correct because “the issue of contract interpretation is a
merits issue, not appropriate to decision on a motion to dismiss
175
under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1).” The Federal
Circuit simply held that “the dispute . . . as to whether the license
agreement requires royalty payments to be tied to valid patent
coverage . . . is sufficient to support declaratory jurisdiction,” leaving
the merits-based arguments for the lower court to consider on
176
remand.
167. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
168. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370–71.
169. Id. at 1308, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
170. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
171. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
172. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
173. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
174. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
175. Id. at 1309–10, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
176. Id. at 1310, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. The Federal Circuit also
addressed “the propriety of the district court’s alternative ground for dismissal.” Id.,
100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. The district court had held that, regardless of
whether PTI established that there was an actual controversy, it would dismiss the
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Other jurisdiction and standing issues in patent infringement suits
In 2011, the Federal Circuit addressed federal jurisdiction over
177
standing to sue under
state law legal malpractice actions,
178
California’s unfair competition laws, standing based on carve-out
179
and jurisdiction
provisions in certain assignment agreements,
180
under 35 U.S.C. § 291, which provides that the owner of an
181
interfering patent may obtain relief in federal court.
The Federal
Circuit also addressed jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 146, which
provides that “[a]ny party to an interference [who is] dissatisfied with
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences on the
182
interference, may have remedy by civil action.”
183
In Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., the Federal
Circuit noted that “federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
state-law legal malpractice actions when the adjudication of the
malpractice claim requires the court to address the merits of the
184
plaintiff’s underlying patent infringement lawsuit.”
In a previous
patent infringement suit, now settled, STX, L.L.C. had argued that
Warrior Sports, Inc.’s patent was unenforceable due to conduct by
two attorneys (who later joined Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C.) during
185
reissue proceedings at the USPTO.
Following the settlement,
Warrior sued Dickinson for legal malpractice, citing a number of
alleged errors in Dickinson’s handling of Warrior’s patent, including
the conduct that led to the allegation of inequitable conduct by
case because judicial efficiency supported resolving PTI’s declaratory judgment
claims as part of the pending Texas action. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. On
appeal, PTI argued that “the district court abused its discretion by ignoring the
forum selection clause in the license agreement.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
The Federal Circuit held that, since the forum selection clause in PTI’s license
agreement employed language to mandate jurisdiction in California, the district
court clearly erred in refusing to enforce the forum selection clause. Id., 100
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373. According to the court, “[n]othing suggest[ed] that a
Texas court would confer any additional conveniences with respect to the availability
of evidence or potential witnesses, nor ha[d] Tessera provided adequate cause to
override PTI’s choice of forum.” Id. at 1311, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373. The
Federal Circuit therefore held that “it was an abuse of discretion for the district court
to refuse jurisdiction over [the] action.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
177. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1367, 1368, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
178. Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., 640 F.3d 1377, 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2012, 2012–13 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
179. MHL Tek, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., 655 F.3d 1266, 1268, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1681, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
180. Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291,
1293, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2006).
182. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006).
183. 631 F.3d 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
184. Id. at 1371, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
185. Id. at 1369, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
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186

STX. Both Warrior and Dickinson requested that the district court
187
The district
hear the malpractice case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
court, however, dismissed Warrior’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, noting that the alleged acts of malpractice could be
188
analyzed under state law without reference to patent law.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether
189
patent law was a “necessary element” of Warrior’s right to relief.
The court concluded that, to prove the proximate cause and injury
elements of its malpractice claim, “Michigan law requires Warrior to
show that it would have prevailed on its infringement claim against
STX and would have been entitled to an award of damages as a
190
result.”
Thus, because patent infringement was found to be a
“necessary element” of Warrior’s malpractice claim, the Federal
Circuit concluded that Warrior’s claim presented a substantial
question of patent law conferring § 1338 jurisdiction upon the
191
federal district court.
192
In Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., the court clarified that
193
standing under California’s unfair competition laws requires only
an allegation of “an injury in fact that [is] caused by [the]
194
defendant’s unfair competition.”
Allergan, Inc. sued Athena Cosmetics, Inc. as well as several other
parties (collectively the “Defendants”) under 35 U.S.C. § 271 for
infringing or inducing infringement of three of its patents and also
alleged that Defendants violated sections 17200–10 of the California
Business and Professions Code (“UCL”) by “unlawfully marketing,
selling, and distributing hair and/or eyelash growth products without
a prescription, without an approved new drug application [from] the
FDA or the California Department of Health Services, and in
195
violation of state and federal misbranding laws.”
Allergan alleged
that Defendants’ unfair competition “has resulted in and continues
to result in serious and irreparable injury to Allergan, including but
196
not limited to lost sales, revenue, market share, and asset value.”
186. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
187. Id. at 1370, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
188. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658–59.
189. Id. at 1371, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
190. Id. at 1372, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
191. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
192. 640 F.3d 1377, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
193. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–10 (West 2011).
194. Allergan, 640 F.3d at 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
195. Id. at 1379, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
196. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), claiming that Allergan lacked standing
to assert a violation of UCL sections 17200–10 because “Allergan did
197
The
not allege an injury that was compensable by restitution.”
district court agreed, based on California law existing at the time, and
198
dismissed Allergan’s claim for relief under the UCL with prejudice.
The district court stayed Allergan’s patent claims until the outcome
199
of its UCL appeal.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the history of UCL section 17204 and
concluded that California courts initially interpreted a recent
amendment to the statute as limiting claims to individuals who were
eligible for restitution, as opposed to those requesting injunctive
200
relief.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that recent California
201
Supreme Court decisions in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court and
202
Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.
rejected that reasoning, stating that
“‘nothing in the text or history of Proposition 64 suggests’ that the
drafters intended ‘to make standing under section 17204 expressly
203
dependent on [the] eligibility for restitution under section 17203.’”
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Allergan plainly alleged an
economic injury that was the result of an unfair business practice and
204
thus, under Kwikset, satisfied the requirements of section 17204.
The court also rejected the Defendants’ argument that California
Proposition 64 added a “business dealings requirement” to standing
under section 17204, holding that the only amendment made by
Proposition 64 was to require that a private person “suffered injury in
fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of such unfair
205
competition.”
The court agreed that, while a direct business
dealing is one way in which a plaintiff could be harmed, California
courts have also recognized claims under the UCL absent direct
206
business dealings.
207
In MHL Tek, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision that MHL Tek, LLC lacked standing to
197. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
198. Id. at 1380, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
199. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
200. Id. at 1380–81, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
201. 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011).
202. 233 P.3d 1066 (Cal. 2010).
203. Allergan, 640 F.3d at 1382, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015 (quoting Kwikset, 246
P.3d at 894–95).
204. Id. at 1383, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
205. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016 (quoting CAL. PROP. 64 § 3 (2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
207. 655 F.3d 1266, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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assert two patents-in-suit and reversed the district court’s decision
208
MHL sued
that MHL had standing to assert a third patent-in-suit.
several automobile manufacturers, alleging infringement of U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,663,496 (“the ’496 patent”); 5,741,966 (“the ’966
patent”); and 5,731,516 (“the ’516 patent”), which relate to tire
209
pressure monitoring systems.
Both the ’496 and ’966 patents are
divisional applications of U.S. Patent Application No. 08/101,379
210
The later-filed ’516 patent is not
(“the Parent Application”).
related to either of the other patents-in-suit or the Parent
211
Application.
Shortly after the Parent Application was filed, the inventors
executed an assignment to Animatronics, Inc., assigning “the entire
right, title and interest, domestic and foreign, in and to the inventions
212
and discoveries in [the Parent Application]” to Animatronics.
Animatronics subsequently assigned “the entire right, title and
interest, domestic and foreign, in and to the inventions and
discoveries set forth in the [Parent] Application” to McLaughlin
213
Electronics (“ME”).
The assignment from Animatronics to ME
contained a “carve out” provision that the assignment “shall not cover
any rights to the [Parent] Application that concern the Animatronics
214
Proprietary Inventions.”
Instead, pursuant to a development
agreement between ME and Animatronics, Animatronics had an
“exclusive, irrevocable, royalty free license” to use certain identified
215
“Animatronics Proprietary Inventions.”
Animatronics subsequently purported to assign the patents-in-suit
216
to MHL. The district court dismissed MHL’s claims relating to the
’496 and ’966 patents for lack of standing, holding that the ’496 and
’966 patents were not subject to the carve-out provision of the license
217
and therefore were assigned from Animatronics to ME. The district

208. Id. at 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
209. Id. at 1268, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
210. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
211. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
212. Id. at 1275, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. at 1271–72, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Id. at 1272, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
216. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
217. Id. at 1272–73, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
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court then determined that the Defendants did not infringe the
218
asserted claims of the ’516 patent.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first reviewed the scope of the
assignment from Animatronics to ME and rejected MHL’s argument
that the ’496 and ’966 patents were subject to the carve-out provision,
219
which concerned the Animatronics Proprietary Inventions.
The
court held that MHL had not met its burden of showing that the
claims of the ’496 patent covered the Animatronics Proprietary
Invention at issue and, therefore, MHL lacked standing to assert the
220
’496 patent.
The Federal Circuit also rejected MHL’s arguments
that the claims of the ’966 patent were subject to the carve-out
221
provision.
The court therefore held that MHL lacked standing to
222
assert the ’496 and ’966 patents.
In addressing MHL’s standing to sue under the ’516 patent, the
Federal Circuit noted that the inventors assigned the entire right,
title, and interest “in and to the inventions and discoveries” in the
Parent Application, and that similar language was used in assignment
223
from Animatronics to ME.
The court rejected MHL’s argument
that the ’516 patent was not subject to the assignment because it was
224
The court determined that
not related to the Parent Application.
the language of the assignment was not so narrow because it assigned
“inventions and discoveries” disclosed in the Parent Application
without requiring them to be in patents or applications related to the
225
Parent Application. The court further noted that the file history of
a divisional application related to the ’516 patent stated that the
inventors had assigned the application to Animatronics, reflecting
that the assignment covered more than just the applications related
226
to the Parent Application. The court then compared the claims of
the ’516 patent to the specification of the Parent Application and
stated that, if the Parent Application reasonably conveyed to those
skilled in the art of the invention of the ’516 patent, then the ’516
227
patent had been assigned to Animatronics and then to ME.
Noting that all of the elements of the claims of the ’516 patent
were disclosed in the Parent Application, the court determined that
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 1268, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
Id. at 1274–75, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687–88.
Id. at 1275, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id. at 1275–76, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id. at 1276, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
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the ’516 patent had been assigned to Animatronics and was not
228
subject to the carve-out provision. The court held that because the
’516 patent was assigned from the inventors to Animatronics and
229
then to ME, MHL lacked standing to assert the ’516 patent as well.
230
In Genetics Institute, LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., the
Federal Circuit disagreed with Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc.’s
jurisdictional arguments and held that the district court did not err
in dismissing Genetics Institute, LLC’s 35 U.S.C. § 291 action for lack
231
of an interference in fact.
Genetics sued Novartis to determine priority of invention under §
291, alleging that an interference in fact existed between certain
232
claims of Genetics’s patent and Novartis’s patents. Novartis moved
to dismiss, arguing in part that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because a 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension of
233
Genetics’ patent did not apply to all of its claims. The district court
granted Novartis’s motion, holding that, while the patent term
extension under § 156 applied to all of the patent claims, “there was
234
no interference in fact as to any of the allegedly interfering claims.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Novartis’s argument, initially raised in
a motion to dismiss Genetics’s appeal, that expiration of the patent
235
divested the court of jurisdiction over the appeal. In so doing, the
236
court declined to extend its holding in Albert v. Kevex Corp. to
237
In Kevex, the court held
circumstances involving expired patents.
only that a patent disclaimer directed to the patent claims addressed
in a § 291 action mooted the action and required dismissal for lack of
238
jurisdiction.
The Genetics Institute court explained that disclaiming
claims under 19 U.S.C. § 253 “effectively eliminate[s] those claims
from the original patent,” and the patent is treated “as though the
239
disclaimed claim(s) had ‘never existed.’”
“Unlike a disclaimed
claim, however, an expired patent is not viewed as having ‘never
240
existed’ . . . [and] ‘does have value beyond its expiration date.’”
228. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
229. Id. at 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
230. 655 F.3d 1291, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
231. Id. at 1293–94, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
232. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
233. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
234. Id. at 1297, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
235. Id. at 1297–98, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
236. 729 F.2d 757, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
237. Genetics Inst., 655 F.3d at 1298–99, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
238. Kevex, 729 F.2d at 758, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 202.
239. Genetics Inst., 655 F.3d at 1299, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (citation omitted).
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Additionally, the Federal Circuit explained that the expiration of
Genetics’s U.S. Patent No. 4,868,112 did not deprive the appealed §
291 action of meaning because the outcome directly impacted a
241
Finally, the court noted
pending district court infringement suit.
that, unlike 35 U.S.C. § 135, which requires one pending application
242
and “any pending application, or . . . any unexpired patent,” § 291
simply requires two “interfering patents,” indicating “one essential
243
Accordingly, the Federal
difference between these two statutes.”
244
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Novartis’s assertion that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the interference proceeding
because a § 156 patent term extension applies on a claim-by-claim
basis, and thus did not apply to the patent claims asserted in the
245
Relying on the plain language of § 156 and its
interference.
legislative history, the court held that “[a] patent as a whole is
extended even though its effect may be limited to certain of its
246
claims.”
The court additionally rejected Novartis’s related
argument that patents extended under § 156 cannot form the basis of
a § 291 interference action, reasoning that neither the statutory text
247
nor the legislative history of § 156 supported such a conclusion.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit declined to adopt Novartis’s
argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
248
proceeding.
The Federal Circuit has also addressed jurisdiction under § 146 of
the Patent Act, which provides that any party to an interference who
is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and
249
Interferences (“Board”) may have remedy by civil action. In Streck,
250
Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reiterated that § 146 establishes de novo review, and commented that
“[t]he purpose of § 146 is to bring to bear, upon the contested issues
of priority of invention, the procedures and rules of federal
251
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award
litigation.”

241. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
242. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id. at 1300, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
244. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
245. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
246. Id. at 1301, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
247. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
248. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
249. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006).
250. 659 F.3d 1186, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1613 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
251. Id. at 1196, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
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of priority of invention to the senior party, Streck, Inc., in an action
brought under 35 U.S.C. § 146 because the district court “correctly
252
applied the relevant procedural and substantive law.”
Streck filed suit against Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc.
(“R&D”), alleging infringement of three patents directed at
hematology control compositions used to check the accuracy of
253
hematology instruments.
At trial, the jury determined that R&D
failed to prove priority of invention by clear and convincing
254
evidence.
Concurrently with the district court litigation, the
USPTO awarded priority to the junior party, an R&D employee, in an
255
interference proceeding. Streck filed a § 146 action in the district
court, which awarded priority in favor of the Streck inventors, and
256
R&D appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected R&D’s argument that the
district court in a § 146 proceeding “must accept the findings of the
Board if those findings were supported by substantial evidence in the
[USPTO] record” and not make de novo findings on those same
257
issues. The court noted that while § 146 provides that the USPTO
258
record “shall be admitted on motion of either party,” § 146 provides
that the civil action is “without prejudice to the right of the parties to
259
take further testimony.”
Accordingly, prior Federal Circuit
precedent held that § 146 “affords a litigant the option of shoring up
260
evidentiary gaps.”
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with R&D’s argument that the
district court may make de novo factual findings only when the
evidence adduced in the district court conflicts with the evidence
261
before the Board. The court reasoned that neither the statute nor
precedent supports such a distinction, and noted that “[t]he standard
for trial and decision of a § 146 action in the district court is not the
same as the standard for review by the Federal Circuit in a § 141
262
direct appeal from the [USPTO] on the Board record.” The court
252. Id. at 1187, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
253. Id. at 1187–88, 1192, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614–15, 1618.
254. Id. at 1188, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
255. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
256. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
257. Id. at 1189, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
258. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
259. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615–16 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
260. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
261. Id. at 1190–91, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616–17.
262. Id. at 1190, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
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further noted that “[s]ection 146 recognizes that, while the Board is
fully capable of assessing all matters presented to it, there are
inherent limits to its fact finding function that arise from the sterile
nature of a proceeding that is limited to documentary and
263
Thus, the district court
declaration or deposition evidence.”
“appropriately considered additional evidence and conducted a de
264
novo determination of the issue of priority under § 146.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected R&D’s arguments that Streck
should have had the burden of proof in the § 146 action because
Streck lost before the USPTO and the appellant routinely bears the
265
burden of proof on appeal. The court reasoned that the burden of
persuasion was properly placed on R&D because “a § 146 action is a
266
new civil proceeding subject to de novo determination.”
The
Federal Circuit also concluded that the lesser preponderance of the
evidence standard applied by the district court was correct because
the interfering patent applications were initially copending in the
267
USPTO.
Regarding priority of invention, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court correctly determined that R&D employees’ experiments
did not constitute an actual reduction to practice because they did
not demonstrate that the invention worked for its intended
268
purpose—determining the accuracy of the hematology instrument.
Rather, the court concluded that the experiments were directed at
269
determining the stability of the composition over time.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the finding that R&D did
not establish an earlier reduction to practice and awarded priority to
270
Streck.
C. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Attorney fee sanctions may be awarded for litigation misconduct “if
both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the
271
litigation is objectively baseless.”
The Federal Circuit upheld
263. Id. at 1191, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
264. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
265. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
266. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
267. Id. at 1191–92, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617–18.
268. Id. at 1195, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620–21.
269. Id. at 1194, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
270. Id. at 1196, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
271. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381, 73
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Prof. Real Estate Investors,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641,
1646 (1993)).
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several awards of attorneys’ fees in 2011 in circumstances involving
litigation misconduct or willfulness.
272
In iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that
an award of attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 was improper
273
where the proposed claim construction was not objectively baseless.
In so holding, the court reviewed the language of § 285 and its
proper interpretation in light of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
274
precedent.
In Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier
275
International, Inc., the Federal Circuit had previously held that,
absent misconduct during patent prosecution or litigation, sanctions
under § 285 may be imposed against a patent plaintiff only if both the
276
“subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless” prongs are met,
each of which must be established by clear and convincing
277
evidence.
In iLOR, the court also noted that the objectively baseless standard
of Brooks Furniture is identical to the objective recklessness standard
for awarding enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees for willful
278
279
infringement under In re Seagate Technology, LLC. The iLOR court
stated that under both Brooks Furniture and Seagate, objective
baselessness “does not depend on the plaintiff’s state of mind at the
time the action was commenced, but rather requires an objective
280
assessment of the merits.”
Applying this standard, the Federal Circuit held that Google, Inc.
had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that iLOR, LLC’s
suit was frivolous or that iLOR’s proposed claim construction was
281
objectively baseless.
The court noted that “[t]he question is
whether iLOR’s broader claim construction was so unreasonable that
282
no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed.”
The court
found support for iLOR’s proposed claim construction and
concluded that, since iLOR could reasonably argue its proposed
272. 631 F.3d 1372, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
273. Id. at 1374, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597.
274. Id. at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599–600.
275. 393 F.3d 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
276. Id. at 1381, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
277. iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1377, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600 (citing Wedgetail, Ltd.
v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1304, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1784
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
278. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600.
279. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
280. iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1377–78, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600 (quoting Brooks
Furniture, 393 F.2d at 1382, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870).
281. Id. at 1378, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601.
282. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2011 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

815

claim construction, it could thus reasonably argue that Google
283
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district
infringed.
court committed clear error in finding the case exceptional under §
284
285, and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees.
The Federal Circuit also set aside the district court’s award of
285
expert fees. While the district court could award such fees under §
285 in exceptional cases based upon a finding of bad faith, there was
286
The court noted,
no basis for a finding of bad faith in this case.
287
though, that other costs and expenses may be allowed on remand.
288
In Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., the Federal Circuit
held that the USPTO’s confirmation of validity in a related
reexamination proceeding, even if later revoked, can provide
evidence of a reasonable basis for a patentee’s validity arguments in
289
the context of a motion for attorneys’ fees.
Although the Federal
Circuit is not bound by the USPTO’s actions and must make its own
determination of invalidity, the court acknowledged that it was
equally true that the USPTO has “expertise in evaluating prior art
290
and assessing patent validity.” That the USPTO initially concluded
the patent claims were valid after assessing the relevant prior art
undercut Cornell Corporation’s contention that Old Reliable
Wholesale, Inc. had no basis for contending that its claims were valid
291
and not anticipated.
Indeed, the USPTO’s initial conclusion of
validity, even if later revoked, provided probative evidence on the
issue of whether Old Reliable had a reasonable basis for arguing that
292
the patent claims were valid and not anticipated.
293
In Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the Federal Circuit
considered whether the use of the crime-fraud exception to pierce
attorney-client privilege was proper in the context of spoliation of
294
evidence.
The Federal Circuit noted that a district court’s rulings
relating to spoliation depended in part on evidence from
communications between Rambus Inc. and its attorneys that was in

283. Id. at 1379, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
284. Id. at 1380, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
285. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
286. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
287. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (enumerating specific fees that could be
allowed on remand).
288. 635 F.3d 539, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1993 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
289. Id. at 549, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001.
290. Id. at 548, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
291. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
292. Id. at 549, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001.
293. 645 F.3d 1311, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
294. Id. at 1315, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
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the record because the district court pierced the privilege. Rambus
argued that Micron Technology, Inc. had not made the required
prima facie showing that: (1)“Rambus had committed or intended to
commit a fraud or crime;” and (2) “the attorney-client
communications in question were in furtherance of that crime or
296
fraud.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Micron had
made the requisite showing and that there was sufficient evidence to
find a violation of section 135 of the California Penal Code, which
provides that each person who knowingly destroys a document that is
about to be produced in evidence—with the intent to prevent it from
297
being produced—is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court concluded
that “Micron made a prima facie showing that (1) Rambus willfully
destroyed documents it knew would have to be produced in the
litigation it intended to initiate” against another party, “(2) Rambus
destroyed those documents in order to keep them from being
produced, and (3) Rambus began destroying those documents based
on communications from its litigation counsel advising it to begin
298
destroying discoverable information.”
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s use of the crime-fraud exception
299
to pierce the attorney-client privilege.
300
In a companion case, Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the
Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision to pierce
Rambus’s attorney-client privilege on grounds of the crime-fraud
exception and California Penal Code section 135, because Rambus
controlled the timing of both its document destruction and the
301
commencement of litigation.
D. Discovery Practices and Sanctions
302

In Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that a party has a duty to preserve documents if litigation is pending
303
or reasonably foreseeable.
The Federal Circuit held that the
standard for spoliation does not require that litigation be “imminent,
304
or probable without significant contingencies.”
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 1329, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706–07.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
Id. at 1330, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
Id. at 1331, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
Id. at 1332, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708–09.
645 F.3d 1336, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720–21.
645 F.3d 1311, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1326, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
Id. at 1320, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699 (citation omitted) (internal
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The district court concluded that the asserted patents were
“unenforceable against Micron because Rambus had engaged in
spoliation by intentionally destroying relevant, discoverable
305
documents in derogation of a duty to preserve them.” The district
court entered judgment in Micron’s favor as a spoliation sanction,
concluding that “the only reasonable sanction for the intentional
destruction of documents was to hold Rambus’s patents-in-suit
306
unenforceable against Micron.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that Rambus destroyed documents “in contravention
307
of a duty to preserve them and, thus, engaged in spoliation.” The
court made clear that the standard for spoliation is an objective one,
asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, but
“whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would
308
have reasonably foreseen litigation.” The Federal Circuit explained
that the “reasonably foreseeable” standard is flexible and fact-specific,
allowing a district court to exercise the discretion needed to confront
309
various factual situations inherent in a spoliation inquiry.
The
court also explained that “[t]his standard does not trigger the duty to
preserve documents from the mere existence of a potential claim or
310
the distant possibility of litigation.” However, “it is not so inflexible
as to require that litigation be ‘imminent, or probable without
311
Thus, the court held that the proper
significant contingencies.’”
standard for determining when a duty to preserve documents
312
attaches is the flexible one of reasonably foreseeable litigation.
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the district court’s dismissal
313
sanction for an abuse of discretion.
The court explained that
dismissal is a “harsh sanction,” and such sanctions should not be
imposed unless there is clear and convincing evidence of both bad314
faith spoliation and prejudice to the opposing party. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit remanded for the district court to consider the
questions of bad faith and prejudice, reminding the district court that
quotation marks omitted).
305. Id. at 1316, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
306. Id. at 1319, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
307. Id. at 1325–26, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
308. Id. at 1320, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
309. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
310. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
311. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
312. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
313. Id. at 1331, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
314. Id. at 1328, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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prejudice to the opposing party requires a showing that the spoliation
“materially affect[s] the substantial rights of the adverse party and is
315
prejudicial to the presentation of his case.”
Judge Gajarsa dissented in part, noting that a patent is a privilege
designed to promote the “Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and is
an exception to the rule against monopolies and to the right to a free
316
and open market. According to Judge Gajarsa, Rambus abused its
privilege when it intentionally destroyed evidence “in bad faith to
protect its exclusive monopoly,” and “the majority fail[ed] to
consider the ‘high hurdle’ that Rambus must overcome in showing
317
that the district court abused its discretion.”
318
In the companion case, Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc.,
Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. and Rambus agreed that whether a party
spoliated evidence depended on whether the evidence was destroyed
319
in “pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”
Rambus,
however, argued that litigation must be “imminent” in order to be
reasonably foreseeable, while Hynix argued there was no such
320
imminence requirement.
The Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly added a
“gloss” to the reasonably foreseeable test that would require litigation
321
to be “imminent, or probable without significant contingencies.”
The district court erred because it did not consider the likelihood
that the “contingencies” Rambus had to resolve before litigation
322
would actually be resolved. In fact, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court “implicitly recognized that the resolution of each
323
Moreover, according to
contingency was reasonably foreseeable.”
the court, “[i]t would be inequitable to allow a party to destroy
documents it expects will be relevant in an expected future litigation,
solely because contingencies exist, where the party destroying
324
documents fully expects those contingencies to be resolved.”
The
315. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 (4th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
316. Id. at 1333, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 138 (1945)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
317. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
318. 645 F.3d 1336, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
319. Id. at 1345, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718–19.
320. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
321. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (quoting Micron, 645 F.3d at 1320, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699) (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
323. Id. at 1345–46, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719–20.
324. Id. at 1346, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719–20.
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Federal Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s findings
regarding spoliation and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its decision and the framework of reasonable
foreseeability set forth in the companion Micron case discussed
325
above.
E. Administration of Proceedings
326

In In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, the Federal
Circuit approved the district court’s claim selection procedure, which
limited the number of claims the plaintiff could assert against each
defendant, holding that in complex cases, district courts need “broad
327
discretion to administer the proceeding[s].”
In a multidistrict patent litigation, plaintiff Ronald A. Katz
Technology Licensing LP asserted four groups of patents relating to
328
interactive call processing systems against numerous defendants.
Katz initially filed 25 separate actions asserting a total of 1975 claims
from 31 patents against 165 defendants, although the actions were
329
later consolidated and transferred.
Over Katz’s objections, the
defendants asked the district court to limit the number of asserted
330
claims.
After initially determining that many claims were
duplicative, the district court limited the number of claims Katz could
331
assert.
The district court also added a proviso permitting Katz to
add new claims if they “‘raise[d] issues of infringement/validity that
332
Instead of
[were] not duplicative’ of previously selected claims.”
selecting additional claims, Katz moved the Federal Circuit to sever
and stay the unselected claims, arguing that the district court’s order
333
violated its due process rights.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
appropriately placed the burden on Katz to show that the unasserted
334
claims were not duplicative.
“When the claimant is in the best
position to narrow the dispute, allocating the production burden to
the claimant will benefit the decision-making process and therefore
325. Id. at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
326. 639 F.3d 1303, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
327. Id. at 1313, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (quoting In re
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1232 (9th Cir.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. Id. at 1308, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741.
329. Id. at 1309, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
330. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
331. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
332. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742 (alterations in original).
333. Id. at 1310, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
334. Id. at 1311, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
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will not offend due process unless the burden allocation unfairly
335
The
prejudices the claimant’s opportunity to present its claim.”
Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s determination
that many claims were duplicative and concluded it was efficient and
336
fair to require Katz to identify nonduplicative claims. Because Katz
failed to make any showing that the unasserted claims were
nonduplicative, it was reasonable for the district court to deny the
337
motion to stay and sever.
Although the Federal Circuit approved the district court’s claim
selection process, it cautioned that it was not suggesting that such a
338
decision was unreviewable.
Rather, the problem with Katz’s
position was that Katz made no effort to show that some of its
339
unselected claims presented unique issues as to liability or damages.
Instead, Katz presented an “‘all or nothing’ argument that the entire
claim selection process was flawed,” a global claim of impropriety that
340
the court found unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit reminded that,
in complex cases, the district court “‘needs to have broad discretion
341
to administer the proceeding.’”
The Federal Circuit also rejected arguments that the district court
violated the statutory presumption that each claim is independently
342
presumed valid. The court explained, “[w]hile different claims are
presumed to be of different scope, that does not mean that they
343
necessarily present different questions of validity or infringement.”
F.

Joint Vacatur Motion

When a patentee is faced with a judgment of invalidity or
inequitable conduct, it is relatively common to settle with the accused
infringer. As a condition of the settlement agreement, the accused
infringer agrees to join the patentee in a motion for vacatur, which
seeks to vacate the adverse decision. Although vacatur requires
exceptional circumstances, it is occasionally granted by district
344
courts.
335. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
336. Id. at 1312, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
337. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
338. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744–45.
339. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
340. Id. at 1313, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
341. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (quoting In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006)).
342. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
343. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
344. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1672 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring).
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345

In Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed a situation where settlement occurred while the case was
346
on appeal.
The parties jointly moved in the Federal Circuit for
remand to the district court, which the Federal Circuit granted for
the limited purpose of allowing the district court to address the
347
parties’ motion for vacatur. The Federal Circuit, however, retained
jurisdiction over the appeals so that the parties could seek appellate
348
review within thirty days of the district court’s decision on remand.
In a concurrence, Judge Moore cautioned that the district court
should not construe the Federal Circuit’s decision to remand as an
349
imprimatur on the parties’ vacatur motion.
Judge Moore, relying
on the Supreme Court precedent of U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
350
Bonner Mall Partnership, stated that “vacatur was an ‘extraordinary
351
remedy,’” requiring a showing of “equitable entitlement.”
Additionally, Judge Moore cited to Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
352
International, Inc., while noting that the public interest should be
considered when deciding whether to vacate a prior decision,
especially where that decision invalidated a patent (a situation in
353
which she characterized the public interest as “overwhelming”).
Judge Moore stated that the “public rights are particularly vulnerable
when considering vacatur following settlement” because the parties
354
often benefit, and thus no “opposing voice” is heard. Although, as
Judge Newman pointed out, in this instance, the third party seeking
355
to intervene may well disagree with the parties’ motion for vacatur.
While settlement of the case also ended three other litigations
between the parties involving three other patents, the patentee had
356
already sued a third party on the patent in question. Judge Moore
pointed out that if the district court did not vacate its invalidity
judgment, the patentee would be collaterally estopped from asserting
345. 629 F.3d 1374, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
346. Id. at 1377, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 (Moore, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 1375, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671 (majority opinion).
348. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
349. Id. at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 (Moore, J., concurring).
350. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
351. Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 (Moore, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co., 513 U.S. at 26) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
352. 508 U.S. 83, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (1993).
353. Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 (Moore, J.,
concurring) (citing Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 100, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1729).
354. Id. at 1376 n.1, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 n.1.
355. Id. at 1375–76 n.1, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671 n.1 (Newman, J., additional
views).
356. Id. at 1377, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672 (Moore, J., concurring).
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357

its invalid patent in future cases, resulting in judicial economy. On
the other hand, if the district court were to vacate its invalidity
judgment, Judge Moore noted that collateral estoppel would likely
358
not apply. Judge Moore advised that these concerns should weigh
heavily against vacatur because the only reason, in her view, that a
patentee would seek vacatur of an invalidity decision is to potentially
359
enforce the patent against others.
Judge Newman wrote separately to add additional views in response
360
to Judge Moore’s concurrence.
Judge Newman indicated that she
did not “endorse the proffer of judicial advice on selected issues”
361
In particular, Judge
provided in Judge Moore’s concurrence.
Newman made clear that Judge Moore’s concurrence was not part of
362
the court’s remand order.
Judge Newman stated that the district
court is in the better position to rule on the parties’ motion for
vacatur after hearing all of the legal and equitable considerations that
363
may be brought to the court’s attention. In Judge Newman’s view,
the “remand should be unencumbered by even the appearance of
prejudgment or of the weight to be given to various
364
considerations.”
G. Contempt
365

In TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., an en banc Federal Circuit
overturned the two-part test established in KSM Fastening Systems, Inc.
366
v. H.A. Jones Co. and set a new standard for contempt proceedings
367
in postinjunction infringement (“design-around”) cases.
Merging
the two-part test into one, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court should consider whether the differences between the modified
elements of the newly accused device and the adjudged infringing
device were significant, thereby rendering the devices “more than
368
colorably different” and contempt proceedings inappropriate.
The district court had previously issued a two-part permanent
357. Id. at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
358. Id. at 1377, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
359. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
360. Id. at 1375–76, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671–72 (Newman, J., additional
views).
361. Id. at 1376, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
362. Id. at 1375, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
363. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
364. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
365. 646 F.3d 869, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
366. 776 F.2d 1522, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled by TiVo,
646 F.3d at 881, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
367. TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
368. Id. at 881–82, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421–22.
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injunction against EchoStar Corp. after a jury finding of willful
369
That injunction ordered
infringement of a TiVo Inc. patent.
EchoStar to cease making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
infringing satellite television receivers (the “infringement
provision”), and to disable the DVR functionality in existing receivers
that had been, or would be, placed with its customers (the
370
“disablement provision”).
Thereafter, TiVo filed a motion to find
371
The district
EchoStar in contempt of the permanent injunction.
court granted TiVo’s motion, finding EchoStar in contempt of both
the infringement and disablement provisions, and imposed
372
approximately $90 million in sanctions.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the test for contempt in
373
cases of alleged continued infringement.
The court rejected the
two-part test established in KSM Fastening, which required courts first
to inquire into the propriety of initiating contempt proceedings by
comparing the accused and adjudged infringing products to
determine whether there was “more than a colorable difference”
between them and then, in the event of a difference, to determine
374
further infringement by holding a new trial.
In rejecting the test,
the court concluded that the two-step inquiry was unworkable,
“confuse[d] the merits of the contempt with the propriety of
375
initiating contempt proceedings,” and was not observed in practice.
Instead, the Federal Circuit concluded that a district court should
combine the inquiries, leaving the question of the propriety of
376
initiating contempt proceedings to the discretion of the trial court.
A contempt proceeding is merited where the injured party provides a
“detailed accusation . . . setting forth the alleged facts constituting the
377
contempt.”
The Federal Circuit explained that a patentee seeking enforcement
of an injunction must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, first,
that a newly accused product is not more than colorably different
369. Id. at 877, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
370. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
371. Id. at 878, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419.
372. Id. at 879, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419–20.
373. Id. at 879–80, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
374. Id. at 880–81, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (citing KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v.
H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530–32, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 682–83 (Fed. Cir.
1985), overruled by TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421). In the
absence of more than a colorable difference, the district court would evaluate the
redesigned product for infringement in the context of a contempt proceeding
without a new trial. Id. at 881, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
375. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
376. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
377. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
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than the adjudged infringing product, and, second, that “the newly
378
A district court’s comparison
accused product actually infringes.”
of the newly accused and adjudged infringing products should focus
on any differences between the features relied upon to establish
infringement and the modified features of the newly accused
379
products. If the modification or removal of a relied-upon feature is
significant, as determined by reference to the relevant prior art
through the assistance of expert testimony, then the newly accused
product is more than colorably different, contempt is inappropriate,
380
and a new trial should be held. The court’s evaluation should also
381
account for the policy favoring legitimate design-arounds.
In the event that a district court finds only a colorable difference
between the modified and adjudged infringing products, the Federal
Circuit instructed that the district court should proceed to determine
382
whether the modified product also infringes.
In doing so, the
district court should apply the same claim construction that was
initially used in determining infringement and should compare the
redesigned product to the asserted claims on a limitation-by383
limitation basis.
The Federal Circuit also explained that, on appeal, it would not
consider allegations that contempt proceedings were improper;
rather, it would review a district court’s factual determinations as to
colorable differences and infringement for clear error and review any
384
award of continued infringement sanctions for abuse of discretion.
The Federal Circuit also indicated that there may be circumstances
under which the initiation of contempt proceedings could constitute
385
an abuse of a district court’s discretion.
Applying its new test to the permanent injunction at issue, the
Federal Circuit vacated the contempt finding as to the infringement
provision but affirmed the finding of contempt of the disablement
386
provision.
Consequently, the court affirmed the sanctions award,
explaining that the sanctions had been expressly awarded on
alternative grounds for a violation of either of the two provisions of
387
the injunction.
Judge Dyk, along with Chief Judge Rader and
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 882, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
Id. at 882–83, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
Id. at 883, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422–23.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
Id. at 881, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
Id. at 890, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
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Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Prost, joined the majority in its general
description of the applicable law, but dissented as to its application in
388
In the dissenters’ view, because the sanctions award was
this case.
based largely on EchoStar’s alleged violation of the infringement
provision, “the award cannot be sustained based on the alleged
389
violation of the disablement provision alone.” Thus, the dissenting
390
judges would have remanded for recalculation of the sanctions.
H. Conflict of Interest
391

In In re Shared Memory Graphics LLC, the Federal Circuit granted a
writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its order
disqualifying the law firm of Floyd & Buss, LLP from representing
plaintiff Shared Memory Graphics LLC (“SMG”) due to a conflict of
interest because defendant Nintendo Co. of America clearly and
392
indisputably waived the conflict of interest.
During a prior patent infringement suit, Floyd & Buss’ partner
Kent Cooper was then-Director of Patents and Licensing for
393
Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”).
AMD and Nintendo, as
codefendants in the earlier suit, executed a Joint Defense Agreement
(“the Agreement”) under which they exchanged information
concerning litigation tactics, settlement strategies, drafts of briefs,
394
and other confidential information.
While Cooper had access to
confidential Nintendo information pursuant to the Agreement, it was
395
unclear whether Cooper actually received any such information.
396
Thereafter, Cooper left AMD to join Floyd & Buss. Upon his entry
397
to the firm, however, he was not screened for potential conflicts.
When Floyd & Buss undertook to represent SMG in its infringement
suit against Nintendo, the firm did not take any steps to exclude
398
Cooper from the firm’s activities, such as erecting a “firewall.”
The district court granted Nintendo’s motion to disqualify Floyd &
Buss from continued representation, concluding that the
Agreement’s waiver of conflicts did not apply when former AMD or
388. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
389. Id. at 902–03, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
390. Id. at 903, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
391. 659 F.3d 1336, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
392. Id. at 1338, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
393. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
394. Id. at 1338, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
395. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
396. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
397. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
398. Id. at 1342, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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399

Conclusively
Nintendo attorneys accepted new employment.
presuming that Cooper had accessed confidential Nintendo
information, the district court disqualified the entire firm from
400
representing SMG against any of the defendants.
SMG petitioned
the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district
401
court’s rulings and to reinstate Floyd & Buss as SMG’s counsel.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the waiver-of-conflict
provision provides that “[t]he parties expressly acknowledge and
agree that nothing in this Agreement, nor compliance with the terms
of this Agreement by either party, shall be used as a basis to seek to
disqualify the respective counsel of such party in any future
402
litigation.” The court identified its task as giving effect to the plain
language of the parties’ Agreement while looking to the Agreement
403
In particular,
as a whole to avoid rendering any part superfluous.
the court noted that Cooper was indisputably a “respective counsel”
of AMD, and that the waiver’s breadth and scope were sufficiently
broad to include “any future litigation” between Nintendo and a
404
party employing, or represented by, Cooper.
The court found that its interpretation was bolstered by the
consistent use of the term “respective counsel” throughout the
405
particular paragraph of the Agreement.
For example, the
paragraph also provided that “[n]othing contained in this Agreement
has the effect of . . . creating any . . . duties between a party or its
respective counsel and the other party or its respective counsel, other than
406
the obligation to comply with the express terms of this Agreement.”
In the Federal Circuit’s view, the interpretation adopted by the
district court would produce an illogical result because the provision
would apply to current counsel of AMD and Nintendo, but not
407
former counsel, such as Cooper.
That interpretation would not
408
hold Cooper to an ongoing obligation of confidentiality. The court
held that such a result would be contrary to the parties’ clearly
expressed intent and “contradict the very reason why any joint

399. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252–53 (majority opinion).
400. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
401. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
402. Id. at 1340, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
403. Id. at 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
404. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
405. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
406. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
407. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
408. Id. at 1341–42, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
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409

defense agreement is in effect in the first place.” Thus, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court’s determination was
incorrect as a matter of law and that SMG demonstrated its clear and
410
indisputable right to issuance of the writ. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit directed the district court to vacate its order disqualifying
411
Cooper and the Floyd & Buss law firm.
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the majority opinion is
412
In Judge Newman’s
problematic for the modern legal profession.
opinion, the issue was “the integrity of the system of legal
representation in today’s world of mobile lawyers and large law firms
413
with interacting clients.”
Thus, the dissenting opinion noted that
the use of firewalls has been accepted for many situations, even
414
though one was not implemented here.
Judge Newman further
remarked that California law recognizes that “disqualification is
proper when an attorney has received information in his role as an
attorney, even if the source of the information is not a ‘client’ of the
415
attorney.”
Judge Newman pointed out that California courts have
accepted the presumption that an attorney in Cooper’s position
received confidential information to protect the holder of the
416
information and the attorney.
Thus, Judge Newman would not
417
have held that the waiver authorized future adverse representation.
I.

Jury-Related Issues

To alter a judgment based on erroneous jury instructions, a party
must establish that “(1) it made a proper and timely objection to the
jury instructions, (2) those instructions were legally erroneous, (3)
the errors had prejudicial effect, and (4) it requested alternative
418
instructions that would have remedied the error.”
The Federal
Circuit addressed allegedly erroneous jury instructions and the
possibility of a tainted jury in Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. v.
419
Troy, where the Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict in favor of
409. Id. at 1342, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
410. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254–55.
411. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
412. Id. at 1343–44, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (Newman, J., dissenting).
413. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
414. Id. at 1343, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
415. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
416. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
417. Id. at 1344, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
418. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1311–12, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1763, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State
Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54 U.P.S.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
419. 659 F.3d 1345, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. and reversed the district
420
court’s denial of Troy’s motion for a mistrial.
Atlantic Research filed a complaint against Troy alleging
421
infringement of a patent and misappropriation of trade secrets.
422
Troy, in turn, alleged that the asserted patent was invalid. Atlantic
Research’s trade secret claim survived summary judgment and
proceeded to trial, where a jury awarded Atlantic Research more than
423
424
$1.8 million in damages.
Troy filed a motion for mistrial, which
425
was denied by the district court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered Troy’s motion for a
mistrial on two grounds: (1) “that the district court erred as a matter
of law by giving two improper Allen charges, named for Allen v. United
426
States;” and (2) “that the district court failed to properly investigate
and remedy the possibility of jury taint due to the presence of
427
extraneous evidence in the jury room during deliberations.”
The
Federal Circuit rejected Troy’s argument that the district court “erred
by giving the jury two coercive Allen charges,” which are intended to
prevent a hung jury by encouraging jurors in the minority to
428
reexamine their positions and carefully consider the evidence. The
court stated that it did not believe there was an absolute prohibition
429
in the First Circuit against giving more than one Allen charge.
With regard to the presence of extraneous evidence, the Federal
Circuit determined that the district court failed to conduct an
adequate investigation after becoming aware that a clamp, which was
relevant to the trade secret claim, was in the jury room during
deliberations and failed “to take any steps to determine the possible
430
prejudicial effect of the clamp prior to the issuance of the verdict.”
Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court “never even
431
asked if the jurors could remain impartial after viewing the clamp.”
Finding an abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit reversed the

420. Id. at 1348, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
421. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
422. Id. at 1350, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
423. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
424. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
425. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
426. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
427. Atl. Research, 659 F.3d at 1358, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1561.
428. Id. at 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563; see Allen, 164 U.S. at 501–02
(holding jury instructions that urged a minority to re-evaluate their positions to be
acceptable).
429. Atl. Research, 659 F.3d at 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563.
430. Id. at 1360, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562–63.
431. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563.
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432

district court ruling and granted Troy’s motion for a mistrial.
433
In Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of a new trial on the basis of
434
improper jury instructions.
Bettcher Industries, Inc. sued Bunzl
Processor Distribution, LLC for patent infringement based on
Bunzl’s manufacture and sale of rotary knife blades marketed as
435
replacements for Bettcher-manufactured rotary knives.
Bunzl
alleged that the asserted patent was invalid as anticipated by prior
art—Bettcher blades that included chamfered corners that were
inherently capable of being used as the “bearing race” required by
436
the claims. During trial, the district court instructed the jury that to
anticipate a claim of the asserted patent, the accused blade must
“contain every limitation of that particular claim,” and that
“[a]nticipation requires that there is no difference between claims of
the [asserted] patent and the . . . Bettcher blade, as viewed by a
437
person of ordinary skill in the art.” Bunzl objected to the phrases
“as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art” and “no difference”
438
in that instruction.
Bunzl argued that the district court’s jury instruction to understand
prior art “as viewed by one of ordinary skill in the art” contradicted
inherency precedent and was potentially misleading “by excluding
the possibility of an unappreciated inherent feature,” such as the
439
The court found that Bunzl did not establish
chamfered corner.
that the jury instruction was wrong or suffered prejudice, and that the
evidence was such “that a reasonable jury could have found that the
chamfers in the Bettcher blades were not bearing faces of a bearing
440
race as viewed from any perspective.”
Because Bunzl’s argument
against the jury instruction relied entirely on the premise that this
was an inherent anticipation case and because Bunzl did not present
evidence sufficient to overcome the substantial deference due a trial
court in ruling on a motion for new trial, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
441
denying Bunzl’s motion.
432. Id. at 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563.
433. 661 F.3d 629, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
434. Id. at 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
435. Id. at 636, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
436. Id. at 634, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
437. Id. at 641, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
438. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
439. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
440. Id. at 642, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–42.
441. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
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Bunzl also argued that the district court erred by instructing the
jury that anticipation required that there be “‘no difference’ between
the prior art and the claimed invention” because the jury instruction
may have misled the jury into believing that the presence of
additional features in the prior art Bettcher blade would preclude a
442
finding of anticipation. The court concluded that Bunzl’s concern
with the “no difference” language was “apparently based on the fear
that the jury might have mistakenly thought that some extraneous
443
feature of the prior art negated anticipation.”
As no such
extraneous feature was at issue in this case, no showing of prejudice
444
was possible. For these reasons, the court held that Bunzl was not
445
entitled to a new trial.
J.

Leave to Amend Pleadings
446

In Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s denial of Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.’s motion for
leave to file a supplemental answer, affirmative defenses, and
447
counterclaims.
The dispute underlying this third appeal to the
Federal Circuit began in November 2001 when Apotex “filed an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking approval for the sale
of generic clopidogrel bisulfate tablets,” marketed by Sanofi-Aventis
under the brand name Plavix, before the expiration of U.S. Patent
448
No. 4,847,265 (“the ’265 patent”).
Apotex’s ANDA included a
449
paragraph IV certification asserting invalidity.
In response, Sanofi
filed suit in March 2002, alleging infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
450
Apotex counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of
271(e)(2).
451
invalidity and unenforceability. Apotex received final FDA approval
452
to sell its generic product in November 2006.
Prior to FDA approval, Sanofi and Apotex reached a tentative
453
settlement agreement (“the March 2006 agreement”).
Under the
March 2006 agreement, Sanofi granted Apotex a future license under
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
659 F.3d 1171, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1174, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757–58.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
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the ’265 patent to sell Apotex’s generic product before patent
454
Sanofi also promised not to launch an authorized
expiration.
455
generic during the pendency of the license.
As a result of prior
litigation involving Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”), a
holding company of one of the plaintiffs, “the March 2006 agreement
was subject to approval by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
456
a consortium of state attorneys general.” The FTC objected to the
March 2006 agreement, including the provision precluding Sanofi’s
457
launch of an authorized generic.
In response, Sanofi withdrew the March 2006 agreement and the
parties negotiated a second agreement in May 2006 (“the May 2006
458
agreement”).
The May 2006 agreement did not expressly include
the limitation regarding authorized generics, but the BMS executive
negotiating on behalf of Sanofi orally promised that Sanofi would not
launch an authorized generic during the pendency of Apotex’s
459
license. BMS submitted the May 2006 agreement with certification
460
Apotex,
for FTC approval, but did not disclose its oral promise.
461
however, disclosed the oral promise to the FTC a week later.
In
May 2009, while litigating damages, Apotex sought leave to file (1) a
supplemental answer, including allegations of patent misuse related
to BMS’s failure to disclose its oral agreement to the FTC as part of
the May 2006 agreement; (2) affirmative defenses; and (3)
counterclaims, including a breach of contract claim alleging “BMS
breached its duty to use reasonable efforts to secure regulatory
462
approval of the May 2006 agreement.”
The district court denied
Apotex’s motion, finding that (1) the patent misuse claim would
“expand, complicate, and prolong discovery” and the ultimate
resolution of the case; (2) BMS’s actions likely did not constitute
patent misuse; and (3) Apotex could separately file the breach of
463
contract claim.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court “properly
rejected Apotex’s patent misuse defense as futile” because BMS’s
failure to disclose the oral agreement and false certification to the
FTC did not broaden the scope of the ’265 patent grant, “‘the key
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id. at 1175, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id. at 1176, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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464

The court, however,
inquiry under the patent misuse doctrine.’”
acknowledged that patent scope could have been broadened if the
465
FTC had failed to discover BMS’s “nefarious conduct.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Apotex’s motion to add a
counterclaim for breach of contract because a court “may deny a
motion to amend where it would ‘significantly delay the resolution of
466
Additionally, Apotex was not prejudiced because it
the dispute.’”
could, and later did, assert the breach of contract claim in a separate
467
action.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE
A. Writ of Mandamus
The remedy of mandamus is available in extraordinary situations
“to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial
power” when the party seeking the writ establishes “that it has no
other means of obtaining the relief desired” and “the right to
468
In 2011, the
issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable.’”
Federal Circuit granted five petitions for writ of mandamus, three
pertaining to requests to transfer cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
469
1404(a). The Federal Circuit also granted petitions for mandamus
to address (1) an issue of first impression—whether Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to pleading false marking under 35
470
U.S.C. § 292 —and (2) a district court’s disqualification of counsel
where meaningful relief could not be obtained other than by seeking
471
a writ of mandamus.
In 2011, the Federal Circuit granted three petitions for writs of
mandamus to transfer cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), two of
which requested transfer out of the Eastern District of Texas, and one
472
that requested transfer out of the District of Delaware. In the first
464. Id. at 1182, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citation omitted).
465. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
466. Id. at 1183, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citation omitted).
467. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764–65.
468. In re Shared Memory Graphics LLC, 659 F.3d 1336, 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1251, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
469. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., 635 F.3d
559, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d
1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
470. In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1309, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2025, 2026 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
471. Shared Memory Graphics, 659 F.3d at 1340, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
472. Link_A_Media Devices, 662 F.3d at 1222, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865;
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473

case, In re Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit granted Microsoft’s
petition, directing transfer of the case to the Western District of
474
Washington.
Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the
trial court has great discretion in applying the case-specific factors
relating to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the
proper administration of justice, the Federal Circuit has held “that
mandamus may issue when the trial court’s application of those
475
factors amounts to a clear abuse of discretion.”
The court found the present facts analogous to those in In re
476
Genentech, Inc., where the Federal Circuit held that the trial court’s
“application of the factors was patently erroneous, in part because a
denial of transfer would require every witness to expend significant
477
time and cost in order to attend trial.”
Here, the convenience of
the witnesses with knowledge of the patent or issues involved in the
478
suit favored the Western District of Washington. The court rejected
plaintiff Allvoice’s argument that it had an “established presence” in
the Eastern District of Texas simply because that company, which
operated from the United Kingdom, had incorporated in Texas just
days before filing suit and maintained an address in the Eastern
District: “Allvoice’s argument . . . rests on a fallacious assumption:
that this court must honor connections to a preferred forum made in
anticipation of litigation and for the likely purpose of making that
479
forum appear convenient.”
Finally, the court disagreed that mandamus should not issue
because Microsoft alternatively attempted to transfer the case to the
Southern District of Texas, which had previous experience
480
adjudicating the patent-in-suit.
According to the Federal Circuit,
any apparent inconsistency in Microsoft’s position about the
Verizon, 635 F.3d at 561, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1362, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
473. 630 F.3d 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
474. Id. at 1365, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
475. Id. at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (citing In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d
1194, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587
F.3d 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 566
F.3d 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551
F.3d 1315, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (noting that the Federal
Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit—in this instance, the Fifth Circuit—to
determine if the trial court’s application of the case-specific factors amounts to a
clear abuse of discretion).
476. 566 F.3d 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting petition
for writ of mandamus to transfer).
477. Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (citing Genentech,
566 F.3d at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030–31).
478. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
479. Id. at 1362, 1364–65, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735–36.
480. Id. at 1365, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
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suitability of Texas as the forum should not preclude transfer to
481
Washington state, “a venue that is far more convenient and fair.”
482
In In re Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., the Federal Circuit
again granted a petition for a writ of mandamus, overturning the
Eastern District of Texas’s (Marshall Division) refusal to transfer a
patent infringement case to the Northern District of Texas (Dallas
483
Division) under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The Federal Circuit applied essentially the same standard noted in
484
Microsoft
that “mandamus may issue when the trial court’s
application of [case-specific] factors creates a patently erroneous
485
result.” The court analogized the facts to those in In re Volkswagen of
486
America, Inc., where an en banc Fifth Circuit granted mandamus
because “a significant number of witnesses and parties were located
within 100 miles of the Dallas Division and could be deposed and
testify without significant travel or expense, while no witness or party
487
was located within the Marshall Division.”
Here, it was also clear
that “maintaining trial in the Marshall Division would require
witnesses to undergo the cost, time, and expense of travel, which
would be significantly reduced if this case was transferred to the
488
Dallas Division.”
The principal question before the Federal Circuit was “whether the
trial court could plausibly justify denying transfer to a far more
convenient venue” solely because it had handled a lawsuit involving
489
the same patent five years earlier.
The Federal Circuit concluded
that given the lapse of time since the previous suit, the Eastern
District of Texas would have to relearn a considerable amount and
would likely have to familiarize itself with new materials that were not
490
part of the previous record.
To interpret § 1404(a) to hold that any prior suit involving the
same patent can override a compelling showing of transfer would
481. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
482. 635 F.3d 559, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
483. Id. at 560, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
484. Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (“[M]andamus may
issue when the trial court’s application of [case-specific] factors amounts to a clear
abuse of discretion.”).
485. Verizon, 635 F.3d at 561, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (citing In re TS Tech
USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1318–19, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
2008); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 310, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501,
1504 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
486. 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
487. Verizon, 635 F.3d at 561, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (citing Volkswagen, 545
F.3d at 316–17, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510).
488. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
489. Id. at 560, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
490. Id. at 562, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
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be inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1404(a). . . . [T]he
Eastern District’s previous claim construction in a case that settled
more than five years before the filing of this lawsuit [was] too
491
tenuous a reason to support denial of transfer.
492

In In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., the Federal Circuit granted
Link_A_Media Devices Corp.’s (“LAMD”) petition to transfer venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) from the District of Delaware to the
493
Northern District of California.
Applying Third Circuit law, the
Federal Circuit noted that “mandamus may be used to correct an
improper transfer order if the petitioner can establish a ‘clear and
494
indisputable’ right to the writ.” In other words, the petitioner must
establish that “the district court’s decision amounted to a failure to
495
meaningfully consider the merits of the transfer motion.”
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court failed to
fairly balance the private and public interest factors to be considered
496
in a § 1404 transfer analysis.
With respect to private interests, the
district court erred by (1) placing “far too much weight on the
plaintiff’s choice of forum” when Marvell International Ltd.’s home
497
forum was not Delaware; and (2) relying too heavily on the fact that
LAMD was incorporated in Delaware when neither § 1404 nor Jumara
498
v. State Farm Insurance Co. list a party’s state of incorporation as a
499
The Federal Circuit also
factor for the venue transfer analysis.
concluded that the district court erred by refusing to consider two of
the private interest factors: the convenience of the witnesses and the
location of the books and records, and by finding that the public
500
interest factors did not favor either forum.
To the contrary, aside
from LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware, the Federal Circuit noted

491. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88.
492. 662 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
493. Id. at 1225, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
494. Id. at 1223, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (quoting Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble,
Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993)).
495. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (citing Swindell-Dressler Corp. v.
Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1962)).
496. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866–67 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995)).
497. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (noting that, when a plaintiff brings suit in
a venue that is not its home forum, that choice of forum is entitled to less deference
(citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007);
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981))).
498. 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995).
499. Link_A_Media Devices, 662 F.3d at 1224, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
500. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). The
Federal Circuit noted that “[w]hile advances in technology may alter the weight
given to these factors, it is improper to ignore them entirely.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1867.
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that Delaware “has no ties to the dispute or to either party.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Marvell’s argument that the
case should remain in Delaware because the judges are highly
experienced in patent litigation, noting that Marvell’s claims arise
under the federal patent laws, which the Northern District of
502
California is equally equipped to address. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit granted LAMD’s petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the
District of Delaware to transfer to the Northern District of
503
California.
The Federal Circuit’s fourth exercise of mandamus involved 35
U.S.C. § 292, the false marking statute. In In re BP Lubricants USA
504
Inc., the Federal Circuit granted a petition for writ of mandamus in
part and directed the district court to dismiss the respondent’s false
505
marking complaint with leave to amend.
Respondent Thomas A. Simonian, a patent attorney, filed a qui
tam relator complaint on behalf of the United States pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 292, in which he alleged that BP Lubricants USA, Inc. falsely
506
marked its bottles with a patent number after the patent expired.
BP filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the relator’s
complaint was deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
because it “failed to allege any underlying facts upon which a court
could reasonably infer that BP knew its patent had expired when it
507
The district court concluded that the
was marking its products.”
complaint stated an actionable claim and met the requirements of
508
Rule 9(b) for pleading fraud or mistake.
The rule states in part:
“[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
509
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
The Federal Circuit granted mandamus because (1) the court had
not previously decided whether Rule 9(b) applies to false marking
cases or discussed the requisite level of pleading required, and (2)
501. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (noting that LAMD is headquartered in
the Northern District of California, its relevant witnesses and evidence are located
there, and the named inventors of the patents-in-suit are employed by a Marvell
affiliate, which is headquartered in California, three miles from LAMD).
502. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867. The Federal Circuit also commented that
there was no evidence that Delaware’s experience in patent law meant that patent
cases were resolved faster in Delaware than in the Northern District of California.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
503. Id. at 1225, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
504. 637 F.3d 1307, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2025 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
505. Id. at 1313, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029.
506. Id. at 1309, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2026.
507. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2026.
508. Id. at 1309–10, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2026–27.
509. Id. at 1309, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2026 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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510

“trial courts have been in considerable disagreement on this issue.”
The Federal Circuit, as a preliminary matter, addressed whether
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to false marking claims
511
under § 292. The court saw no sound reason to treat § 292 actions
differently than actions under the False Claims Act, in which
complaints must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement for particularity in
512
pleading. Thus, rather than a general allegation that the defendant
knew or should have known that the patent expired, “a complaint
must in the § 292 context provide some objective indication to
reasonably infer that the defendant was aware that the patent
513
expired.”
The Federal Circuit held that the relator’s complaint failed to meet
the requirements for Rule 9(b) “[b]ecause the relator’s complaint
here provided only generalized allegations rather than specific
underlying facts from which we can reasonably infer the requisite
514
intent.”
The Federal Circuit granted a fifth writ of mandamus in In re Shared
515
Memory Graphics LLC, as discussed above, and directed the district
court to vacate its order disqualifying the law firm of Floyd & Buss,
LLP from representing plaintiff Shared Memory Graphics LLC
(“SMG”) due to a conflict of interest because defendant Nintendo
Co. of America clearly and indisputably waived the conflict of
516
interest.
The Federal Circuit reiterated that the remedy of mandamus is
available in extraordinary situations “to correct a clear abuse of
discretion or usurpation of judicial power” when the party seeking
the writ establishes that it has no other means of obtaining the relief
desired and the right to issuance of the writ is “clear and
517
indisputable.”
In the context of disqualification of counsel, the
court concluded that SMG would not be able to obtain meaningful
relief other than by seeking a writ of mandamus because, by the time
an appeal “could be taken, the trial would be over, and SMG would
518
have gone through the litigation without the counsel of its choice.”
And the alternative of waiting for a direct appeal would require a

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

Id. at 1313, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2029.
Id. at 1310–11, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2027.
Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2027.
Id. at 1311, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2028.
Id. at 1312, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2028.
659 F.3d 1336, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1338, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1340, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
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showing of prejudice, which would be very difficult for SMG to
demonstrate, short of misconduct on the part of the substitute
519
After considering the merits, the Federal Circuit
counsel.
concluded that the district court’s determination was incorrect as a
matter of law, and that SMG demonstrated its “clear and
520
indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.
Judge Newman dissented because, in her view, the district court’s
521
ruling had “plausible support.” Thus, she believed that the majority
“inappropriately intruded into the district court’s authority and
522
responsibility, to the detriment of the integrity of legal practice.”
B. Confidentiality Marking
The Federal Circuit has expressed dissatisfaction when the parties
523
appearing before it fail to follow the court’s rules of practice. In In
524
re Violation of Rule 28(d), the Federal Circuit imposed monetary
sanctions on counsel for Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. (collectively “Sun”) for
violating Federal Circuit Rule 28(d) by improperly designating as
confidential material that fell outside the scope of the protective
525
order.
In that case, Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC sued Sun and other generic
drug manufacturers, “alleging the infringement of Sanofi’s patent,
which claimed the colorectal cancer drug oxaliplatin,” ultimately
526
reaching a settlement and entering into a license agreement.
Following a series of other events, the district court, upon Sanofi’s
request, entered a revised version of the consent judgment and
enjoined Sun from “manufacturing, using, offering to sell, or selling .
527
. . or importing” its generic oxaliplatin. Sun opposed entry of the
528
revised consent order and appealed.

519. Id. at 1340 n.1, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 n.1.
520. Id. at 1340–42, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254–55.
521. Id. at 1344, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (Newman, J., dissenting).
522. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
523. See In re Violation of Rule 28(d), 635 F.3d 1352, 1360–61, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1144, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that counsel’s violation of the court’s
rules were severe and holding that a $1000 sanction was appropriate); Aventis
Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 637 F.3d 1341, 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1192
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that occasional leniency by the court is not an “invitation
to flaunt [its] practice and precedent”).
524. 635 F.3d 1352, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
525. Id. at 1360–61, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
526. Id. at 1354, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
527. Id. at 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
528. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
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529

In their appellate briefs, the parties marked as confidential
530
discussion of aspects of the license and settlement agreements. At
oral argument, the Federal Circuit questioned whether Sun’s counsel
violated the court’s rules by marking parts of its briefs that contained
case citations, quotations from published opinions, and Sun’s legal
531
argument as confidential.
Following oral argument, the Federal
Circuit issued a show-cause order to Sun to explain why the court
“should not impose sanctions for the violation of Federal Circuit Rule
532
28(d).”
In response, Sun argued that making the legal argument
public would have divulged the confidential terms of the license
533
agreement.
The Federal Circuit assumed, for the purpose of considering
sanctions, that the license and settlement agreements were properly
534
designated as confidential. Despite that assumption, the court held
535
Sun’s confidential designation improper.
Since the particular
subject matter of the license and settlement agreements was publicly
disclosed in the consent judgment, legal argument pertaining to that
subject matter was not, and could not, be properly marked as
536
confidential. The Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he marking of
legal argument as confidential under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) cannot be
justified unless the argument discloses facts or figures of genuine
537
competitive or commercial significance.”
Since that was not the
case here, and Sun made no argument to the contrary, the Federal
Circuit concluded that Sun’s confidential markings were not justified

529. Sun argued in its merits briefs that the district court erred in entering the
revised consent judgment and injunction because “the revised consent judgment was
inconsistent with the license agreement.” Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
Specifically, Sun challenged the district court’s interpretation of the terms of the
license agreement pertaining to the triggering events. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1145. The Federal Circuit issued a nonprecedential opinion, concluding that the
contested triggering provision was ambiguous, vacated the revised consent judgment
and injunction, and remanded to the district court to resolve the ambiguity. Id., 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
530. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
531. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. Following the court’s questioning
regarding the appropriateness of these markings in light of Federal Circuit Rule
28(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “Sun submitted a motion to modify
the protective order to remove the confidentiality designations.” Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1146. The Federal Circuit subsequently granted Sun’s motion. Id., 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
532. Id. at 1355–56, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
533. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
534. Id. at 1359, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148–49.
535. Id. at 1359–61, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149–50.
536. Id. at 1360, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
537. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
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The court concluded that:

[n]o good faith reading of our rule could support Sun’s marking of
its legal arguments as confidential. The action of Sun’s counsel
bespeaks an improper causal approach to confidentiality markings
that ignores the requirements of public access, deprives the public
of necessary information, and hampers this court’s consideration
539
and opinion writing.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c), Sun severely violated Federal
Circuit Rule 28(d), and the court imposed a $1000 monetary
540
sanction on Sun’s counsel.
C. Cross-Appeal
The Federal Circuit had occasion to consider another violation of
541
one of its rules of practice in Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc. In
this decision on a motion to dismiss, the Federal Circuit dismissed
Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.’s improper cross-appeal because, even
if successful, the cross-appeal would not expand the district court’s
542
judgment in Apotex’s favor.
Aventis Pharma S.A. and Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC (collectively
“Aventis”) separately sued Apotex and Hospira, Inc. for infringing
543
the same patents.
The district court, after consolidating the two
cases, entered final judgment in favor of Apotex and Hospira,
“finding that all the asserted claims of the patents in suit were invalid
544
for obviousness and unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.”
The district court, however, also found that some of the asserted
545
claims were not invalid for double patenting. Subsequently, Aventis
appealed to the Federal Circuit, while Apotex filed a “protective”
546
cross-appeal to preserve its ability to challenge the district court’s
538. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
539. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
540. Id. at 1360–61, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
541. 637 F.3d 1341, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
542. Id. at 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
543. Id. at 1342, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
544. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
545. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
546. Prior to filing its motion to dismiss, Aventis contacted Apotex and requested
that Apotex voluntarily withdraw its cross-appeal, citing the Federal Circuit’s Practice
Notes to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1 and TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 28.1 advisory
committee’s notes; TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151,
1156–57, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501, 1504–05 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Apotex rejected
Aventis’s request, stating that it believed its cross-appeal was proper and claiming that
TypeRight could be distinguished (without providing any citation or explanation). Id.
at 1342–43, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. Apotex also claimed, without citation, that
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double-patenting finding if the Federal Circuit reversed the
547
obviousness and inequitable conduct judgments.
The Federal Circuit explained that a cross-appeal may only be filed
“when a party seeks to enlarge its own rights under the judgment or
548
to lessen the rights of its adversary under the judgment.” The court
also explained the rationale for its practice—“an unwarranted crossappeal ‘unnecessarily expands the amount of briefing,’ and also gives
‘the appellee an unfair opportunity to file the final brief and have the
549
final oral argument, contrary to established rules.’”
The Federal
Circuit noted that it does not limit the arguments that can be
presented on appeal and that the responsive briefing is the proper
550
means for raising alternative grounds for affirming a judgment. In
the court’s view, this opportunity is substantively the same as that
provided in other appellate circuits, even if “the means used to do so
551
differs in form.”
In Aventis, the district court found the asserted claims invalid for
obviousness and the patents-in-suit unenforceable for inequitable
552
conduct.
Nevertheless, Apotex filed a cross-appeal asserting “(1)
additional grounds for invalidity and (2) claims of non-infringement
553
The court held, however, that
directed to the same claims.”
“[w]here, as here, the district court has entered a judgment of
invalidity as to all of the asserted claims, there is no basis for a crossappeal as to either (1) additional claims for invalidity or (2) claims of
554
non-infringement.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected Apotex’s attempt to distinguish
555
TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., finding Apotex’s conduct
“particularly egregious” because TypeRight prohibited the precise type
556
of cross-appeal filed by Apotex.
Finally, the court noted that even
the court’s precedent supported its position and that other appellate courts allow
conditional cross-appeals. Id. at 1343, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. Aventis then
moved to dismiss. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
547. Id. at 1342, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
548. Id. at 1343, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (quoting Bailey v. Dart Container
Corp., 292 F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
549. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (quoting Bailey, 292 F.3d at 1362, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320).
550. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191–92.
551. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
552. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
553. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
554. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (quoting TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501, 1504 (Fed. Cir.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
555. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
556. Aventis, 637 F.3d at 1343, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (citing TypeRight, 374
F.3d at 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504).
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though it has not sua sponte struck every improperly filed crossappeal, “[t]his infrequent leniency is not an invitation to flaunt [the
court’s] practice and precedent, and the improper use of a crossappeal directly contrary to [the court’s] precedent may meet with
557
sanctions.” Ultimately, because Apotex’s cross-appeal, if successful,
would not expand the scope of the district court’s judgment in favor
of Apotex, the Federal Court granted Aventis’s motion and dismissed
558
Apotex’s improper cross-appeal. The court also noted that it would
address any future motion by Aventis for attorneys’ fees and costs
559
incurred as a result of Apotex’s cross-appeal “in due course.”
560
In Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., the Federal Circuit,
inter alia, dismissed Fiserv, Inc.’s cross-appeal on invalidity because
“[t]he final judgment rule prohibits a party from appealing a district
561
court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment.”
The Federal
Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that appellate
courts lack jurisdiction over the denial of a motion for a summary
judgment based on disputed issues of fact because such a denial ‘does
not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the
562
claim.’” The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim because there was no final determination on the merits of
563
Fiserv’s invalidity counterclaim.
D. Jurisdiction
In 2011, the Federal Circuit had several occasions to clarify its
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and 1295(a)(1).
564
In Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., the Federal
Circuit held that to determine the scope of its appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), it must decide whether the jurisdiction
565
of the district court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
Since the
malpractice claims at issue required the district court to resolve a
substantive issue of patent law—whether Warrior Sports, Inc. would
have prevailed on its infringement claim against one of its
557. Id. at 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
558. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
559. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
560. 641 F.3d 1368, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
561. Id. at 1381, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1979 (quoting Lermer Ger. GmbH v.
Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2014, 2015 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
562. Id. at 1381–82, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1979 (quoting Switz. Cheese Ass’n v.
E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)).
563. Id. at 1382, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1979.
564. 631 F.3d 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
565. Id. at 1370, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
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competitors and been entitled to an award of damages as a result—
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338, and,
566
thus, the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction.
567
In Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., the Federal Circuit
confirmed that it had jurisdiction over an appeal interpreting a
California unfair competition law because the plaintiff also asserted
568
patent infringement claims.
The Federal Circuit noted that even
though the district court had stayed the patent claims pending the
appeal of its decision on the state unfair competition claims, the
existence of the patent claims were sufficient to give rise to the
569
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
570
In Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Federal
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an appeal of an order
granting a motion to stay an infringement suit because the “appeal
[was] not from a final judgment . . . and [did] not otherwise qualify
571
as an appealable order.”
Spread Spectrum Screening LLC (“S3”) asserted patent
infringement claims against Eastman Kodak Co., four of Kodak’s
customers (collectively “the Kodak Customers”), and a Kodak
competitor and one of its customers in the Northern District of
572
Illinois. Two months into the case, Kodak moved to “(1) sever the
case against it from the other defendants; (2) transfer the case
against it to the Western District of New York; and (3) stay the case
573
against the Kodak Customers in the Northern District of Illinois.”
The district court granted Kodak’s motion in all respects, finding that
the Kodak Customers were “merely peripheral” to S3’s claims because
“the customers ‘merely use’ the [allegedly infringing] Kodak
product, [and] ‘they have nothing substantive to offer during
574
plaintiffs [sic] action against Kodak.’” S3 only appealed the district
575
court’s order to stay.
The Federal Circuit rejected S3’s three independent bases for
jurisdiction. First, the Federal Circuit held that the stay was not a
final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 because the stay did not
dispose of S3’s claims against the Kodak Customers or their
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.

Id. at 1370–72, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660–61.
640 F.3d 1377, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1380, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
657 F.3d 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1351, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
Id. at 1352, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id. at 1353, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1351, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
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576

In so holding, the court rejected S3’s two
counterclaims.
577
Specifically, S3 was not “effectively
arguments for an exception.
[put] out of court” by the stay because the stay did not terminate the
action, delay the action for a protracted or indefinite period, or
surrender federal court jurisdiction to a state court or administrative
578
body.
Rather, S3 maintained the ability to pursue its case against
Kodak in the Western District of New York, was not prejudiced
because the parties were under an ongoing obligation to preserve
evidence, and still had monetary damages available to compensate S3
579
for any infringement. The Federal Circuit rejected S3’s additional
argument that the stay should be considered final under Gillespie v.
580
United States Steel Corp. because the Supreme Court made clear that
Gillespie had unique facts and the Court had declined to extend the
581
Thus, the Federal Circuit declined to
case beyond those facts.
582
extend Gillespie in this case.
Second, the Federal Circuit rejected S3’s argument that
interlocutory review was warranted under the “customer-suit
exception ‘to the general rule that favors the forum of the first-filed
583
action.’”
Generally the customer-suit exception is applied “to stay
[an] earlier-filed litigation against a customer while a later-filed case
584
involving the manufacturer proceeds in another forum.”
The
Federal Circuit determined (1) that the facts here were not similar to
the facts in a traditional customer-suit exception case; (2) that the
district court did not apply the customer-suit exception in its order
staying the case, instead relying on Seventh Circuit case law in finding
the Kodak Customers “merely peripheral” to the litigation against
Kodak; and (3) that the broader language in the Federal Circuit’s
585
Kahn v. General Motors Corp. decision is properly limited to cases

576. Id. at 1354, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
577. Id. at 1354–57, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270–72.
578. Id. at 1355–56, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270–71 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
579. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
580. 379 U.S. 148 (1964). In Gillespie, the Supreme Court “found that immediate
appellate review of an interlocutory order was permissible because the effect of the
trial court’s ruling, which struck certain claims from the complaint, was
‘fundamental to the further conduct of the case.’” Spread Spectrum Screening, 657 F.3d
at 1356, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271 (quoting Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 154).
581. Spread Spectrum Screening, 657 F.3d at 1356–57, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
582. Id. at 1357, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
583. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272 (quoting Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1206
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
584. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
585. 889 F.2d 1078, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

2011 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

845
586

dealing with injunctive relief, which was not at issue here.
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the stay did not involve an
587
injunction.
The court rejected S3’s argument that the stay was
effectively an injunction because that rationale could apply to every
588
case in which a stay is ordered.
Fearing this result, the Federal
589
Circuit dismissed S3’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
590
In Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for entry of a
permanent injunction and remanded for entry of an appropriate
591
injunction.
Robert Bosch LLC owns several patents covering
592
various aspects of beam-type wiper blade technology. In addition to
its research and development efforts, Bosch sold blades to both
593
original equipment manufacturers and aftermarket retailers.
“Pylon Manufacturing Corp., LLC (‘Pylon’) also [sold] beam blades
and has competed with Bosch for business from retailers such as Wal594
Mart.”
Bosch sued Pylon, alleging that Pylon’s beam blades
595
infringed Bosch’s patents. The district court bifurcated the issue of
596
Following a jury verdict declaring
damages upon Pylon’s request.
that Pylon infringed valid claims of two of Bosch’s patents, Bosch
597
moved for entry of a permanent injunction.
The district court denied Bosch’s motion, holding that Bosch
failed prove that it would suffer irreparable harm because (1) Bosch
failed to define a relevant market; (2) Bosch competed with other
wiper blade manufacturers in addition to Pylon; and (3) the wiper
blade business was not the “core” nature of Bosch’s business as a
598
whole. Ultimately, “the absence of irreparable harm [was] fatal to
Bosch’s motion,” and the district court denied the motion without
even addressing the other three equitable factors of the permanent
599
600
injunction inquiry. Bosch subsequently appealed.
586. Spread Spectrum Screening, 657 F.3d at 1357–59, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1272–74.
587. Id. at 1359–60, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
588. Id. at 1360, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
589. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274–75.
590. 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
591. Id. at 1157, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
592. Id. at 1145, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658–59.
593. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
594. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
595. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
596. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
597. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
598. Id. at 1146, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
599. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
600. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
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The Federal Circuit rejected Pylon’s argument that its jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to hear Bosch’s appeal was not
established because Bosch was required to show that the district
court’s order will have “‘a serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,’
and that ‘the order can be effectually challenged only by immediate
601
The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with Bosch “that
appeal.’”
the additional hurdles cited by Pylon apply only in cases involving
orders that do not expressly deny an injunction but have the effect of
602
denying injunctive relief.”
Because the district court’s order
explicitly denied the grant of a permanent injunction, Bosch did not
need to make any additional showings to establish the court’s
603
jurisdiction.
E. Review of General Jury Verdict
The Federal Circuit had occasion to address the considerations
relevant to, and potential detriments of, general jury verdicts in
604
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., where the Federal Circuit, inter
alia, vacated the district court’s judgment as a matter of law that claim
9 of Cordance Corporation’s U.S. Patent No. 6,757,710 (“the ’710
605
patent”) was not invalid. At trial, Amazon.com, Inc. presented two
theories as to why claims 2 and 9 of the ’710 patent were invalid:
606
written description and derivation.
The jury found both claims
607
Cordance filed two motions for
invalid in a general verdict.
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Amazon presented
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that (1) claims 1–3,
5, and 7–9 were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f); and that (2) claims
608
7–9 were invalid for lack of an adequate written description.
The
district court granted Cordance’s motions with respect to written
609
description and § 102(f). In granting Cordance’s § 102(f) motion,
however, the district court did not include claims 2 and 9 in its order,
601. Id. at 1147, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659–60 (citation omitted). Pylon
relied on Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 379 (1987), and
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). See Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d
at 1146–47, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (describing Pylon’s insistence that Bosch
meet the standards set out in Stringfellow and Carson).
602. Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1147, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
603. Id. at 1146, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660 (citing Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1300, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662,
1668 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
604. 658 F.3d 1330, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
605. Id. at 1331, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
606. Id. at 1337, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
607. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
608. Id. at 1337–38, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
609. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
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610

Thus,
and did not provide any explanation for their exclusion.
while the district court addressed claim 9 with respect to written
description, it did not find that Amazon presented insufficient
611
evidence as to invalidity of claim 9 under § 102(f).
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the impact on claim 9 of
the district court’s grant of Cordance’s motions on one theory (35
612
U.S.C. § 112) but not the other (§ 102(f)). The court noted that,
“[w]hen reviewing a general jury verdict, different rules apply
depending upon whether the flaw is in the legal theory or the
613
evidence.”
Thus, “[a] general jury verdict of invalidity should be
upheld if there was sufficient evidence to support any of the
614
alternative theories of invalidity.” The court reiterated that:
[a] failure of proof with respect to any single item of evidence does
not justify a grant of either JMOL or a new trial; even if some of the
proposed factual grounds . . . are not generally sufficient to support
a verdict, that is not fatal, because the critical question is whether
the evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to support the jury’s
615
verdict.

The Federal Circuit concluded that because the district court had
not ruled “on the sufficiency of the evidence on both [invalidity]
theories presented to the jury with respect to claim 9, the district
court had no basis to find the jury’s general verdict unsustainable on
616
the written description theory alone.”
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as a matter of law on
617
written description.
F.

Waiver

While the Federal Circuit typically takes a strict approach to waiver,
the court can be more lenient when a party is pro se. Such was the
618
case in Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, where the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s summary judgment determination that Vernon
Bowman infringed several claims of Monsanto’s patents by planting
the progeny of Monsanto Co. and Monsanto Technology LLC’s
610. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
611. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
612. Id. at 1338, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237–38.
613. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
614. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
615. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238 (quoting Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS
Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
616. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
617. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
618. 657 F.3d 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Additionally, the court concluded that
genetically altered seeds.
although Bowman did not waive his argument regarding lack of
notice, Bowman had actual notice of Monsanto’s allegations of
620
infringement.
Monsanto invented, developed, and patented technology for
genetically modified “Roundup Ready” soybeans that exhibit
resistance to N-phosphonomethylglycine (a compound commonly
621
The technology allows for the
known as glyphosate).
transformation of a plant cell with a gene encoding for a glyphosate622
tolerant enzyme. The plants then express the enzyme and exhibit
glyphosate resistance, which allows farmers to treat their fields with
glyphosate-based herbicides, such as Monsanto’s Roundup product,
623
to curb weed growth without harming the crops.
This technology
624
In 2007, Monsanto
can be incorporated into a variety of crops.
sued Bowman, a grower, for infringement of two of its patents
625
relating to the relevant technology.
The district court found that
626
Bowman infringed, and Bowman appealed.
On appeal, Bowman argued that Monsanto could not recover preComplaint damages because Monsanto did not, as required by 35
U.S.C. § 287(a), provide actual notice and did not mark or require
growers to mark their second-generation seeds containing
627
Monsanto’s patented technology.
Monsanto countered that
Bowman waived his argument regarding lack of notice by failing to
628
raise it at the district court. Further, Monsanto asserted that even if
Bowman’s notice argument had not been waived, Monsanto
complied with § 287(a) by providing Bowman with actual notice of
the infringement, or alternatively, provided constructive notice “by
marking and requiring all seed partners to mark first-generation
629
seeds containing Monsanto’s patented technology.”
The Federal Circuit reiterated that § 287(a) allows a patent owner
to recover damages for patent infringement “only after providing
actual notice to the accused infringer or constructive notice through
marking the patented article or its package with the applicable patent
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.

Id. at 1343, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1348–49, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id. at 1343, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1343–44, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1344, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1346, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
Id. at 1348, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
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630

The Federal Circuit held that because Bowman
number(s).”
argued that Monsanto failed to put any growers or grain elevators on
notice of its patent rights before the district court, Bowman did not
631
waive his lack of notice argument under § 287(a).
Thus, the
Federal Circuit concluded that while Bowman did not cite § 287(a) as
the legal basis for his “lack of notice” contention, “as a pro se litigant,
he alleged facts and proffered argument sufficient to preserve the
632
issue for appeal.”
633
In Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit
reached the opposite result when considering the issue of waiver as it
634
On cross-appeal, Cordance
related to discrete patent claims.
sought a new trial regarding the jury’s invalidity verdict, but it did not
contend that Amazon’s evidence on derivation was insufficient as to
claims 2 and 9 of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,710, or that the district court
erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law on
635
derivation as to claims 2 and 9.
The Federal Circuit noted that
“Cordance, on appeal, never argued the separate issue of claims 2
and 9 and glossed over the fact that the district court did not grant its
. . . motion [for judgment as a matter of law] on derivation as to
636
claims 2 and 9.”
Cordance did not seek an amended judgment
before the district court and “waived its challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence as to derivation before the district court and before [the
637
Federal Circuit] on appeal.” Further, the Federal Circuit held that
Cordance failed to present any argument relevant to its request for a
new trial on the validity of claims 2 and 9, and thus, similarly waived
638
that issue on appeal.
III. AGENCY PRACTICE
A. United States Patent and Trademark Office
In 2011, the Federal Circuit had occasion to consider several
appeals from the USPTO, including those addressing the USPTO’s
initial burden to establish a prima facie case of invalidity. The court
reminded the USPTO of its obligation to issue a new ground of
630. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006); Dunlap
v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 247–48 (1894)).
631. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
632. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229–30.
633. 658 F.3d 1330, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
634. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
635. Id. at 1331, 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232, 1238.
636. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
637. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
638. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
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rejection when new factual findings change the thrust of the
639
The court rejected the notion that res
examiner’s rejection.
judicata or issue preclusion would preclude a reexamination
proceeding based on some of the same references previously asserted
against some of the same claims in a prior litigation that resulted in a
640
finding that the claims were not invalid.
641
In In re Jung, the Federal Circuit considered the USPTO’s initial
642
The court
burden of establishing a prima facie case of invalidity.
explained that the USPTO satisfies its initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case when a rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying
the applicant of the reasons for the rejection together with such
information and references that may be useful in determining
643
whether to continue prosecution of the application.
The Federal
Circuit held that there was never a requirement that an examiner
make an on-the-record claim construction of every term in every
rejected claim and explain every difference between the prior art and
644
claimed invention to constitute a prima facie rejection.
645
In In re Leithem, the Federal Circuit again reminded the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences that when it relies upon a new
ground of rejection, the applicant is entitled to reopen prosecution
646
or to request a rehearing. In this case, the Federal Circuit vacated
and remanded the Board’s decision to sustain the unpatentability of
the sole pending claim of U.S. Patent Application No. 09/863,585
(“the ’585 application”) for obviousness because the Board, in
affirming the examiner’s rejection, relied on a new ground of
647
648
The ’585 application disclosed an improved diaper.
rejection.
Typically, “diapers are constructed using an absorbent core of dry
649
shredded wood fiber pulp, known as fluff pulp.” The fluff pulp for
the improved diaper was manufactured by extracting wood pulp with

639. In re Leithem, 661 F.3d 1316, 1319, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155, 1157 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
640. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1256, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922,
1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
641. 637 F.3d 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
642. Id. at 1358–59, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
643. Id. at 1362, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006)).
644. Id. at 1363, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
645. 661 F.3d 1316, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
646. Id. at 1316–17, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158; see also Jung, 637 F.3d at 1364,
98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (reminding the Board that an applicant is entitled to
reopen prosecution or request a new hearing when the Board relies on a new
ground of rejection).
647. Leithem, 661 F.3d at 1316–17, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
648. Id. at 1317, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
649. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
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a caustic substance at low temperature followed by drying and
650
fluffing.
The examiner rejected the pending claim as obvious over two prior
art references, finding that one of the references disclosed a diaper
satisfying every claim element except manufacturing the fluff pulp by
cold caustic extraction, and that the other reference disclosed cold
651
caustic extraction of wood pulp and a method of making fluff pulp.
The examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to modify
the first reference (“Pociluyko”) with a fluff pulp made by the
652
method disclosed in the second reference (“Novak”).
On appeal to the Board, Leithem argued that Novak teaches a pulp
that is wet-laid paper, not a fluffed pulp material, and thus Novak’s
wet-laid paper could not simply be substituted for the dried fluff pulp
653
of Pociluyko to produce the claimed invention.
In its initial
decision, the Board agreed with Leithem regarding Novak’s
disclosure, but sustained the rejection because the Board also found
that “the Novak pulp is a pulp which may be fluffed for use in an
654
absorbent core.”
Leithem petitioned the Board for rehearing, contending that the
Board relied on a new ground of rejection because it found that
Novak’s pulp was not fluffed, but could be dried, fluffed, and then
used as disclosed in Pociluyko, whereas the examiner, had “found
655
The
that Novak’s wet-laid pulp was itself already a fluff pulp.”
Board disagreed with Leithem’s contention, finding that the thrust of
the rejection had not changed because the examiner referred to
“pulp,” Leithem referred to “pulp,” and the Board’s initial decision
656
referred to “pulp.”
Thus, the Board denied Leithem’s request for
657
rehearing.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Leithem again argued that the
Board relied on a new ground of rejection when it affirmed the
658
examiner’s rejection.
While Leithem agreed that Novak’s wet-laid
paper “could be dried and then shredded in a hammermill to make

650. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156–57.
651. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citations omitted).
652. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citation omitted).
653. See id. at 1318, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citation omitted) (describing
the Board’s findings, pursuant to Novak’s arguments).
654. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
655. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
656. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citation omitted).
657. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citation omitted).
658. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
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fluff pulp,” that was not the reason for the examiner’s rejection.
The Federal Circuit first explained that “[m]ere reliance on the
same statutory basis and the same prior art references, alone, is
insufficient to avoid making a new ground of rejection when the
Board relies on new facts and rationales not previously raised . . . by
660
the examiner.”
While the Board is permitted to make additional
factual findings founded upon the Board’s own knowledge and
experience to “fill in the gaps” that may occur in the examiner’s
evidentiary showing, the court stated that “when reliance upon such
facts changes the thrust of the rejection, the Board’s action ‘does
661
everything but cry out for an opportunity to respond.’”
The court concluded that the Board “found new facts concerning
the scope and content of the prior art” and that these facts were the
662
principal evidence upon which the Board’s rejection was based.
Because the examiner never expressed, nor relied upon, the Board’s
rationale for combining Novak with Pociluyko, Leithem was never
663
afforded an opportunity to respond specifically to this rejection.
Accordingly, the court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded
the case to provide Leithem a chance to respond to the new
664
rejection.
In so doing, the court explained that “[t]he Board
cannot play it so fast and loose in affirming an examiner’s rejection
665
that it disregards procedural safeguards afforded to the applicant.”
666
In In re Stepan Co., the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
Board’s decision affirming an examiner’s obviousness rejection
during reexamination of a patent because the Board relied on a new
667
ground of rejection.
The examiner, on reexamination, ruled that
all of the claims “were invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
668
or, in the alternative, obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).”
On
appeal, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the claims for
669
obviousness, relying on the same references the examiner cited.
The examiner and the Board found most of the patent claims
obvious in light of the reference, WO 97/21764 (“Singh”), and found
the remaining claims to be obvious in light of Singh combined with
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.

Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
Id. at 1319, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1320, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
Id. at 1321, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
660 F.3d 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1342–43, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489–90.
Id. at 1343, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
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670

The examiner, however, viewed Singh as
other patent references.
prior art under § 102(b), which includes “publications or inventions
patented more than one year prior to the date of the application of
the patent in question,” while the Board viewed Singh as prior art
under § 102(a), which includes “publications or inventions patented
671
before the invention thereof by the applicant.”
Although the
examiner did not treat Singh as § 102(a) prior art, the Board further
held that the Rule 1.131 Declaration submitted by Stepan Company
was “ineffective to remove Singh as a reference qualifying under 35
672
673
U.S.C. § 102(a).” Stepan appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first explained that under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b), the Board has the authority to issue a new ground of
rejection if the Board knows of any grounds not involved in the
674
appeal for rejecting any pending claim.
“Because the Board is
limited to review of the examiner’s decisions . . . the authority to issue
a new ground of rejection, and the rights of the applicant that flow
therefrom, ensure that the Board can fulfill its notice obligation to
675
the applicant during prosecution.”
The Federal Circuit held that “[b]y making and relying on new fact
findings regarding . . . the sufficiency of Stepan’s Declaration to swear
behind the Singh reference as § 102(a) prior art, the Board relied on
676
a new ground of rejection.”
The court rejected the USPTO’s
argument that Stepan had a fair opportunity to be heard simply
because Stepan presented, and the Board considered, argument and
677
evidence to antedate Singh as a § 102(a) reference.
The court
rejected the USPTO’s alternative argument that Stepan waived its
administrative due process rights by not requesting a rehearing of the
678
Board’s decision. The court interpreted the USPTO’s argument as
asserting that the Board had discretion to determine whether to
679
designate a ground of rejection as “new.”
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit first noted that no deference was
due the USPTO’s regulatory interpretation because the

670. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
671. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (internal quotation marks omitted).
672. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
673. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
674. Id. at 1344, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
(2011)).
675. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006)).
676. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (citation omitted).
677. Id. at 1344–45, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
678. Id. at 1345, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491–92.
679. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires “prior notice to the
applicant of all ‘matters of fact and law asserted’ prior to an appeal
680
Thus, the court concluded that
hearing before the Board.”
“[a]llowing the Board unfettered discretion to designate a new
ground of rejection . . . would frustrate the notice requirements of
681
the APA.”
Second, the court held that the USPTO’s argument contradicted
the plain text of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), which states that “when the
Board makes a new ground of rejection, the appellant, within two
months from the date of the decision, must” reopen prosecution or
682
The applicant’s obligation to pursue one of
request rehearing.
these two options, however, is only triggered “after ‘the Board makes a
683
new ground of rejection.’” Thus, since the Board did not designate
its new §§ 102(a)/103(a) rejection as a new ground of rejection,
684
“Stepan had no affirmative obligation to request rehearing.”
Finally, because the Board failed to indicate that its rejection was a
new ground, the Federal Circuit concluded that “the Board’s decision
was final for the purposes of judicial review and Stepan complied with
its administrative process obligations pursuant to [the USPTO’s]
685
Accordingly, while the court did not express an
regulations.”
opinion on the merits of the obviousness rejection or the use of
Singh as § 102(a) prior art, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded for Stepan to pursue its patent application in accordance
686
with 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
687
In In re Construction Equipment Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board’s conclusion following reexamination that the patent
688
claims at issue were obvious over the prior art.
Construction
Equipment Company (“CEC”) owns U.S. Patent No. 5,234,564 (“the
’564 patent”), which describes a vehicle that screens rocks and plant
689
matter based on size from soil or dirt at a construction site.
Following a request for ex parte reexamination of several claims of
the ’564 patent, the USPTO found that the request “raised a

680. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (2006)).
681. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
682. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(b) (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
683. Id. at 1345–46, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (quoting 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(b)(2)).
684. Id. at 1346, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
685. Id. at 1346 n.2, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 n.2.
686. Id. at 1346 & n.4, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 & n.4.
687. 665 F.3d 1254, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
688. Id. at 1254, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
689. Id. at 1254–55, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922–23.
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substantial new question of patentability” and began reexamination
690
CEC asserted that the request was initiated by
proceedings.
Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd., against whom CEC had
previously asserted the ’564 patent and had attained an injunction
691
against further infringement.
After the reexamination, all of the
claims at issue were rejected by the examiner as obvious in light of
692
the numerous other references cited in the reexamination request.
CEC appealed to the Board, which generally affirmed the Examiner’s
693
rejections.
The Federal Circuit found no error of either fact or law in the
694
The court agreed with the Board that “every
Board’s analysis.
limitation of each claim” was found in one of the available
695
references. The court further agreed that “one of ordinary skill in
the art would have been able to combine the available references in
such a way as to practice the alleged invention of each claim,” and
“that such a person would have had a reason to make such
696
combinations.” The court therefore concluded that CEC’s alleged
invention consisted entirely of “combining known elements into a
machine that, while possibly new, was nevertheless obvious and
697
therefore unpatentable.”
Judge Newman, in dissent, raised issues related to the
constitutionality of agency actions, res judicata, and issue
698
preclusion.
First, Judge Newman noted that the USPTO’s
reexamination decision addressed the same issue that the Federal
Circuit had adjudicated eleven years ago, when the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court’s ruling of nonobviousness of the ’564 patent
based on some of the same references cited in the reexamination
699
request. Judge Newman expressed concern that, in this case, there
had already been a final disposition of the issue of validity in Article
700
III-safeguarded courts.
As Judge Newman explained, “the
Constitution places the judicial power in the courts, whose judgments
are not thereafter subject to revision or rejection,” and that
“[n]either the legislative nor the executive branch has the authority
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.

Id. at 1255, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id. at 1255 n.1, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923 n.1 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1255, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id. at 1255–56, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id. at 1255, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id. at 1255–56, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id. at 1256, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
Id. at 1257–61, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924–28 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1257, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
Id. at 1258, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926 (citations omitted).
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701

Consequently, Judge Newman
to revise judicial determinations.”
concluded that “revision by the agency of the district court’s order
would render the previous judgment by the district court ‘merely
702
advisory’ and thus in violation of the Constitution.”
Judge Newman also expressed her belief that “the principles of
litigation repose” are violated by an administrative agency’s
703
reopening of issues that were finally decided by the judiciary.
According to Judge Newman, the rules of res judicata and issue
preclusion were relevant in this case because reexamination was
requested by Powerscreen, who was the defendant in the prior district
court proceeding, the appellant in the prior Federal Circuit appeal,
704
and the petitioner for certiorari.
Judge Newman cited to language of the Supreme Court, in which
the Court explained that under res judicata, “a final judgment on the
merits of . . . an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
705
action.” Judge Newman then went on to state that the fundamental
rationale of the doctrine of issue preclusion is that “a party who has
litigated an issue and lost should be bound by that decision and
706
cannot demand that the issue be decided over again.”
Moreover,
according to Judge Newman, the “fundamentals of judicial authority
and administrative obligation are not subject to the vagaries of shifts
in the burden or standard of proof in nonjudicial forums,” and “a
lower standard of proof in an administrative agency cannot override
707
the finality of judicial adjudication.”
Thus, Judge Newman
concluded that because the question of obviousness had already been
finally decided, Powerscreen should have been precluded from
708
reopening the same issue in another forum.
Furthermore, Judge
Newman noted that the issue was not waived because “[w]aiver is
inapplicable against issues of res judicata and issue preclusion, for
preclusion principles serve the powerful public and private interests

701. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925.
702. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925.
703. Id. at 1258–59, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
704. Id. at 1259, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
705. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926 (quoting San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &
Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 n.16 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
706. Id. at 1260, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927 (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d
1459, 1465, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
707. Id. at 1261, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
708. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
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of finality in judicial proceedings and the avoidance of inconsistent
709
results.”
The panel majority responded in a footnote, noting that it was
“unpersuaded by the dissent’s contention” that the court should hold
the reexamination proceedings unconstitutional, or barred by res
710
judicata or issue preclusion.
First, the majority explained that
federal appellate courts have “a well-established practice of declining
to take up arguments not timely made by the parties,” and stated that
the notion that the reexamination was ipso facto unlawful was neither
711
briefed nor argued by any party, at any stage of the case.
Second, the majority disagreed that either constitutional principles
or the common-law doctrines of claim or issue preclusion would bar
712
reexamination of the ’564 patent, finding In re Swanson to be
713
In describing the holding in
“highly instructive” in this regard.
Swanson, the majority recalled that the Federal Circuit had “found no
error in the [US]PTO’s holding that reexamination could be
instituted on the strength of a reference that the requesting party had
unsuccessfully asserted as prior art in litigation involving the same
patent, even where [the Federal Circuit] had affirmed the district
714
court’s judgment of validity.” As the majority further explained, the
Swanson court’s judgment was “not incompatible with the
[e]xaminer’s rejection of claims on reexamination” because the
“district court’s judgment was not that the patent was valid per se, but
that the accused infringer had failed to carry its burden to prove it
715
invalid.”
Thus, there was “no contradiction between the affirmed
litigation judgment and the [e]xaminer’s rejection during
716
reexamination.”
The majority could find no reason why Swanson
would not control this case because, in both cases, “the
reexamination was initiated by a party that had previously failed to
717
prove the patent invalid in litigation.”
Moreover, the majority
noted that “the reexamination involved numerous references,

709. Id. at 1259, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
710. Id. at 1256 n.3, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3 (majority opinion).
711. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3 (citations omitted).
712. 540 F.3d 1368, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
713. Constr. Equip., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
714. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3 (citing Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1379, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203).
715. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3 (citing Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1379, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203).
716. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
717. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
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combinations, and even claims” not considered in the prior district
718
court action.
Third, the majority argued that “the dissent’s suggestion that a
finding that a patent is not invalid in one proceeding against one
party would bar any other validity challenge would be a dramatic
expansion of the concept of non-mutual offensive collateral
719
estoppel.” The court therefore declined “to adopt a rule for patent
cases that [was] inconsistent with all other governing law regarding
720
collateral estoppel.”
B. International Trade Commission
In John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. v. International Trade
721
Commission, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s determination
that John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. (d/b/a PPC, Inc.) (“PPC”),
failed to satisfy the domestic industry requirement of section 337 of
722
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. PPC manufactured cable
connectors, used to connect coaxial cables, and various electronic
723
devices. PPC filed suit in the ITC, alleging violations of section 337
and asserting infringement of several patents, including U.S. Patent
No. D440,539 (“the ’539 patent”), which “describes an ornamental
724
design for a coaxial cable connector.”
Under section 337, PPC was required to establish a domestic
725
industry relating to the ’539 patent. PPC granted only one license
for the ’539 patent to Arris International, Inc. as a result of years of
litigation involving PPC, Arris, and Arris’s distributor, International
Communications Manufacturing, Inc. (“ICM”) in three different
726
actions, two of which involved the ’539 patent. PPC argued that the
money it spent litigating the patent up to execution of the license
should be considered a substantial investment in exploitation of the
727
’539 patent through licensing. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
initially agreed, finding that PPC satisfied the domestic industry
728
requirement.
718. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
719. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
720. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 n.3.
721. 660 F.3d 1322, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1462 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1536, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26154 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2011).
722. Id. at 1324, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
723. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
724. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
725. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2006)).
726. Id. at 1325, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
727. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463–64.
728. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
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The ITC, however, reversed the ALJ’s ruling. The Commission
found that while in some circumstances enforcement-related
litigation expenses may support a finding of domestic industry, in this
case PPC had not met its burden to show that its litigation expenses
729
were related to licensing. The ITC remanded the case to the ALJ to
allow PPC an opportunity to show what portions of its enforcementrelated expenses were related to licensing and to demonstrate that its
730
investment in licensing was substantial.
“On remand, the [ALJ]
ruled that PPC had not sufficiently tied its litigation costs to licensing
and that any investment that PPC had made in licensing was not
731
substantial.”
The ALJ’s remand opinion was adopted by the ITC
732
733
without modification and the order became final. PPC appealed.
The Federal Circuit first rejected the ITC’s argument that PPC did
734
not have standing to appeal. The ITC argued that PPC suffered no
injury from the ITC’s decision because the only imported product
that was found to infringe the ’539 patent was also found to infringe
735
one of PPC’s utility patents. Thus, the ITC asserted that PPC lacked
736
standing to appeal. The Federal Circuit held that just because the
infringing product “will be excluded regardless of the outcome of the
appeal does not moot PPC’s interest in obtaining the much broader”
general exclusion order to exclude all products deemed to infringe
737
the ’539 patent.
Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit agreed with the ITC that
expenditures on patent litigation do not always constitute evidence of
738
a substantial investment in the exploitation of a patent. Here, the
ALJ found that there was no evidence that PPC engaged in
739
prelitigation licensing efforts.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the vague testimony of PPC’s executives did not
undermine the ALJ’s finding that PPC failed to demonstrate that it
attempted to license the ’539 patent to Arris before beginning
740
litigation. Moreover, PPC received a permanent injunction in one
case that remained in place for two years until PPC licensed the ’539

729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.

Id. at 1326, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id. at 1327, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
Id. at 1328, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

860

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
741

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

[Vol. 61:785

patent to Arris. The ITC found that the delay suggested that PPC’s
goal in litigating was to stop Arris from manufacturing its infringing
742
products, not to get a license. In light of the record, the court held
that the ALJ reasonably concluded that PPC failed to show that the
expenses of two litigations involving the ’539 patent were related to
743
licensing.
As for the third litigation, which involved a different utility patent,
PPC argued that the enforcement of that patent forced Arris to sign
the license to the ’539 patent and, therefore, PPC should have been
744
credited toward its investment in licensing the ’539 patent.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed, reasoning that it did not follow that PPC’s
actions in the litigation were directed toward licensing the ’539
745
patent.
Although the ALJ found that PPC had incurred some legal
expenses in negotiating and drafting the licensing agreement, the
746
ALJ found that the investment was not substantial.
Moreover, the
ALJ noted that “PPC had no formal licensing program and there was
no evidence that it had offered to license the patent to any party
747
other than its litigation opponents.” Although “there is no rule that
a single license . . . cannot satisfy the domestic industry requirement
based on a substantial investment in licensing,” the Federal Circuit
concluded that the ALJ could view the absence of other licenses as a
748
factor supporting his decision.
Thus, the Federal Circuit
determined that the ITC’s conclusion, based on the ALJ’s review of
749
the evidence, was supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the court rejected PPC’s argument that the ITC should
have “credited at least a portion of the salary that PPC paid to the
named inventor of the ’539 design patent as an investment in
‘engineering, research and development,’ together with PPC’s
investment in the equipment and facilities [to develop] the patented
750
design.”
The ITC found that PPC presented no evidence of any
investment in research and development that related specifically to
751
the ’539 patent. Because PPC had the burden of proof, the Federal
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.

Id. at 1329, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id. at 1330, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id. at 1329–30, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
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Circuit held there was no error in the ITC’s conclusion that PPC
failed to carry its burden, and there was no reason to remand for
752
further findings, as suggested by the dissent.
Writing separately, Judge Reyna joined the majority’s opinion
finding that PPC had standing to seek a general exclusion order with
753
respect to the ’539 patent. But Judge Reyna dissented from the rest
of the majority opinion because he believed additional fact-finding
was needed to determine whether PPC’s research and development
754
expenditures were a substantial investment in exploitation.
Judge
Reyna believed that “PPC introduced substantial evidence showing its
considerable investment in the . . . research project as a whole, which
755
necessarily included the work that yielded the patented design.”
He then stated that there was no evidence in the record to support
the ITC’s conclusion that the time and resources PPC invested in
researching or developing the design of the ’539 patent were
756
minimal and could not constitute a substantial investment.
Accordingly, Judge Reyna stated that “[r]emand is necessary to
conduct further fact finding as to the extent to which PPC’s research
and development efforts may be allocated between the functional
757
and ornamental features” of the invention.
Judge Reyna also believed that the ITC erred in its interpretation
and application of section 337(a)(3)(C), resulting in its wholesale
rejection of litigation expenses for meeting the domestic industry
758
requirement, except in limited circumstances.
He stated that
Congress did not limit the term “exploitation” to activity only related
759
to one of the named examples listed in the statute. Rather, Judge
Reyna argued that Congress left the list open-ended to provide
760
flexibility for what may constitute exploitation.
Because the ITC
failed to articulate any reasonable basis in the legislative history to
justify departing from the plain meaning of the statute, the “ITC’s
construction artificially and arbitrarily narrowed the domestic
761
Judge Reyna also expressed his view that,
industry requirement.”
with respect to section 337 investigations, the ITC is an intellectual
property enforcement forum and that, under the broad language of
752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.

Id. at 1331, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
Id. at 1336, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
Id. at 1336–37, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472–73.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473–74.
Id. at 1338, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474.
Id. at 1338–39, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474.
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section 337(a)(3)(C), patent infringement litigation is an investment
762
in the exploitation of a patent.
IV. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Introduction
The Federal Circuit issued numerous opinions impacting
patentability and validity in 2011. Highlights include applications of
35 U.S.C. § 101 following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
763
Bilski v. Kappos, most notably, the landmark decision in Association
for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office
764
765
(Myriad), regarding the patentability of DNA molecules, and
766
relating to the
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec,
relationship between vaccination schedules and the subsequent
767
occurrence of noninfectious medical disorders.
Other highlights
relate to obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton
768
769
Enterprises, Inc.,
In re Brimonidine Patent Litigation,
and Star
770
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ) and the adequacy of
written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc.
771
v. Abbott Laboratories, Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated Regional &
772
University Pathologists, Inc., and Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson &
773
Johnson ).
B. Patentable Subject Matter
Section 101 provides that an applicant may obtain a patent for
discovering or inventing a “new and useful process, machine,
774
manufacture, or composition of matter.”
Long-standing case law
has defined three categories that are per se excluded from § 101
subject matter eligibility: (1) laws of nature, (2) physical phenomena,

762. Id. at 1339, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474.
763. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010).
764. 653 F.3d 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
765. Id. at 1344, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
766. 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
767. Id. at 1059, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
768. 632 F.3d 1358, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
769. 643 F.3d 1366, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-800, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2363 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
770. 655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
771. 636 F.3d 1341, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-596, 2012 WL 538345 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012).
772. 642 F.3d 1031, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
773. 647 F.3d 1353, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
774. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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775

and (3) abstract ideas. Section 101 jurisprudence has come under
776
both the Federal Circuit’s and the public’s scrutiny in recent years.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s most recent § 101 guidance in
777
Bilski v. Kappos,
the Federal Circuit considered several cases
presenting an issue of § 101 subject matter eligibility.
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
778
Trademark Office (Myriad), multiple entities—consisting of medical
organizations, researchers, genetic counselors, and patients—sued
Myriad Genetics, Inc., seeking declaratory judgment to invalidate
779
Myriad’s patents.
Myriad owns several patents, including both
composition and method claims related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2
780
genes, genes that are linked to breast and ovarian cancer.
The
district court granted summary judgment, invalidating Myriad’s
patent claims for failing to claim eligible subject matter under §
781
101.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the composition claims,
holding that Myriad’s patent claims to isolated genes are directed to
782
783
patent-eligible subject matter. Relying on Diamond v. Chakrabarty
784
and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the court stated that
the distinction “between a product of nature and a human-made
invention for purposes of § 101 turns on a change in the claimed
785
composition’s identity compared with what exists in nature.”
Applying that construct, the court held that “BRCA1 and BRCA2 in
their isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in
786
the body.”
The court noted that isolating DNA is not the same as
merely “purifying” DNA, focusing on the structural differences
787
between naturally occurring and isolated DNA.
Indeed, the court
775. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197
(1980).
776. Last year, the Supreme Court declined to create a new categorical exclusion
for business method patents in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (2010). This year, the Federal Circuit declined to create a new categorical
exclusion for isolated DNA molecules in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United
States Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
777. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010).
778. 653 F.3d 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11725, 2012 WL 986819 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
779. Id. at 1333, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
780. Id. at 1334, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
781. Id. at 1333–34, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
782. Id. at 1350, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
783. 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
784. 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (1948).
785. Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1351, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
786. Id. at 1352, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
787. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415–16.
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found characteristics such as informational properties and
physiological use or benefit irrelevant to the patent-eligibility
788
inquiry. The court also noted that holding isolated DNA molecules
eligible subject matter for patentability “comports with the
789
Accordingly, the court
longstanding practice of the [US]PTO.”
held that isolated DNA molecules qualify as patent-eligible subject
790
matter.
With respect to Myriad’s method claims, however, the court
determined that all but one of Myriad’s claims were directed to
791
abstract mental processes, which is patent-ineligible subject matter.
Myriad’s method claims encompassed (1) comparing and analyzing
two gene sequences and (2) screening potential cancer
792
therapeutics.
The court noted that Myriad’s first type of method
claims included no further process or administering or determining
step beyond looking at two sequences and identifying any differences
793
between them.
The court further explained that because the
“comparison between the two sequences can be accomplished by
794
mere inspection alone,” the claims merely recite abstract mental
795
processes and fail to satisfy § 101.
In contrast, Myriad’s second type of method claim required
“growing” host cells transformed with the BRCA1 gene in the
presence or absence of a potential therapeutic, “determining” the
growth rate of the two types of cells, and “comparing” the growth rate
of the two types of cells to assess the potential therapeutic’s
796
effectiveness.
The court concluded this process included
transformative steps (i.e., growing the transformed cells) and physical
manipulation (i.e., determining the cells’ growth rate), not merely
797
mental processes.
Thus, the court held the latter of Myriad’s
798
method claims directed to patentable subject matter.
799
Judge Moore concurred in the judgment. For inventions derived
from nature, Judge Moore distilled a slightly different test from Funk
Brothers and Chakrabarty than did the majority: an invention with

788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.

Id. at 1353, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
Id. at 1354, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
Id. at 1353–54, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
Id. at 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
Id. at 1355, 1357, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418–20.
Id. at 1356–57, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419.
Id. at 1357, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419–20.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
Id. at 1357–58, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
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“markedly different characteristics with the potential for significant
800
Applying the test to Myriad’s
utility, is patentable subject matter.”
composition claims, Judge Moore agreed that cDNAs and small,
isolated DNA fragments are patentable subject matter because they
chemically differ from and have “different and beneficial utility” than
801
naturally occurring DNA.
Judge Moore encountered difficulty in
applying the test to longer, isolated DNA fragments because the
“chemical and structural differences in an isolated gene do not
clearly lead to ‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared
802
to nature.” Judge Moore nevertheless concluded that deference to
Congress and settled expectations (based on the USPTO’s grant of
patents for isolated DNA molecules for “more than a decade”)
weighed against categorically excluding longer, isolated DNA
803
molecules from patent-eligible subject matter.
804
Judge Bryson concurred in part and dissented in part.
Judge
Bryson agreed with the court’s holding regarding Myriad’s cDNA
805
claims and method claims. Judge Bryson departed from the court’s
holding regarding the patentability of Myriad’s gene and gene
806
fragment claims.
Judge Bryson summarized the issue as “whether
an individual can obtain patent rights to a human gene,” which he
807
answered in the negative.
Judge Bryson grounded his dissent on the principle that “isolated
808
Judge
genes are not materially different from the native genes.”
Bryson’s interpretation of Chakrabarty is essentially the same as that
which Judge Moore set forth in her concurring opinion: “(1) the
similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is found in
nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and
809
what is found in nature.”
Judge Bryson, like Judge Moore, also
performed different analyses for longer DNA fragments (i.e., the
810
isolated gene) and shorter DNA fragments.
800. Id. at 1359–60, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422 (emphasis added) (citing
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197
(1980)).
801. Id. at 1364–65, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
802. Id. at 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280, 281–82 (1948)).
803. Id. at 1367, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427–28.
804. Id. at 1373, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
805. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
806. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
807. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
808. Id. at 1375, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
809. Compare id. at 1378, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435, with id. at 1359–60, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
810. Id. at 1373, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431–32 (Bryson, J., concurring in part
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Considering the structure of a gene within the chromosome, Judge
Bryson reasoned that any change that may exist between the isolated
DNA molecule and the naturally occurring DNA molecule is
“necessarily incidental to the extraction of the genes from the
811
Judge Bryson
environment in which they are found in nature.”
analogized cleaning a dirty diamond to cleaving the naturally
occurring “chemical bonds” in native DNA to produce isolated
812
genes.
This “change,” Judge Bryson concluded, is not enough to
813
render the isolated DNA molecule patent-eligible subject matter.
Likewise, analyzing utility, Judge Bryson stated that “Myriad has
failed to credibly identify new uses for the isolated BRCA genes as
814
probes or primers.”
Judge Bryson also highlighted that
“[b]iochemists extract the target genes along lines defined by nature
so as to preserve the structure and function that the gene possessed
815
in its natural environment.”
Regarding Myriad’s claims to shorter DNA fragments, Judge
Bryson’s dissent focused solely on the “breathtakingly broad” claim
816
language.
On this basis, Judge Bryson would have held Myriad’s
817
Finally, Judge Bryson’s dissent disputed the
claims unpatentable.
weight that the majority assigned to the USPTO’s practice of granting
818
patents for DNA molecules. Judge Bryson pointed to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, which made no mention of deference
owed to the USPTO’s prior determination that microorganisms were
819
not patent-eligible subject matter.
Judge Bryson admonished that
neither the inventing community’s expectations nor the USPTO’s
past practice should color the court’s role, which is “to interpret the
law that Congress has written in accordance with the governing
820
precedents.”
Quickly following Myriad, the Federal Circuit again confronted §
821
101 in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC.
On remand
from the Supreme Court’s vacature of the Federal Circuit opinion
following Bilski, the court reconsidered the patent eligibility of the

and dissenting in part).
811. Id. at 1375, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
812. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
813. Id. at 1375–76, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433–34.
814. Id. at 1378, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
815. Id. at 1377, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
816. Id. at 1378–79, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
817. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
818. Id. at 1380, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
819. Id. at 1381, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437–38.
820. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437–38.
821. 659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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subject matter of Classen Immunotherapies, Inc.’s asserted method
822
patent claims.
823
Classen owns the rights to three related patents. Representative
claims for two of the patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,420,139 (“the ’139
patent”) and 6,638,739 (“the ’739 patent”), claim the “method
whereby information on immunization schedules and the occurrence
of chronic disease is ‘screened’ and ‘compared,’ the lower risk
schedule is ‘identified,’ and the vaccine is ‘administered’ on that
824
schedule.”
The third patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 (“the ’283
patent”), claims “[a] method of determining whether an
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic
immune-mediated disorder” by immunizing a group of mammals
according to a known schedule and comparing the incidence of
825
chronic disease against a control group. The district court granted
summary judgment, holding all asserted claims to be ineligible for
patenting under § 101 because they claimed an abstract idea, namely,
the “relation between the infant immunization schedule for
infectious diseases and the later occurrence of chronic immune826
mediated (non-infectious) disorders.”
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit first emphasized that “[t]he § 101
827
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”
The court
endorsed the long-recognized distinction between the § 101
categories of eligible subject matter and the substantive conditions of
828
patentability enumerated in §§ 102, 103, and 112.
The court
reiterated that “the presence of a mental step is not of itself fatal to §
829
101 eligibility.”
The Federal Circuit relied heavily upon its opinion in Research Corp.
830
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., noting that the Supreme Court
831
declined to define “abstract” in Bilski. The Federal Circuit held in
Research Corp. that “the preferable procedure, when the claims are
within the general classes of § 101 subject matter and not manifestly
822. Id. at 1059, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010)).
823. Id. at 1060, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
824. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
825. Id. at 1060–61, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495–96.
826. Id. at 1059, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
827. Id. at 1064, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225,
95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
828. Id. at 1064–65, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498–99 (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 10 (1981)).
829. Id. at 1065, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
830. 627 F.3d 859, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
831. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1065–66, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499–500 (citing
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868–69, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280–81).
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abstract, is to apply the substantive conditions and requirements of
832
patentability.” Thus, observing that the ’139 and ’739 patents both
include a physical step (i.e., immunizing on the determined
schedule), the court held the claimed subject matter “traverses the
833
coarse eligibility filter of § 101.”
Indeed, the court characterized
the inclusion of the physical, “immunizing” step as moving the claims
834
“from abstract scientific principle to specific application.” The ’283
patent, on the other hand, merely recites the collection and
835
comparison of data, with no corresponding immunization step.
Accordingly, the court found the ’283 patent claims directed to
836
ineligible subject matter.
Disclosing additional views, Chief Judge Rader, joined by Judge
Newman, cautioned the court against “accept[ing] invitations to
837
restrict subject matter eligibility.”
Chief Judge Rader noted that
creative claim drafting is an unintended consequence of imposing
judicially created subject matter restrictions, which impose higher
expenses in prosecution and litigation, encourages gamesmanship,
838
and discourages innovation.
Chief Judge Rader advised that
“judges should tread carefully when imposing new limits on the
protection for categories of human innovation” and should instead
rely upon the substantive conditions in §§ 102, 103, and 112 to
839
determine patentability.
Writing in dissent, Judge Moore disagreed with the majority that
the immunization step transformed Classen’s claims from a mental
process to patentable subject matter, characterizing the application
840
step as “nothing more than post-solution activity.”
Judge Moore
thus found no distinction between the claims in the three asserted
patents, which “do nothing more than suggest that two immunized
841
groups be compared to determine which one is better.”
Characterizing such “abstract intellectual concepts” as “the basic tools
842
of scientific and technological work,” Judge Moore found Classen’s
832. Id. at 1066, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500 (citing Research Corp., 627 F.3d at
868–69, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280–81).
833. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
834. Id. at 1068, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
835. Id. at 1067, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
836. Id. at 1068, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
837. Id. at 1074, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505 (Rader, C.J., stating additional
views).
838. Id. at 1074–75, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505–06.
839. Id. at 1075, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
840. Id. at 1079, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509–10 (Moore, J., dissenting).
841. Id. at 1078, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
842. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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claims drawn to “a fundamental scientific principle so basic and
843
Judge Moore also
abstract as to be unpatentable subject matter.”
emphasized the “staggering breadth of the claims,” characterizing
Classen’s invention as a “monopoly over the scientific method
844
itself.”
Judge Moore further noted the impropriety of the “intent
and effect” of Classen’s claims to “keep others from exploring the
845
same principle” and “monopolize the process of discovery itself.”
Although Judge Moore conceded that the “precise line to be drawn
between patentable subject matter and abstract idea is quite
846
elusive,” Classen’s claims to “the scientific method as applied to the
847
field of immunization” is “not even close.”
In contrast to Classen, the Federal Circuit in CyberSource Corp. v.
848
Retail Decisions, Inc. agreed with the district court that the asserted
849
patent claims were directed to ineligible subject matter.
CyberSource Corporation owns a method patent directed to
850
detecting fraud in an Internet credit card transaction.
The first
claim at issue “recite[d] a process for verifying the validity of credit
card transactions over the Internet,” and the second claim “recite[d]
a computer readable medium containing program instructions for
851
executing the same process.”
The Federal Circuit first affirmed the district court’s ruling that
CyberSource’s asserted claims failed the machine-or-transformation
852
test.
CyberSource’s first method claim merely “requires one to
853
‘obtain and compare intangible data pertinent to business risks.’”
The “mere collection and organization of data,” however, fails the
854
transformation prong. Moreover, the court rejected CyberSource’s
argument that the Internet, without which CyberSource’s claimed
method would “not be necessary or possible,” serves as a “machine” to
855
which the claimed method is tied. The court reasoned that even if
the Internet is a “machine,” the Internet cannot perform the fraud
843. Id. at 1076, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
844. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
845. Id. at 1079–80, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509–10.
846. Id. at 1078, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
847. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
848. 654 F.3d 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
849. Id. at 1367, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
850. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
851. Id. at 1369, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.
852. Id. at 1370, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693–94.
853. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011, 1014 (N.D.
Cal. 2009), aff’d, 654 F.3d 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
854. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
855. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
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detection steps disclosed in the claim, and the claim does not require
856
Thus, the court
that one use the Internet to gather the data.
concluded, CyberSource’s method claims also fail the machine
857
prong.
Next, the court analyzed the patent eligibility of the claims outside
of the machine-or-transformation test. Relying on the Supreme
858
859
Court’s decisions in Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the “Supreme Court appeared to
endorse the view that methods which can be performed mentally, or
which are the equivalent of human mental work, are unpatentable
860
abstract ideas.” The court explained that “computational methods
which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of
methods that embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological
861
work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”
The court concluded that all of the claims in CyberSource’s first
asserted claim can be performed by the human mind and thus held
862
CyberSource’s claims ineligible patent subject matter.
CyberSource’s second asserted claim, in contrast, recites a
computer readable medium containing program instructions to
863
execute the method disclosed in the first claim.
The court
explained that simply invoking the computer readable medium
limitation does not automatically render patentable an otherwise
864
unpatentable mental process.
The court instead analyzed the
underlying invention and concluded that both claims are directed to
the same method for detecting credit card fraud, thus treating the
second claim like a process claim for purposes of patent-eligibility
865
analysis. Because the claimed process can be performed entirely in
the human mind, the court concluded that CyberSource’s second
866
asserted claim directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
The court reached the opposite result in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,
867
LLC. Ultramercial, LLC owns U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (“the ’545
856. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
857. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
858. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972).
859. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
860. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (citing Benson,
409 U.S. at 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675).
861. Id. at 1373, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675).
862. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695–96.
863. Id. at 1373–74, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
864. Id. at 1374, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
865. Id. at 1374–75, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
866. Id. at 1375, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698–99.
867. 657 F.3d 1323, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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patent”), which claims a method for monetizing and distributing
copyrighted products via the Internet, where advertisers pay for the
copyrighted content and consumers access the copyright content at
868
Ultramercial
no cost in exchange for viewing the advertisements.
appealed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to
869
claim statutory subject matter.
Delivering the opinion for the court, Chief Judge Rader again
noted the “statutory reluctance” in § 101 to delineate new categories
870
of patent-ineligible subject matter.
The court also reiterated that
while an abstract principle is not patentable subject matter, its
871
In this case, the ’545 patent
application may well be patentable.
applied the principle of monetizing advertisements to a practical use,
872
which employs “intricate and complex computer programming.”
The court distinguished Ultramercial’s patent claims from those in
CyberSource, stating that “the claims here require . . . controlled
interaction with a consumer via an Internet website, something far
873
removed from purely mental steps.”
Thus, the court held the ’545
874
patent satisfied § 101.
In its analysis, the court was careful not to
“define the level of programming complexity required before a
875
Similarly,
computer-implemented method can be patent-eligible.”
the court stated that “use of an Internet website to practice such a
method is [n]either necessary [n]or sufficient in every case to satisfy
876
§ 101.” Thus, the presence of “programming complexity” or tying
the method claim to an Internet website does not guarantee that a
877
computer-implemented method claim comports with § 101.
C. Indefiniteness
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claims
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter
878
which the applicant regards as his invention.” But only those claims
“not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous” will fail to

868. Id. at 1324, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
869. Id. at 1325, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141–42.
870. Id. at 1327, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
871. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
872. Id. at 1328, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
873. Id. at 1330, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
874. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
875. Id. at 1328, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
876. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
877. See id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (explaining that “programming
complexity” and use of an Internet website were simply factors in determining
patent-eligibility).
878. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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satisfy the requirements of paragraph two of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Definiteness is evaluated at the time of filing through the eyes of one
skilled in the relevant art who has both the specification and
880
knowledge of the art. Thus, “proof of indefiniteness must meet ‘an
exacting standard;’” a party who seeks to invalidate a patent claim for
indefiniteness must show by clear and convincing evidence that one
skilled in the art “could not discern the boundaries of the claim
based on the claim language, the specification, the prosecution
881
history, and the knowledge in the relevant art.”
882
In Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chemical Co., the Federal Circuit
reversed a district court’s ruling of indefiniteness because one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been able to interpret the claim
883
in light of the specification and well-known international standards.
Wellman, Inc. held two patents directed toward slow-crystallizing
polyethylene terephthalate (“PET”) resins for use in plastic beverage
884
containers.
As compared to conventional resins, the slowcrystallizing PET had a significantly higher heating crystallization
exotherm peak temperature (TCH), which provided exceptional visual
885
TCH is measured by differential
clarity and reduced hazing.
scanning calorimetry (“DSC”), which requires defined sample
886
conditions and testing parameters for consistent measurement.
The district court found Wellman’s patent invalid for indefiniteness
because the patent failed to “provide sufficient guidance for
887
construing the TCH claim term.”
The Federal Circuit first looked to the specification and found
abundant support for construing the TCH claim term as requiring
879. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
880. See, e.g., Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 780–
81, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (noting that the words of a claim are construed at the time of the invention);
Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1625, 1628 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (summarizing the relevant considerations for
determining definiteness)).
881. Id. at 783, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562 (citation omitted).
882. 642 F.3d 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-584, 2012 WL 538344 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012).
883. Id. at 1367–69, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514–16.
884. Id. at 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506–07.
885. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506–07.
886. See id. at 1357, 1359, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507–08 (discussing the district
court’s finding that Wellman’s patent lacked necessary sample conditions and testing
parameters).
887. Id. at 1366, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513.
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888

testing of amorphous materials. Wellman’s expert testified that the
“less than four percent crystallinity,” disclosed in the specification,
would be understood in the industry as an amorphous PET
889
material. Wellman also established that one of ordinary skill in the
art would have been aware of and applied a well-known industry
standard for conducting DSC using defined moisture and thermal
890
history conditions.
Thus, the court held that although the claim
terms did not explicitly recite moisture conditions for DSC testing,
the industry standard “made this a routine concern to a person of
891
ordinary skill in the art.” The court likewise agreed that the skilled
artisan would have been directed to the appropriate thermal
conditions by the knowledge from the specification that material was
amorphous or by the explicit recommendation in the industry
892
standards.
893
Similarly, in Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the
Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of judgment as a
894
Star
matter of law that the asserted claims were not indefinite.
Scientific, Inc. holds patents directed to tobacco curing methods that
minimize or eliminate the formation of tobacco-specific nitrosamines
(“TSNAs”)—known carcinogens—on tobacco leaves during the
895
curing process.
Common tobacco curing processes utilize diesel
gas or propane gas heaters, which emit exhaust gases and create
anaerobic conditions, which in turn can lead to the formation of
896
TSNAs. Star’s method patents disclose a “controlled environment”
that manipulates “at least one” of the factors of humidity, rate of
temperature exchange, temperature, airflow, arrangement of the
leaves, or levels of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and/or oxygen,
to alleviate the anaerobic conditions and thereby decrease or
897
eliminate the formation of TSNAs.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (“RJR”) argued that Star’s patents were
invalid for indefiniteness “because one of ordinary skill would be
unable to determine the difference between ‘conventional processes’

888. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513–14.
889. Id. at 1367, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (internal quotation marks omitted).
890. Id. at 1367–69, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514–16.
891. Id. at 1368, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
892. Id. at 1368–69, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515–16.
893. 655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
894. Id. at 1367, 1374, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926, 1931.
895. Id. at 1367–68, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
896. Id. at 1367, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
897. Id. at 1368, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926–27 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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and the ‘controlled environment’ required by” Star’s patents. Star’s
patents explain that “the practice of tobacco curing is more of an art
899
than a science.”
The Federal Circuit placed little weight on the
jury’s assumption that “controlled environment” is indefinite because
the “patents do not give exact numbers measuring humidity,
900
temperature, and airflow.”
Casting the issue as “whether a person
of ordinary skill would know how to establish a controlled
environment to perform the claimed method,” the court found the
record replete with support that such a person “would possess
adequate understanding to manipulate these variables to create a
901
controlled environment.” Indeed, the court noted that the patent
itself points to “conventional methods commonly and commercially
used in the U.S.” upon which a skilled person in the art could rely to
902
determine the “controlled environment” disclosed in Star’s patents.
The court thus concluded that, despite the lack of disclosed number
values or ranges of number values, “controlled environment” is not
903
“insolubly ambiguous” and therefore not indefinite.
904
Judge Dyk dissented. Judge Dyk reasoned that Star’s patents do
not equate a “controlled environment” with conventional curing
processes; thus, one of ordinary skill could not rely on conventional
905
curing knowledge to discern Star’s “controlled environment.”
Judge Dyk emphasized an RJR expert’s testimony that one of
ordinary skill could not determine “ranges of temperature, humidity,
906
and airflow” disclosed in the patent terms.
Judge Dyk concluded
that “the patents describe the claimed ‘controlled environment’ as
something different from conventional curing methods, but fail to
explain those differences in a way that would permit a skilled artisan
907
to determine the bounds of the claims.”

898. Id. at 1370, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
899. Id. at 1368, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,202,649
col.6 ll.35–36 (filed Sept. 15, 1999)).
900. See id. at 1374, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (discrediting the jury’s
assumption based on evidence that a person of skill in the art would have adequate
knowledge to use the variables to create a “controlled environment”).
901. Id. at 1373–74, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
902. Id. at 1374, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
903. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
904. Id. at 1379, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
905. Id. at 1379–80, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
906. Id. at 1380, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
907. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
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D. Written Description
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 mandates that a patent specification
908
“shall contain a written description of the invention.” The Federal
909
Circuit in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., recently
confirmed the court’s long-standing precedent that § 112, paragraph
1 contains a written description requirement separate and distinct
910
from the enablement requirement of that paragraph. To satisfy the
written description requirement, an applicant must demonstrate to
one skilled in the art that he or she is in possession of the
911
invention.
Acknowledging that the term “possession” “has never
been very enlightening,” the court explained that “the specification
must describe an invention understandable to [a] skilled artisan and
912
show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”
The Federal Circuit assesses such possession by “an objective inquiry
913
into the four corners of the specification.”
A “mere wish or plan”
for obtaining the claimed invention, however, does not constitute
914
adequate written description. Thus, written description issues often
arise when a patentee alleges constructive possession of the
915
In other words, although the
embodiment in question.
specification lacks specific reference to an embodiment, the patentee
may argue that his or her broadly drafted claims nonetheless
encompass that embodiment with sufficient clarity that one of skill in
916
the art can “visualize or recognize” the claimed invention.
1.

Possession of the claimed invention
Chemical and biotechnological inventions frequently implicate
constructive possession. In Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott
917
Laboratories, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial
of judgment as a matter of law and held Centocor Ortho Biotech,

908. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
909. 598 F.3d 1336, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
910. Id. at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
911. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1563–64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1117 (Fed Cir. 1991)).
912. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
913. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
914. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
915. See infra Part IV.D.1.
916. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406
(holding that more than a generic statement is required in claims to genetic material
to specially define the genes within its definition).
917. 636 F.3d 1341, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-596, 2012 WL 538345 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012).
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Inc.’s asserted claims invalid for lack of an adequate written
918
Centocor’s original application, filed in 1991 and
description.
disclosing mouse and chimeric antibodies to human tumor necrosis
factor-α (“TNF-α”), was followed by a series of continuation-in-part
919
applications adding new matter. In asserting infringement against
Abbott Laboratories, Centocor relied on later-filed claims covering
920
fully human antibodies to human TNF-α.
Abbott cited its own
921
To succeed, Centocor needed to
patent as invalidating prior art.
show that its asserted claims had adequate written support in its
922
earlier-filed applications, thereby defeating Abbott’s priority date.
Looking to the four corners of Centocor’s earlier-filed application
specifications, the Federal Circuit noted the absence of (1) a single
description satisfying the claim limitations; (2) any human variable
region or relevant identifying characteristics of the fully human
antibodies; and (3) any relationship between the human TNF-α
protein, the known mouse variable region, and potential human
923
variable regions satisfying the claim limitations. Instead of finding
adequate written description support for a fully human TNF-α
antibody in Centocor’s earlier-filed specifications, the Federal Circuit
found “a wish list of properties” of what a fully human TNF-α
antibody should have along with a “plan for making fully human
antibodies,” neither of which satisfied the written description
924
requirement.
In some circumstances, an applicant may nevertheless satisfy the
written description requirement for a claimed antibody by disclosing
the protein alone. Thus, the Centocor court acknowledged the
current USPTO written description guidelines, which “indicate that a
functional claim reciting ‘an isolated antibody capable of binding to
[protein] X’ is adequately described where the specification fully
characterizes protein X—even if there are no working or detailed
925
prophetic examples of actual antibodies that bind to protein X.”
The court explained, however, that the USPTO’s example presumes
the applicant discloses a novel protein and claims both the protein

918. Id. at 1344, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
919. Id. at 1345, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872–73.
920. Id. at 1348, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75.
921. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75.
922. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
923. Id. at 1349–51, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875–77.
924. Id. at 1351, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–77.
925. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (quoting USPTO, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
TRAINING MATERIALS 45–46 (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/
written.pdf).
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926

Moreover, the guidelines
and the antibody that binds to it.
“characterize ‘production of antibodies against a well-characterized
antigen’ as ‘conventional’ and ‘routine,’ given ‘well developed and
927
mature’ antibody technology.”
An applicant may therefore claim
an undescribed antibody when he or she fully discloses the novel
protein and making the claimed antibody is “so routine” that
possessing the claimed protein necessarily places the applicant in
928
possession of the antibody. By contrast, Centocor did not disclose a
novel protein in its earlier filed applications, nor could it characterize
929
making the fully human antibody as a matter of mere routine.
Thus, the Federal Circuit held Centocor’s asserted claims invalid for
930
lack of written description.
As illustrated in Centocor, the “level of detail required to satisfy the
written description requirement varies depending on the nature and
scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the
931
relevant technology.” Applicants often attempt to rely on the state
of the art in combination with their specification to show possession
932
of their claimed invention.
In Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated
933
Regional & University Pathologists, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
934
Billupsthe district court’s rejection of such an argument.
Rothenberg, Inc. argued that its patent, disclosing the general
chromosomal location of a human genetic mutation (“somewhere
‘within less than a 300 base pair region of a define exon of a well
studied multi-gene family’”), combined with the knowledge in the
art, demonstrated possession of a method to test for genetic
935
mutations responsible for hereditary hemochromatosis.
The
936
Federal Circuit disagreed.
Although Billups’s patent claims a test for the genetic mutations
responsible for hemochromatosis, the underlying specification did
not identify a single genetic mutation or even disclose the underlying
926. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
927. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (quoting USPTO, supra note 925, at 46).
928. Id. at 1351–52, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
929. Id. at 1352–53, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
930. Id. at 1353, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
931. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d
1349, 1357–58, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078, 1084–85 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
932. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1603
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
933. 642 F.3d 1031, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
934. Id. at 1032, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
935. Id. at 1036–37, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83. Billups asserted a second
patent as well, which is discussed infra Part IV.G.1.
936. Billups, 642 F.3d at 1037–38, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
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937

The court explained that to satisfy the written
gene sequence.
description requirement, Billups’s genus claims must disclose “either
a representative number of species falling within the scope of the
938
genus or structural features common to the member of the genus.”
Billups’s patent, however, failed to identify even a single species that
satisfied the claims, and the subsequent discovery of a genetic
mutation within the claimed genus did not constitute adequate
939
written description.
Billups argued that its patent could still satisfy the written
description requirement because it “contains functional claim
940
language” and teaches structure.
The Federal Circuit conceded
that “[f]unctional claim language can meet the written description
requirement when the art has established a correlation between
941
structure and function.”
But Billups could not establish such a
correlation because its specification “contains only functional, not
942
structural, characteristics of the predicted mutations.”
In
particular, Billups’s disclosure of a general location was “too
imprecise to constitute structural features necessary to meet the
943
written description requirement.” Thus, “Billups did not possess a
genetic mutation useful for diagnosing hemochromatosis when it
filed its patent application,” and its disclosure “merely represents
944
Billups’s research plan.”
Reliance on the state of the art for purposes of the written
description requirement requires an understanding of the maturity
and predictability of the field. Because the court evaluates the
specification from the perspective of one of skill in the art, “in some
circumstances, a patentee may rely on information that is ‘well-known
in the art’ for purposes of meeting the written description

937. Id. at 1036, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83.
938. Id. at 1037, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83 (quoting Ariad Pharm., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
939. Id. at 1036–37, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83.
940. Id. at 1037, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
941. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583 (alteration in original) (quoting Ariad, 598
F.3d at 1350, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171) (internal quotation marks omitted).
942. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
943. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
944. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583; see also Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1351, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that the claim constituted a “mere wish or plan” for making fully human
antibodies, rather than an invention), cert. denied, No. 11-596, 2012 WL 538345 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 2012).

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2011 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

879

945

But when the art is unpredictable, the technology
requirement.”
nascent, and the specification directly contradicts what the patentee
asserts was well known in the art, no reasonable fact-finder could
946
conclude that the patentee possessed the invention.
As in Billups, the Federal Circuit rejected arguments that relied on
the state of the art to show possession of claimed inventions in Boston
947
Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson.
Johnson & Johnson, Cordis
Corp., and Wyeth (collectively “J&J”) own several patents relating to
drug-eluting coronary stents for the treatment of restenosis in
948
coronary artery disease.
Two patents (“the 1997 patents”) share a
common specification and claim the use of rapamycin or a
949
macrocyclic lactone analog of rapamycin as the therapeutic agent.
A third patent (“the ’662 patent”) claims drug-eluting stents that use
950
rapamycin or a macrocyclic triene analog of rapamycin. J&J added
the claim terms “macrocyclic lactone analog” and “macrocyclic triene
analog” by amendment after a competitor received European
approval to sell a drug-eluting stent containing everolimus, a
951
rapamycin macrocyclic lactone and triene analog.
All of the
952
examples in J&J’s patents are directed to the use of rapamycin. But
the 1997 patents’ specifications fail to disclose any formulae,
structures, definitions, examples, or experimental models defining
953
structurally similar analog compounds. And though the ’662 patent
specification provides slightly more detail, it also fails to disclose a
954
single species of macrocyclic triene analog.
The court acknowledged some analogs existed in the prior art, but
concluded that the claims broadly cover thousands of possible
analogs with no guidance on how to select those with the proper
955
functionality.
Indeed, the court rejected appellants’ attempt to
956
J&J relied on a prior art
correlate structure and function.
945. Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1366, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
946. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
947. 647 F.3d 1353, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
948. Id. at 1356, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
949. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003–04.
950. Id. at 1358–59, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003–04.
951. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
952. Id. at 1358–59, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
953. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004–05.
954. Id. at 1359, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003–04.
955. Id. at 1364–65, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–11.
956. Id. at 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011. The Federal Circuit has previously
found that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement
where an established correlation exists between structure and function. Univ. of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1893
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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publication and a declaration in an attempt to establish that
957
But the
rapamycin’s structure and function were known in art.
court found J&J’s argument belied by the patent specification, which
specifically notes ongoing active investigation into the precise
mechanism of rapamycin, as well as J&J’s own statements that the
958
state of the art was “highly unpredictable.” Given the absence of a
single identified analog, the admitted unpredictability of the art, and
the nascent state of drug-eluting stents for the treatment of
restenosis, the Federal Circuit concluded that J&J’s patents fail to
959
satisfy the written description requirement.
Concurring in part, Judge Gajarsa would have invalidated the 1997
960
patents for lack of enablement and criticized the majority opinion
for “further extend[ing] the written description requirement into the
961
realm of enablement.” Indeed, Judge Gajarsa advocated use of the
enablement requirement as “the appropriate tool for invalidating
962
claims that are broader than their disclosure.”
Judge Gajarsa
agreed with the district court’s application of the factors from In re
963
Wands and conclusion that it would take undue experimentation to
practice J&J’s claimed invention with a macrocyclic lactone analog in
964
Thus, Judge Gajarsa concluded that J&J’s patent claims
1997.
should have been invalidated for failing the enablement
965
requirement.
Analyzing the written description requirement in a
nonbiotechnology context, the Federal Circuit in Atlantic Research
966
Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Troy affirmed a district court’s grant of
summary judgment of invalidity where the claim’s scope plainly
967
exceeded the disclosure in the specification.
Atlantic Research
Marketing Systems, Inc. owns U.S. Reissue Patent No. RE39,465 (“the
’465 patent”), which is directed to a handguard device for use on
968
military rifles.
Handguard devices permit attachment of ancillary
969
Ancillary
equipment, such as integrated laser systems, onto rifles.
957. Bos. Scientific Corp., 647 F.3d at 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011.
958. Id. at 1365–66, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011.
959. Id. at 1367, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010–11.
960. Id. at 1369, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part).
961. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011–12.
962. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
963. 858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
964. Bos. Scientific Corp., 647 F.3d at 1369–70, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012
(Gajarsa, J., concurring in part).
965. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
966. 659 F.3d 1345, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
967. Id. at 1355–56, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
968. Id. at 1348–49, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
969. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554–55.
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equipment cannot be attached directly to rifle barrels without
incurring damage from the heat and vibration of the barrel, and in
970
Free-floating handguards solve
turn, causing the barrel to warp.
this problem by attaching to points on the firearm other than the
971
barrel, thus “floating” around the barrel.
972
In 2004, Troy, a former Atlantic Research employee, began
selling a free-floating handguard that attaches to the gun at a single
973
Atlantic Research sued, asserting its ’465
point, the barrel nut.
974
patent. The ’465 patent, unlike Troy’s device, discloses a “receiver
975
sleeve” that attaches to the top of the gun, which is self-supported.
According to the ’465 patent’s specification, the receiver sleeve can
also gain additional support from a “yoke” or “clamp” attached to the
976
firearm’s barrel nut. Thus, the ’465 patent’s specification discloses
two embodiments: a handguard with one support point at the
receiver sleeve and a handguard with two support points, one at the
977
receiver sleeve and one at the barrel nut.
Atlantic Research asserted one independent claim, claim 31,
against Troy, which claims a barrel nut support point, but makes no
978
reference to a receiver sleeve support point. The district court held
claim 31 and its dependent claims invalid for failing the written
description requirement because the specification fails to disclose a
979
handguard with one support point at the barrel nut.
Atlantic
Research argued that the district court erred in its claim construction
by interpreting the barrel nut as the only support point, which clashes
980
with the specification.
Atlantic Research posited that the proper
construction allows for additional support from the receiver sleeve

970. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554–55.
971. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554–55.
972. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554–55. Atlantic Research simultaneously
brought a claim against Troy for misappropriation of a trade secret. Id. at 1348, 100
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. The court noted the “inherent tension” between Atlantic
Research and Troy, arguing that the technology at issue is both the subject of a trade
secret and a patent, leaving “little room for either party to prevail on both claims.”
Id. at 1357, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
973. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555. Troy applied for a patent on his
invention in 2005, which issued in 2007. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
974. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
975. Id. at 1351, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556. The receiver sleeve extends down
the barrel and attaches to the upper handguard piece, which attaches to the lower
handguard piece, thereby allowing the handguard device to float around the barrel.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
976. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
977. Id. at 1352, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
978. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
979. Id. at 1352–53, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
980. Id. at 1353, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
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attachment, although the receiver sleeve is not specifically referenced
981
in the claim.
982
The Federal Circuit rejected Atlantic Research’s argument. The
court noted that the specification “is the single best guide to the
983
meaning of disputed claim term.” In this case, however, construing
claim 31 to cover only subject matter disclosed in the specification
“would eviscerate the plain meaning of claim language and ignore
substantive differences between claims regarding an issue that is a
984
focal point of the invention.”
The first thirty claims explicitly
require either two attachment points or one attachment point at the
985
Thus, the court determined it significant that the
receiver sleeve.
asserted claims 31–36 conspicuously omit the receiver sleeve
limitation, suggesting that the patentee meant not to import the
986
receiver sleeve limitation into the claims. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment finding of
987
invalidity for inadequate written description.
2.

Claims framed to address less than all identified problems in the art
988
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that it is a “false premise that if the problems addressed
by the invention are related, then a claim addressing only one of the
989
problems is invalid for lack of sufficient written description.”
The
Federal Circuit recently clarified this holding in Crown Packaging
981. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
982. Id. at 1355, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
983. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
984. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
985. Id. at 1354, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
986. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. The court noted that “‘substantive
differences’ between claims ‘can be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of
particular claim terms.’” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558 (quoting Arlington
Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1811, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 2010-1025, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9463 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2011)).
987. Id. at 1355, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. Also damaging to Atlantic
Research’s argument was the inconsistency between its arguments before the district
court and the Federal Circuit. See id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (noting with
disfavor that Atlantic Research has changed argumentative tactics between the
district court and the Federal Circuit). Before the district court, Atlantic Research
pushed for an interpretation that permitted a single attachment point at the barrel
nut in order to prove infringement. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. Atlantic
Research changed tactics before the Federal Circuit, which the court viewed with
“extreme disfavor.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (quoting N. Telecom Ltd. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1290, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
988. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
989. Id. at 1367, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
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990

The shared
Technology, Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp.
specification of Crown’s patents discusses two ways to save metal
991
during the process of joining can ends to can bodies.
Relying on
Revolution Eyewear, Crown argued that the specification adequately
supported the use of the first method independent from the second
992
method to achieve the desired result. The Federal Circuit agreed,
reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity
993
for failing to satisfy the written description.
994
The court distinguished Crown from Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc.,
995
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, and ICU Medical, Inc. v.
996
Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., all cases in which the specification
997
“unambiguously limited the scope of the invention.”
Looking to
the specification, the court found no suggestion that metal savings
998
To the
could only be achieved by combining both methods.
contrary, a table containing data showed metal savings by applying
999
only the one method. The court also rejected Ball’s argument that
the patents were invalid because no drawings showed the claimed
1000
embodiment.
The court then looked to the claims themselves and
found clear evidence that Crown intended to claim the one method
1001
independent from the second method of improving metal usage.
Judge Dyk dissented in part, explaining that he would find the
asserted claims invalid for failing the written description
1002
requirement.
Judge Dyk interpreted the asserted claims as
covering “a new and distinct invention” not described in the
1003
specification or the claims.
Judge Dyk admonished, “[t]he fact that
the claims are broad enough to cover such an invention . . . is not
sufficient when the invention itself is not described either in the
1004
claims or elsewhere in the specification.”
Judge Dyk thus

990. 635 F.3d 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
991. Id. at 1375–76, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245–46.
992. Id. at 1380–81, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249 (citing Revolution Eyewear, 563
F.3d at 1367, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739).
993. Id. at 1381, 1384, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249, 1251.
994. 156 F.3d 1154, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
995. 424 F.3d 1336, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1724 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
996. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
997. Crown, 635 F.3d at 1382, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249–50.
998. Id. at 1380–81, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
999. Id. at 1381, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1000. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1001. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1002. Id. at 1384, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1003. Id. at 1385, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
1004. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
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concluded that he would affirm the district court’s grant of summary
1005
judgment of invalidity.
E. Best Mode
In addition to an adequate written description and enablement, 35
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 requires that a patent specification “shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor [or joint
1006
inventor] of carrying out [the] invention.”
As of the September
1007
16, 2011, enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA), the failure to disclose the best mode is no longer a valid basis
for challenging the validity of an issued patent, either in litigation or
1008
during postgrant review before the USPTO.
But because the
USPTO has an obligation to only issue patents that comply with the
patent statutes, a patent application may still be rejected for failure to
disclose the best mode. With passage of the AIA, however, priority
applications relied on for benefit of an earlier filing under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 119(e) and 120 are made exempt from the best mode
1009
requirement.
Best mode violations occur when any inventor fails to disclose what
he or she believes is the best mode of practicing the claimed
1010
invention as of the date the patent is filed.
The best mode inquiry
first subjectively analyzes whether an inventor possessed a best mode
and then objectively analyzes whether the inventor concealed the best
1011
mode.
An applicant’s failure to disclose its commercial mode does not
necessarily violate the best mode requirement because the inquiry
1012
focuses on the claimed invention, not the marketed product.

1005. Id. at 1385–86, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252–53.
1006. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
1007. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
1008. § 15, 125 Stat. at 328.
1009. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 119(e)(1), 120 (stating the requirements for
applications receiving the benefits of an earlier filed provisional), with § 15, 125 Stat.
at 328 (exempting applications that rely on earlier provisional applications from the
best mode requirement).
1010. E.g., Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 n.5, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1657, 1663 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that Star’s patents violated the
best mode requirement, where Reynolds conceded that the inventor had not
contemplated a best mode as of the priority date of the asserted claims. 655 F.3d
1364, 1373, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1011. Green Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1296, 96
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1012. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1567, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281,
1284 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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When the commercial mode, however, falls within the scope of the
patent claims, failure to disclose the commercial mode may very well
violate the best mode requirement. The court performed exactly
1013
Wellman
such an analysis in Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chemical Co.
held two patents directed toward slow-crystallizing polyethylene
1014
terephthalate (“PET”) resins for use in plastic beverage containers.
Wellman, Inc. commercialized its slow-crystallizing PET resin—
Ti818—before Wellman filed its patent application, but neither the
1015
Ti818 recipe nor any other recipe appeared in Wellman’s patents.
Turning to the first prong in the best mode inquiry, the Federal
Circuit found no genuine dispute that at least one inventor
subjectively believed at the time of filing that the Ti818 resin
1016
constituted the best slow-crystallizing PET resin available.
The
court discounted Wellman’s argument that it continued tweaking the
Ti818 recipe into 2004, past the filing date, negating Ti818 as the best
1017
mode.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “an evolving recipe
potentially means that the inventors had no best mode of practicing
1018
the invention.”
But here, “[s]ubtle changes” made “to
accommodate specific customer demands” did not overcome every
inventor’s belief that the Ti818 recipe, as known in 2003, was the best
1019
mode of practicing the invention at the time of filing.
Moreover,
at least one inventor subjectively believed one element, carbon black
1020
Although the
N990, a special additive, was essential to the recipe.
inventor disclosed N990 to Wellman’s patent counsel, Wellman kept
1021
N990 a trade secret.
Turning to the second prong of the best mode analysis, the Federal
1022
Circuit determined that Wellman in fact concealed the best mode.
While the disclosure need not identify which disclosed mode is the
best mode, Wellman’s disclosure actually leads away from the best
mode by identifying preferred ranges and particle sizes of ingredients
1023
that fall outside of the Ti818 recipe’s scope.
Furthermore, by
keeping N990 a trade secret, Wellman intentionally concealed the
1013. 642 F.3d 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-584, 2012 WL 538344 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). For further discussion on
indefiniteness in Wellman, see supra Part IV.C.
1014. Wellman, 642 F.3d at 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506–07.
1015. Id. at 1357–58, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506–07.
1016. Id. at 1361, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509–10.
1017. Id. at 1361–62, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
1018. Id. at 1362, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
1019. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
1020. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
1021. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
1022. Id. at 1364, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
1023. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
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1024

Considering that at least one inventor subjectively
best mode.
believed Ti818 practiced the best mode at the time of filing, the
specification disclosed preferred embodiments that excluded Ti818,
and Wellman maintained one critical element as a trade secret, the
Federal Circuit concluded Wellman’s patents violated the best mode
1025
disclosure requirement.
F.

Qualifying as Prior Art

An invention is not novel if the invention was “in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
1026
application for patent in the United States.”
An on-sale bar applies
when two conditions exist prior to the critical date: (1) “the product
must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale,” and (2) “the
1027
invention must be ready for patenting.”
Pursuant to the AIA, for
patent applications filed after March, 16, 2013, the on-sale bar will
apply to inventions in public use or on sale before the effective filing
1028
date anywhere, not just in the United States.
Thus, under the AIA,
if “the claimed invention was . . . in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention,” the claimed invention fails to satisfy the novelty
1029
condition.
Applying the pre-AIA on-sale bar standard, the Federal Circuit
clarified the relationship between the two conditions in August
1030
Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd.
The alleged infringer, Camtek,
Ltd., identified the patent holder’s own machine, the NSX-80, as
prior art, which in combination with other prior art references would
1031
render the patent obvious.
The jury found the NSX-80 was not on
1032
sale prior to the critical date and thus did not qualify as prior art.
Camtek appealed, arguing that the district court improperly
instructed the jury that, to be § 102(b) prior art, the product “must

1024. Id. at 1365, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
1025. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
1026. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
1027. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646–
47 (1998).
1028. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102).
1029. Id. An exception exists if the disclosure, made one year or less prior to the
effective filing date, was made by the inventor or one who derived the information
from the inventor. Id.
1030. 655 F.3d 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1031. Id. at 1288, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
1032. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
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also have been ready for patenting at the time the alleged offer for
1033
sale is made.”
1034
The Federal Circuit agreed with Camtek.
The court explained
1035
“the invention must be
that under Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
ready for patenting prior to the critical date. But to conclude that it
also must be ready for patenting at the time of the offer would render
1036
the second prong of the Pfaff test superfluous.”
The court further
explained that while the invention need not be ready at the time the
offer is made, there can be no offer for sale until after the conception
1037
date.
Thus, if the offeror retracts the offer for sale prior to
1038
If, however,
conception, no offer for sale of the invention exists.
the offer remains open, “a subsequent conception will cause it to
become an offer for sale of the invention as of the conception
1039
date.”
Regarding the NSX-80, the Federal Circuit could not
determine whether conception predated the offer for sale given the
1040
record on appeal.
1041
the Federal
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Circuit considered and rejected a public use argument for two prior
1042
art references.
Star Scientific, Inc.’s method patents disclose a
“controlled environment” for curing tobacco leaves that manipulates
humidity, temperature, and various gases to alleviate anaerobic
conditions that lead to the formation of carcinogenic tobacco-specific
1043
nitrosamines (“TSNAs”).
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (“RJR”)
identified two prior art references, which RJR contended defeated
1033. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1034. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
1035. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
1036. August Tech. Corp., 655 F.3d at 1289, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
1037. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774–75.
1038. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
1039. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
1040. Id. at 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. Despite its inability from the
record to determine whether the NSX-80 qualified as § 102(b) prior art, the Federal
Circuit held that the NSX-80 would not render obvious August Technology’s patent
claims. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. The NSX-80 lacked an element disclosed
in the asserted claims, which was also not disclosed in the other prior art references.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. Thus, even if the NSX-80 was on sale prior to the
critical date, it could not, alone, or in combination with other prior art references,
render obvious August Technology’s patent claims. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1775.
1041. 655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For a full
discussion of the factual background of Star Scientific, see supra Part IV.C.
1042. Star Scientific, 655 F.3d at 1376–78, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933–34.
Reynolds asserted a third prior art reference that it argued anticipated Star’s patents,
but the reference postdated Star’s effective filing date and, thus, the court summarily
dismissed the reference. Id. at 1377, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1043. Id. at 1368, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926–27.
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the novelty of the Star patents because they were in public use more
1044
The first
than one year prior to Star’s patents’ effective filing date.
reference, Spindletop, unequivocally applied to tobacco leaves that
1045
had been cured for “at least five days.”
By contrast, Star’s patents
1046
Thus, the
contain “uncured” tobacco leaves as a claim limitation.
court concluded that Spindletop did not qualify as an anticipatory
1047
prior public use reference.
The second reference, Brown, similarly failed to qualify as an
1048
anticipatory prior public use reference.
One of the claim
limitations as construed by the district court required substantial
prevention of the formation of TSNAs, such that the level of certain
1049
TSNAs is below 0.05 or 0.10 parts per million (ppm).
Data
collected from tobacco-leaf samples cured using the Brown method
prior to one year before Star’s patent filing date produced test results
1050
below the detectable limit of the test (0.15 ppm).
The Federal
Circuit held that such inconclusive evidence was unable to support
the necessary finding of clear and convincing evidence that Brown
1051
anticipated Star’s patents.
G. Novelty
1.

An anticipatory reference
A single prior art reference invalidates a patent claim when the
single reference expressly or inherently discloses, or anticipates, each
1052
In Billups-Rothenberg, Inc.
and every limitation in the patent claim.
1053
the Federal
v. Associated Regional & University Pathologists, Inc.,
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of invalidity by
1054
anticipation.
In 1994, Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. filed a patent
application disclosing the chromosomal location of the gene
1055
responsible for the iron-storage disease, hemochromatosis.
Two
years later, scientists unaffiliated with Billups received U.S. Patent No.
6,025,130 (“the ’130 patent”) disclosing the genetic sequence of
1044. Id. at 1377, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1045. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1046. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1047. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1048. Id. at 1377–78, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
1049. Id. at 1377, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
1050. Id. at 1377–78, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
1051. Id. at 1378, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
1052. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
1053. 642 F.3d 1031, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For further
discussion of written description issues in Billups, see supra Part IV.D.1.
1054. Billups, 642 F.3d at 1038, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
1055. Id. at 1033, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
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three mutations associated with hemochromatosis and genetic tests
1056
Billups then filed a
for the disease involving those mutations.
second patent, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,355,425 (“the ’425
1057
patent”).
The ’425 patent claims a method for diagnosing
hemochromatosis by testing for mutations, including the S65C
1058
mutation disclosed in the unaffiliated ’130 patent.
The parties did not dispute that the ’130 patent, filed three years
prior to Billups’s ’425 patent, discloses the genetic sequence of the
1059
S65C mutation.
But Billups argued that the ’130 patent “merely
correlates” the mutation and the disease, and characterized the S65C
mutation as “a clinically insignificant polymorphism unrelated to
1060
disease state.”
Billups thus concluded that the ’130 patent did not
1061
teach using the mutation to diagnose hemochromatosis.
The Federal Circuit rejected Billups’s argument, explaining that an
1062
anticipatory prior art reference need only disclose the invention.
Thus, a prior art reference is no less anticipatory if it discloses the
1063
Although the ’130 patent
invention and then disparages it.
questioned the mutation’s utility, the patent disclosed the genetic
1064
mutation and its use in diagnosing hemochromatosis.
The ’130
patent therefore served as an anticipatory prior art reference,
1065
invalidating the ’425 patent.
The court reached the opposite result in Bettcher Industries, Inc. v.
1066
Bettcher Industries, Inc. sued Bunzl USA, Inc. for
Bunzl USA, Inc.
infringement, resulting in a judgment of no infringement and no
1067
invalidity.
Bunzl nevertheless filed a motion for judgment as a
1068
matter of law as to invalidity, which the district court denied.
Bunzl appealed, citing Bettcher’s own products as anticipatory prior
1069
art.
The asserted patent relates to a knife blade in a power-operated
1070
rotary knife.
“The claimed blade includes an annular bearing race
1056. Id. at 1034, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
1057. Id. at 1034–35, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1058. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1059. Id. at 1038, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1060. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1061. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1062. Id. at 1038–39, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1063. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584 (citing Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1064. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1065. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1066. 661 F.3d 629, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1067. Id. at 632, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434–35.
1068. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434–35.
1069. Id. at 634, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1070. Id. at 632–33, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
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recessed into a side wall of the blade and dimensioned to receive a
protruding annular bearing structure of the blade support housing to
1071
Bunzl cited
maintain the blade in spinning contact with the knife.”
Bettcher’s prior art blades as anticipatory references, which included
chamfered corners “inherently capable” of serving as bearing faces of
1072
a bearing race, or surface against which the bearings move.
Bunzl
asserted that it did not matter whether anyone actually used the
chamfered corners as a bearing face or whether those skilled in the
art would understand that the chamfered corners could act as a
1073
bearing face.
Bettcher responded that the prior art blade lacked the
1074
“frustoconical bearing faces” limitation of the asserted patent.
Moreover, the chamfers’ purpose was to “avoid contact with a mating
part,” contrary to Bunzl’s assertion that the chamfers inherently serve
1075
as bearing faces.
Bettcher further argued that “inherent
anticipation requires that the chamfers always necessarily function as
1076
bearing faces.”
The court agreed with Bettcher, disregarding Bunzl’s conjecture
that the chamfers were capable of serving as bearing faces in a
1077
hypothetical configuration.
The court explained that inherency
“may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere
fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances
1078
is not sufficient.”
The court rejected Bunzl’s characterization of
the chamfers in Bettcher’s prior art blades as bearing faces “based on
a hypothetical configuration of surrounding structures disclosed
nowhere in the prior art . . . and suggested by nothing in the
1079
record.”
The court therefore found adequate evidence supporting
the jury’s verdict that chamfers in Bettcher’s prior art blades did not
1080
anticipate the asserted patent claims.
Judge Reyna dissented, finding all of the structural features in the
1081
asserted patent claims present in the Bettcher prior art blades.
Judge Reyna emphasized that the patent “claims do not recite any
1071. Id. at 633, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1072. Id. at 634, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1073. Id. at 639, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
1074. Id. at 634, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1075. Id. at 639, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1076. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1077. Id. at 639–40, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1078. Id. at 639, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d
578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323, 326 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1079. Id. at 640, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1080. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
1081. Id. at 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
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particular length or size” of the “frustoconical” bearing face surfaces
and that the chamfers in the prior art blades were capable of
1082
In this regard, Judge Reyna found
functioning as bearing surfaces.
1083
1084
In Schreiber, the
In re Schreiber “both instructive and controlling.”
court concluded that each structural claim limitation for a spout for
1085
dispensing oil was satisfied by a prior art reference.
Schreiber
attempted to distinguish his invention over the prior art by relying on
a functional limitation—that the prior art reference did not disclose
1086
use with popcorn, for which his invention was intended.
The
Schreiber court characterized such a functional limitation as having no
1087
Similarly, Judge Reyna found no patentable
“patentable weight.”
weight in Bettcher’s argument that the chamfers in its prior art blade
1088
were not intended for use as bearing faces.
Judge Reyna therefore
would have held the asserted patent invalid for anticipation because,
whether called chamfers or bearing faces, the chamfers in the prior
art blade are capable of serving as bearing faces, satisfying each
1089
structural element of the asserted claim language.
2.

Prior invention
The AIA generally awards patent rights to the first inventor to file
1090
an application for a patent.
Patent claims obtained under the
prior system, however, can be invalidated under 35 U.S.C. §
102(g)(2) of the pre-AIA Patent Statute by demonstrating that the
claimed invention was previously made in the United States by
another inventor who did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the
1091
invention.
In Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. AstraZeneca
1092
Pharmaceuticals LP, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment, invalidating Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.’s patent claims under § 102(g)(2) based on

1082. Id. at 651–52, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448–49. In fact, Bunzl’s expert
created and demonstrated a rotary knife with a housing using chamfers as in the
prior art blade as bearing surfaces. Id. at 652, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
1083. 128 F.3d 1473, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1084. Bettcher, 661 F.3d at 653, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (Reyna, J., dissenting)
(citing Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1477–78, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431–32).
1085. Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1477, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
1086. Id. at 1477, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
1087. Id., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
1088. Bettcher, 661 F.3d at 653–54, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449–50 (Reyna, J.,
dissenting).
1089. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449–50.
1090. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, Stat. 284, 285
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102).
1091. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006).
1092. 661 F.3d 1378, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Teva sued
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP’s prior invention.
AstraZeneca, asserting U.S. Patent No. RE39,502 (“the ’502
1094
patent”).
The ’502 patent claims “statin formulations stabilized
exclusively by an amido-group containing” a “stabilizing effective
1095
Statins,
amount” of a polymeric compound (“AGCP compound”).
compounds used to treat abnormal lipid levels in the blood, are not
1096
medically effective unless stabilized.
AstraZeneca manufactures and sells Crestor, a stabilized statin
formulation that includes an AGCP compound, which Teva asserted
1097
infringes the ’502 patent.
Although Crestor also contains a nonAGCP stabilizer, and AstraZeneca intended the AGCP compound to
act as a disintegrant rather than as a stabilizer, AstraZeneca conceded
infringement for the limited purpose of advancing its summary
1098
judgment motion under § 102(g)(2).
On this record, it was
undisputed that Crestor “is an embodiment within the scope of the
1099
asserted claims.”
Because the parties did not dispute that
AstraZeneca manufactured its formulation before Teva “conceived
1100
and reduced” to practice its invention, the district court granted
AstraZeneca’s motion for summary judgment and found
AstraZeneca’s formulation was an invalidating prior invention to
1101
Teva’s asserted patent claims.
On appeal, Teva argued that AstraZeneca’s formulation could not
serve as a prior invention because AstraZeneca did not appreciate the
1102
“stabilizing effect” of the AGCP compound.
Teva further asserted
that the district court implicitly construed its patent claims in an
overbroad manner, “reliev[ing] AstraZeneca of its burden of proving
that it created the claimed subject matter and appreciated that it had
1103
done so.”
Teva simultaneously argued that if AstraZeneca’s
formulation qualified as a prior invention, then AstraZeneca
“suppressed or concealed its invention by failing to disclose that” the
1104
AGCP compound acts as a stabilizer.
1105
The court
The Federal Circuit rejected Teva’s arguments.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.

Id. at 1380, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id. at 1380–81, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id. at 1382, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id. at 1381, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853–54.
Id. at 1381–82, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id. at 1382, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id. at 1380, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.

Teva also raised a third
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explained that a party asserting prior invention “must prove that it
appreciated what it had made,” but the prior inventor need not
1106
“know everything about how or why its invention worked.”
Moreover, the prior inventor does not need to “conceive of its
invention using the same words as the patentee would later use to
1107
claim it.”
Because AstraZeneca acknowledged that its formulation was stable
and contained an AGCP compound, the court concluded that
1108
AstraZeneca appreciated what it had made.
Indeed, the court
could not require AstraZeneca to specifically appreciate “which
component was responsible for the stabilization” because that would
bind AstraZeneca “to conceive of its invention in the same words” as
1109
Teva would later use, contradicting precedent.
The Federal Circuit next explained that, contrary to Teva’s
argument, the district court did not “implicitly adopt[] a broadening
claim construction” because the district court “did not resolve any
1110
dispute about the scope of the asserted claims.”
Teva maintained
that AstraZeneca’s product infringed the ’502 patent claims and
AstraZeneca conceded infringement for the express purpose of filing
1111
its summary judgment motion.
Therefore, claim scope was never
1112
at issue.
Finally, the court held that AstraZeneca did not suppress or
conceal its invention because it was undisputed that AstraZeneca did
1113
not appreciate that the AGCP compound acted as a stabilizer.
Accordingly, AstraZeneca could not suppress or conceal what it did
1114
not appreciate.
H. Obviousness
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an applicant may not receive a patent “if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
1115
been obvious.”
Courts evaluate obviousness from the perspective
argument: that the district court erred in applying a § 102(b) inherency precedent,
but the Federal Circuit did not address this argument, finding it inapplicable. Id. at
1382, 1385, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854, 1857.
1106. Id. at 1384, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
1107. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
1108. Id. at 1385, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
1109. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
1110. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
1111. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
1112. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
1113. Id. at 1385–86, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
1114. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
1115. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
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1116

This perspective, long
of one with ordinary skill in the art.
anchored to “the time the invention was made,” will now be viewed
from the perspective of the effective filing date of the claimed
1117
invention under the AIA.
For a patent to be obvious, a person of ordinary skill must have
been able to combine the prior art references with a reasonable
1118
expectation of success.
The Supreme Court in KSR International
1119
emphasized the need for caution in granting
Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
patents based on “a combination of familiar elements according to
known methods,” as this would likely prove “obvious when it does no
1120
more than yield predictable results.”
Thus, a court must ask
“whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior
1121
art elements according to their established functions.”
KSR also
1122
the framework for assessing obviousness set forth in
reaffirmed
1123
Graham v. John Deere Co.
Graham enumerated four factors relevant
to the obviousness inquiry: (1) “the scope and content of the prior
art;” (2) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art; (3) “the level of ordinary skill” in the art; and (4) objective
1124
evidence, also known as secondary considerations.
1.

Teaching all claimed limitations
1125
In accordance with the first two Graham v. John Deere Co. factors,
and in contrast to anticipation, which relies on a single prior art
reference, courts invalidate patents for obviousness when multiple
prior art references combine to render obvious the claimed
1126
invention. In Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enterprises, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
invalidity for obviousness through the combination of three prior art
1127
references.
Tokai Corporation owns three patents directed to
1116. Id.
1117. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103 (prohibiting obtaining a patent if the differences
between the prospective subject matter of the patent and prior art were obvious “at
the time the invention was made”), with Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88
(2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103 to prohibit obtaining a patent if the differences
between the invention and prior art were obvious “before the effective date”).
1118. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1378, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1119. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
1120. Id. at 401, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1121. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1122. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1123. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
1124. Id. at 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467.
1125. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
1126. 632 F.3d 1358, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1127. Id. at 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. Tokai also addressed secondary
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utility lighters with automatic child-safety mechanisms to prevent
1128
Three pieces of prior art played a key role in
accidental ignition.
invalidating Tokai’s patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,326,256 (“Shike”);
1129
5,090,893 (“Floriot”); and 4,832,596 (“Morris”).
Shike’s utility
1130
Floriot taught a
lighters did not have a child-safety mechanism;
cigarette lighter with an automatic safety device, which reset to the
1131
locking position after each use; and Morris disclosed a cigarette
lighter with an automatic safety device that required sequential action
1132
by the user’s thumb and forefinger to ignite.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the prior art, alone or in
1133
In
combination, disclosed each of Tokai’s asserted patent claims.
reaching its decision, the court noted that the components of the
invention are simple mechanical parts that are well known in the art
1134
and, as recognized in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
“the
nature of the mechanical arts is such that ‘identified, predictable
solutions’ to known problems may be within the technical grasp of a
1135
skilled artisan.”
Here, the single difference between the prior art
and the patent claims consisted of “the intended position of the
1136
thumb and finger for operating the lighter.”
This, the Federal
Circuit held, was an immaterial change, and it would thus have been
obvious for one of ordinary skill and creativity to combine the three
prior art pieces, “even if it required some variation in the selection or
1137
arrangement of particular components” disclosed in the prior art.
Judge Newman dissented, asserting that combining Shike, Floriot,
1138
and Morris does not yield the Tokai invention.
Judge Newman
focused on the two-finger concurrent action required by Tokai’s
invention, which made operation by a child’s hand impossible, as
1139
opposed to the sequential action disclosed in the prior art.
Judge
Newman charged the district court with improperly applying
hindsight in its obviousness determination and chastised the court for
considerations and the “enhanced burden” to rebut the presumption of invalidity
when the USPTO considered the same prior art asserted by the alleged infringer,
each of which is discussed infra Parts IV.H.5, IV.J.
1128. Tokai, 632 F.3d at 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674–75.
1129. Id. at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
1130. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
1131. Id. at 1368, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
1132. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
1133. Id. at 1369, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
1134. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
1135. Tokai, 632 F.3d at 1371, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S.
at 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390).
1136. Id. at 1369, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
1137. Id. at 1371–72, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1138. Id. at 1377, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1139. Id. at 1374, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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1140

“trivializ[ing] an improvement by its relative simplicity.”
As in Tokai, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of invalidity for obviousness in Tyco Healthcare
1141
Group LP v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
Tyco Healthcare Group LP
owns the rights to U.S. Patent No. 5,211,954 (“the ’954 patent”),
1142
directed to low-dose temazepam, a sleep-inducing drug.
The
parties did not dispute that the only difference between the low-dose
temazepam claimed in the ’954 patent and a prior art drug was the
1143
lower dosage.
Moreover, three years before the ’954 patent’s
priority date, a British medical reference book published the use of
temazepam in elderly patients at a dosage encompassing the range
1144
claimed in the ’954 patent.
The Federal Circuit explained that the court presumes obviousness
when a claimed invention falls within a range disclosed in the prior
1145
art.
Thus, Tyco can only rebut the presumption by showing that
the prior art taught away from the invention or by showing new and
1146
The court rejected all
unexpected results relative to the prior art.
of Tyco’s attempts to show the prior art taught away from low-dose
1147
temazepam.
Tyco consistently focused on the lack of utility or
1148
The
effectiveness of low-dose temazepam shown in the prior art.
court, however, found Tyco’s argument irrelevant because the
asserted claims were not tied to product efficacy or the intended use
1149
of temazepam in any particular treatment regimen.
Moreover,
Tyco failed to show the prior art taught away from low-dose
1150
temazepam in all patient groups.
This was especially true, given
that the prior art reference specifically recommended its use in
elderly patients and because physicians prefer to prescribe the lowest
1151
effective dose possible.
The Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s finding of validity
with respect to one of Allergan, Inc.’s patents in In re Brimonidine
1152
Patent Litigation.
In this case, Allergan asserted several patents
1140. Id. at 1378, 1380, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686, 1688.
1141. 642 F.3d 1370, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1142. Id. at 1371, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1143. Id. at 1372, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214–15.
1144. Id. at 1371, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1145. Id. at 1372, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–16.
1146. Id. at 1373, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–16.
1147. Id. at 1373–76, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–18.
1148. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–18.
1149. Id. at 1373–74, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
1150. Id. at 1375–76, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217–18.
1151. Id. at 1376, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
1152. 643 F.3d 1366, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-800, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2363 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012). The Federal Circuit found one
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relating to its brimonidine tartrate eye-drop formulation, Alphagan P,
1153
As
used to reduce intraocular pressure associated with glaucoma.
compared to Allergan’s earlier brimonidine tartrate formulation
(Alphagan), Alphagan P produced less eye irritation and provided a
reduced drug concentration that was less likely to result in allergic
1154
reactions.
The asserted claim of Allergan’s U.S. Patent No. 5,424,078 (“the
’078 patent”) related to aqueous ophthalmic preservative
formulations containing buffer in the range of about pH 6.8 to 8, a
tonicity component, and stabilized chlorine dioxide (“SCD”) as the
1155
Apotex, Inc. advanced two prior art references in
sole preservative.
1156
an attempt to invalidate the ’078 patent.
The first reference lacked
the claimed tonicity and buffering limitations but disclosed
ophthalmic SCD solutions, which could be converted to a stronger
1157
preservative (“activated”) by addition of an acid or oxidant.
The
court disregarded Allergan’s argument that the reference was
directed solely to “activated” SCD, and agreed that it would have been
obvious to adjust an SCD solution to physiologic tonicity and to
1158
approximate physiologic pH using a buffering component.
The
second reference, moreover, disclosed all the modifications that
1159
Allergan alleged imparted patentability to its asserted claims.
The
Federal Circuit, therefore, reversed the district court’s finding of
validity, instead holding that the ’078 patent claims would have been
1160
obvious.
In contrast, in Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
1161
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of
Co.,
1162
nonobviousness.
Retractable Technologies, Inc. (“RTI”) and
Becton, Dickinson & Co. both sell medical syringes with needles that
retract into the syringe body following use to avoid accidental needle
1163
sticks.
RTI sued Becton for infringement of various claims from
patent invalid for obviousness. Id. at 1370, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881. The
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that four other related
patents would not have been obvious, discussed infra Part IV.H.3. Brimonidine Patent
Litig., 643 F.3d at 1370, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
1153. Brimonidine Patent Litig., 643 F.3d at 1368–69, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1154. Id. at 1369, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880–81.
1155. Id. at 1370, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
1156. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881–82.
1157. Id. at 1370–71, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881–82.
1158. Id. at 1371, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882.
1159. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882.
1160. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882.
1161. 653 F.3d 1296, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 659 F.3d 1369, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1162. Id. at 1298, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1163. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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multiple RTI patents, and Becton asserted a defense of invalidity for
1164
obviousness, which both the jury and the district court rejected.
Becton appealed the finding of nonobviousness with respect to a
1165
single patent claim.
Becton relied on two prior art references, McGary and Pressly,
which the parties agreed disclosed each limitation of RTI’s patent
1166
claim, with one exception.
The exception was whether McGary
and Pressly disclose “lodging the thumb cap in the open back of the
[syringe] barrel thereby rendering the thumb cap inaccessible for
1167
grasping.”
The court determined that McGary and Pressly disclose
a mechanism whereby the thumb cap locks, not lodges, into the back
1168
of the syringe barrel.
Becton asserted a third prior art reference, Power, which depicts
1169
Becton
the thumb cap in both a lodging and locking embodiment.
thus argued that it would be obvious to one skilled in the art to
replace the locking mechanism in McGary or Pressly with the lodging
1170
mechanism in Power.
The court admitted that “the figures from
these references, on their face, tend to show that Power’s ‘lodging’
mechanism is interchangeable with the ‘locking’ mechanism
1171
disclosed in McGary or Pressly.”
Nevertheless, the court declined
to disturb the jury’s underlying factual finding that one skilled in the
art would not have been motivated to replace the locking mechanism
1172
with the lodging mechanism.
Furthermore, the court
acknowledged the jury’s “presumed” factual finding of secondary
considerations of nonobviousness based on testimony, which revealed
Becton’s internal studies on “the impracticability of retractable
1173
syringes.”
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s
1174
finding of nonobviousness.
1175
the
Similarly, in Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Federal Circuit held Star Scientific, Inc.’s patent claims nonobvious,
1176
reversing the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law.
1164. Id. at 1301–02, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
1165. Id. at 1309, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
1166. Id. at 1308, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1167. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1168. Id. at 1309, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243–44.
1169. Id. at 1309–10, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1170. Id. at 1310, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1171. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1172. Id. at 1310–11, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1173. Id. at 1310, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1174. Id. at 1310–11, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
1175. 655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For a complete
discussion of Star Scientific’s factual background, see supra Part IV.C.
1176. Star Scientific, 655 F.3d at 1367, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
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Star asserted two patents against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (“RJR”),
both directed to a method for reducing or eliminating the formation
of tobacco-specific nitrosamines (“TSNAs”), known carcinogens, in
1177
RJR raised two prior art
tobacco during the curing process.
references that, in combination, it asserted rendered Star’s patents
1178
invalid for obviousness.
The first reference, Wiernik, summarized
1179
various studies in the literature regarding the formation of TSNAs.
The second reference, Tohno, taught a method to accelerate the
curing process by “manipulat[ing] . . . air flow, humidity, and
1180
temperature.”
The court first noted that the record showed no motivation to
combine the teachings of Wiernik and Tohno, and that even if such
motivation existed, “Tohno and Wiernik would still not present a
1181
clear and convincing instance of obviousness.”
The court classified
Wiernik’s teachings as “speculative and tentative,” emphasizing the
use of noncommittal language in the reference, such as “may” and
1182
“might.”
The court likewise reduced the Tohno reference,
pointing out that Tohno provides no mention of TSNAs, let alone a
1183
link between oxygen levels and the formation of TSNAs.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that RJR failed to
establish a prima facie case for obviousness, and the district court
1184
erred in denying Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
2.

Teaching away
A prior art reference may suggest nonobviousness when it “teaches
away” from the claimed invention—that is, when “a person of
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged
from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a
1185
direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”
1186
In Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
validity of a patent based on evidence that the art cited by the
1187
challenger implicitly taught away from the claimed invention.
1177. Id. at 1367–68, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926–27.
1178. Id. at 1375, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1179. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1180. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1181. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1182. Id. at 1376, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1183. Id. at 1375–76, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
1184. Id. at 1376, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
1185. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
1186. 649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
1187. Id. at 1342, 1344–45, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017–18.
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Spectralytics, Inc.’s patent was directed to a laser cutting tool for
coronary stents in which the work piece was directly attached to the
1188
This arrangement allowed the work piece and cutting
cutting tool.
tool to move in “precise unison,” thereby eliminating the “deleterious
1189
By contrast, all prior art machines attempted
effects of vibration.”
to dampen vibration by firmly attaching the work piece to the base of
1190
the machine.
The Federal Circuit held that the district court did
not err in concluding that the jury could have found that the prior
art “taught away” from attaching the work piece to the cutting tool
because all prior machines improved accuracy by damping
1191
Indeed, Cordis Corp.’s own expert testified that
vibrations.
Spectralytics’ design was contrary to the accepted teachings of the
1192
prior art.
Although the Federal Circuit had in previous cases
rejected assertions of “teaching away” on the ground that prior art
did not directly warn against the claimed invention or teach that the
claimed invention would not work, the court clarified that
“‘[t]eaching away’ does not require that the prior art foresaw the
specific invention that was later made, and warned against taking that
1193
path.”
1194
the Federal Circuit
In Unigene Laboratories, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, finding
Unigene Laboratories, Inc.’s patent claim nonobvious because the
prior art references either did not disclose or taught away from the
1195
claimed invention.
Unigene owns U.S. Patent No. RE40,812E
(“the ’812E patent”), a reissue patent, directed to a pharmaceutical
1196
Fortical,
nasal spray marketed under the brand name Fortical.
used to treat postmenopausal osteoporosis, is a bioequivalent of a
1197
competitor’s nasal spray, Miacalcin.
Miacalcin was marketed
1198
before the ’812E patent’s priority date and served as the “reference
1199
composition” for the inventor’s development work.
Apotex, Inc.
1188. Id. at 1339–40, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014–15.
1189. Id. at 1340, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
1190. Id. at 1343, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1191. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1192. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1193. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1194. 655 F.3d 1352, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1858 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-879, 2012 WL 136904 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
1195. Id. at 1355, 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859, 1861.
1196. Id. at 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
1197. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. This case arose from Apotex’s filing of an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to market a generic
version of Unigene’s Fortical product. Id. at 1356, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
1198. Id. at 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
1199. Id. at 1362, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
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argued that the asserted claim of the ’812E patent would have been
1200
obvious in light of Miacalcin and other prior art references.
Although both Fortical and Miacalcin use salmon calcitonin as
1201
their active ingredient, their exact formulations differ.
While
Miacalcin uses benzalkonium chloride (“BZK”) as a preservative,
absorption enhancer, and surfactant, Fortical uses 20mM citric acid
(absorption enhancer and stabilizer), polysorbate 80 (surfactant),
1202
The
and phenylethyl alcohol and benzyl alcohol (preservatives).
Federal Circuit noted that when the patented formulation of a
composition or formulation patent “was made to mimic a previously
FDA-approved formulation, the functional and pharmaceutical
properties of the ‘lead compound’ can be more relevant than the
1203
actual chemical structure.”
In Miacalcin, BZK acts as an absorption
1204
In Fortical, 20mM citric acid acts as an absorption
enhancer.
enhancer, which Unigene heavily relied upon to refute Apotex’s
1205
obviousness argument.
In rejecting Apotex’s argument, the court analyzed three prior art
1206
references.
The first reference disclosed a solid oral dosage of
salmon calcitonin, not a liquid formulation, which was the subject of
1207
Although the reference did mention citric
Unigene’s patent claim.
acid, it discussed citric acid concentrations “much higher than those
in [Unigene’s asserted patent claim]” and in a nonanalogous method
1208
of administration.
The second reference—“the closest prior art” to
Unigene’s claim—taught away from using 20mM citric acid as an
1209
absorption enhancer.
The reference discusses over fifty example
compounds of “pharmaceutically acceptable chelating agents to serve
as absorption agents,” including citric acid, and concludes that the
1210
compounds “yielded ‘discouraging’ test results.”
The third
reference merely referred to citric acid as a pH adjuster or buffer,
1211
making no reference to its use as an absorption enhancer.
The
court thus concluded that Unigene’s claim limitation for using 20mM

1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.
1209.
1210.
1211.

Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id. at 1355–56, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
Id. at 1356, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
Id. at 1361–62, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id. at 1362, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id. at 1362–63, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864–65.
Id. at 1363, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864–65.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864–65.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
Id. at 1363–64, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
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citric acid as an absorption enhancer supported a finding of
1212
nonobviousness.
3.

Obvious to try
An invention is not obvious merely because it might have been
“obvious to try.” When obviousness is asserted based on an obviousto-try basis, there must be a “finite number of identified, predictable
solutions,” and the success ultimately derived from pursuing those
1213
solutions must have been an “anticipated success.”
The Federal
Circuit has explained that “‘predictable result’ . . . refers not only to
the expectation that prior art elements are capable of being
physically combined, but also that the combination would have
1214
worked for its intended purpose.”
In an obvious to try analysis,
“[t]he important question is whether the invention is an ‘identified,
1215
Thus, “obvious
predictable solution’ and an ‘anticipated success.’”
to try” arguments are unavailing where the claimed solutions would
not have been an “anticipated success” in light of the uncertainties in
1216
the art.
Addressing the “obvious to try” standard in In re Brimonidine Patent
1217
Litigation,
the Federal Circuit concluded that four of Allergan’s
asserted patents were neither obvious to try nor obvious in view of the
1218
uncertainties and roadblocks faced by the inventors.
In particular,
Apotex argued that each of the asserted claims reads on a
combination of Alphagan and Refresh Tears, an over-the-counter
1219
lubricant eye drop commonly prescribed with Alphagan.
Alphagan
contains brimonidine tartrate, a benzalkonium preservative known to
irritate the eyes, and was maintained at an acidic pH, which likewise
1212. Id. at 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
1213. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1397 (2007) (emphases added); see also Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341,
1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen the problem is
known, the possible approaches to solving the problem are known and finite, and
the solution is predictable through use of a known option, then the pursuit of the
known option may be obvious . . . .” (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1397)).
1214. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326, 90
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1872–73 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1215. Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1097, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1352, 89
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171).
1216. See id. at 1340–41, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108 (explaining that there must
be a “nexus” between the invention’s commercial success and the “patentably distinct
feature of the invention”).
1217. 643 F.3d 1366, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-800, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2363 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
1218. Id. at 1375–76, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86.
1219. Id. at 1372–74, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883–84.
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1220

Refresh Tears, on the other hand,
tended to irritate the eye.
contained CMC (a viscosity enhancer also known to increase
solubility) and used the less irritating SCD preservative at a
1221
physiologic pH of 7 or above.
Looking to expert testimony and academic articles, the Federal
Circuit rejected Apotex’s “obvious to try” arguments due to the
district court’s factual findings, which suggested combining the two
1222
In
products would not result in a therapeutically effective product.
particular, the claimed inventions would not have been an
“anticipated success” in light of the uncertain stability of brimonidine
in combination with either SCD or CMC, and questions regarding the
1223
drug’s solubility at nonacidic pH.
The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court’s findings that “one of ordinary skill would not have
1224
And although
been expected to disregard those roadblocks.”
doctors routinely prescribe the two products together, that “alone
does not establish that it would have been obvious to combine the
1225
two in a single formulation.”
Judge Dyk dissented, noting, “[a] finding of obviousness under the
‘obvious to try’ standard ‘does not require absolute predictability of
success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of
1226
success.’”
Judge Dyk focused on the “undisputed evidence” that
Alphagan had common side effects, Refresh Tears contained
ingredients known to reduce the side effects caused by Alphagan, and
1227
doctors frequently coprescribed Alphagan and Refresh Tears.
Judge Dyk further disputed the district court’s factual findings
regarding the solubility and stability of brimonidine tartrate,
concluding that one having ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the two products, thereby obtaining the
1228
claimed formulation and rendering it obvious to try.
4.

Analogous art
For purposes of an obviousness determination, a reference

1220. Id. at 1369, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1221. Id. at 1372–74, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883–84.
1222. Id. at 1375–76, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86.
1223. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86.
1224. Id. at 1376, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86.
1225. Id. at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884.
1226. Id. at 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1417, 1423–24 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
1227. Id. at 1378–79, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
1228. Id. at 1378–79, 1382, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887–88, 1890.
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1229

qualifies as prior art only if it is analogous to the claimed invention.
Analogous art includes all art in the same field of endeavor and art
from a different field that is “reasonably pertinent to the particular
1230
problem with which the inventor is involved.”
Thus, “[i]f a
reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention,
the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use
1231
of that reference in an obviousness rejection.”
1232
In Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that a reference directed to an electronic chess-like laser
game, Laser Chess, qualified as analogous art for an invention
1233
directed to a physical chess-like laser game.
The district court
disregarded prior art raised by MGA Entertainment, Inc. because the
references “described electronic, rather than real-world, laser
1234
games.”
The Federal Circuit stated that the district court clearly
erred, explaining that the patent-in-suit and the Laser Chess
reference are directed to the same purpose: “a chess-like, laser-based
1235
strategy game” designed to be “winnable yet entertaining.”
Moreover, the elements claimed in Innovention Toys, LLC’s patent
deal with the same problems of game design and game elements
found in any strategy game, “whether molded in plastic by a
1236
mechanical engineer or coded in software by a computer scientist.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could
find the Laser Chess reference does not qualify as analogous prior
art, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
1237
nonobviousness.
1238
the Federal Circuit reversed the
By contrast, in In re Klein,
Board’s finding of obviousness in light of allegedly analogous prior
art where the purpose of the claimed invention differed from that of
1239
any cited references.
The applicant, Klein, sought to patent a
mixing device to prepare sugar-water nectar in bird and butterfly
1240
feeders.
The device featured a compartment with multiple fixed
1229.
1992).
1230.
2004).
1231.
1232.
1233.
1234.
1235.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.
1240.

In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1060 (Fed. Cir.
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
Clay, 966 F.2d at 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
637 F.3d 1314, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1316, 1322, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014, 1018.
Id. at 1318, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
Id. at 1322, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018–19.
Id. at 1322–23, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
Id. at 1323, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
647 F.3d 1343, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1345, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
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1241

The divider’s placement into a
locations for a removable divider.
fixed location resulted in two compartments, one for sugar and one
for water, proportionate to various bird and butterfly nectar
1242
recipes.
Hence, upon removal of the divider, the sugar and water
1243
In denying Klein’s patent
mixed to form the desired nectar.
application, the Board relied on five references it characterized as
1244
“reasonably pertinent to the [particular] problem.”
In overturning the Board’s decision, the court explained that the
purpose of three of the references was to “separate solid objects,” and
Klein would not have been motivated to consider references not
“adapted to receive water or contain it long enough to be able to
1245
prepare different ratios in the different compartments.”
The court
similarly rejected the remaining references, which, although directed
to the mixing of liquids, did not encompass a movable divider or
1246
otherwise allow for the preparation of varying ratios.
Thus, none
of the asserted references qualified as analogous prior art because
they did not relate to the same purpose or problem as Klein’s
1247
invention.
5.

Secondary considerations
1248
The fourth Graham v. John Deere Co. factor, evidence of secondary
considerations, evaluates the objective indicia of patentability, such as
commercial success, long-felt but unsolved need, failure of others,
1249
and unexpected results.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly
explained that such evidence is “not just a cumulative or
confirmatory part of the obviousness calculus but constitutes
1250
independent evidence of nonobviousness.”
Moreover, it “may
often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness
1251
in the record.”
Such evidence, though not necessarily dispositive,
1252
must be considered when present.
1241. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
1242. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
1243. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
1244. Id. at 1346–47, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992.
1245. Id. at 1350–51, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1995.
1246. Id. at 1351–52, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996.
1247. Id. at 1352, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996–97.
1248. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
1249. Id. at 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467.
1250. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1251. Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1252. See, e.g., In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1073–74, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1799, 1812
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A fundamental requirement for the application of secondary
indicia is evidence of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of
1253
Evidence of secondary considerations
the invention as claimed.
must also be “reasonably commensurate with the scope of the
1254
This does not mean that an applicant must submit
claims.”
evidence directed to every conceivable embodiment. To establish
unexpected results, for example, an applicant need not test every
embodiment within the scope of the claims if the applicant provides
an adequate basis on which to support the “conclusion that other
1255
embodiments . . . will behave in the same manner.”
Likewise, an
applicant “need not sell every conceivable embodiment of the claims
in order to rely upon evidence of commercial success, so long as what
1256
was sold was within the scope of the claims.”
1257
where Endo
These requirements are illustrated in In re Kao,
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the assignee of the three patent applications at
issue, appealed the Board’s affirmation of obviousness for claims
1258
related to its extended release oxymorphone dosage forms.
The
Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s findings on one application
1259
based largely on evidence of secondary considerations.
During
prosecution, Endo presented evidence of unexpected results and
commercial success to rebut the examiner’s prima facie case of
1260
obviousness.
The Board rejected all of this evidence as not
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board’s application of so strict a commensurateness
requirement was improper. However, here, this error was harmless because there
was no nexus between the secondary considerations presented and the claimed
invention.”); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that it is inappropriate for a court in any
case to ignore relevant evidence such that “evidence rising out of the so-called
‘secondary considerations’ must always when present be considered”). But see Pfizer,
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1369, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336–37 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (rejecting the district court’s reliance on secondary considerations due to
the evidence’s “suspect” nature and lack of support in the appellate record). A court
may commit error in its secondary considerations analysis, but the error is not
necessarily reversible error if the patentee/applicant fails to establish a nexus
between the evidence of secondary considerations and its claimed invention. Kao,
639 F.3d at 1073, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
1253. Kao, 639 F.3d at 1068, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808 (citing Wyers v. Master
Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1531 (2011)).
1254. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
1255. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
1256. In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1131 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see also In re Glatt Air Techniques, Inc., 630 F.3d 1026, 1030, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1661, 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It seems unlikely that a company would sell a
product containing multiple, redundant embodiments of a patented invention.”).
1257. 639 F.3d 1057, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1258. Id. at 1061, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
1259. Id. at 1067, 1071–74, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807, 1810–12.
1260. Id. at 1068–69, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808–09.
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1261

commensurate with the scope of the claims.
With respect to unexpected results, Endo submitted evidence that
the dissolution profile of its claimed extended release formulation
resulted in multiple peaks of oxymorphone blood levels that help
1262
The
prevent patients from building a tolerance to the opioid.
Board concluded, without basis, that the unexpected property must
be caused by some component of that particular formulation and
disregarded the evidence as not commensurate with the scope of the
1263
claims.
Pointing to the contrary declaration testimony of Endo’s
expert, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the Board “ignored the
1264
evidence of record and relied instead upon its own conjecture.”
Concluding that the Board’s rejections were improper, the court
remanded the application for a determination of whether a nexus
exists between the unexpected results and “aspects of the claimed
1265
invention not already present in the prior art.”
Turning to Endo’s evidence of commercial success, the Federal
Circuit determined that the Board erred by requiring Endo to show
evidence for the entire claimed range of the invention rather than
1266
for its sole commercial embodiment.
The court noted that “[i]t
seems unlikely that a company would sell a product containing
multiple, redundant embodiments of the patented invention. . . .
Under the [Office’s] logic, there would never be commercial success
1267
evidence for a claim that covers more than one embodiment.”
The
court explained that an applicant can point to the commercial
success without selling every possible embodiment within the scope of
1268
his claims.
Nevertheless, the court again cautioned that on
remand, Endo must show the nexus between commercial success and
1269
aspects of its claimed invention not already in the prior art.
The Federal Circuit also discussed secondary considerations in
1270
Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enterprises, Inc., where the court affirmed the
district court’s finding that Tokai Corporation failed to prove a nexus
between its commercial success of utility lighters and the claimed
1261. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807–08.
1262. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1263. Id. at 1069, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1264. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1265. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1266. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808–09.
1267. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Glatt
Air Techniques, Inc., 630 F.3d 1026, 1030, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1661, 1664 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1268. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808–09.
1269. Id. at 1069–70, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
1270. 632 F.3d 1358, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The full
background of Tokai is set forth supra Part IV.H.1.
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1271

The Federal Circuit in Tokai established that the
invention.
1272
The court
industry required all lighters to have a safety device.
found telling that Tokai’s corporate representative, who testified
about Tokai’s marketing and sales, did not once mention the
automatic safety device featured on Tokai’s utility lighters, which
purportedly distinguished the claimed invention from the prior
1273
art.
Similarly, Tokai’s evidence of copying was not persuasive and
the court dismissed Tokai’s assertion that Easton’s bare stipulation to
1274
infringement proved copying.
The court explained that even if
Tokai had proven a nexus between commercial success and the
claimed invention, the overwhelming prima facie case of obviousness
1275
obliterated any weight due to the fourth Graham factor.
Judge Newman dissented in Tokai, finding support for
nonobviousness in all the reasons set forth by the district court in
establishing obviousness. Judge Newman first found error in the
1276
district court’s disregard of Tokai’s commercial success.
Judge
Newman explained that a prima facie case for nexus is made when
there is commercial success and the successful product is the
1277
disclosed invention.
Judge Newman indicated that the benefits of
Tokai’s design had “displaced the competition,” and evidence
adduced at trial indicated that large retailers were purchasing Tokai’s
1278
lighters because of the improved child safety mechanism.
Judge
Newman also disagreed that “the known need” for an improved safety
mechanism contributed to the obviousness of Tokai’s invention,
stating that the “continuing need weighs against the obviousness of
1279
this successful device.”
Finally, Judge Newman disagreed that the
1280
simplicity of Tokai’s invention evidenced its obviousness.
Indeed,
that Tokai’s invention “eluded discovery, and that its advantages were
immediately apparent to the marketplace and to the competition,
1281
weigh in favor of nonobviousness.”

1271. Tokai, 632 F.3d at 1370, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1272. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1273. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1274. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1275. Id. at 1371, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1276. Id. at 1379, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686–87 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1277. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (citing Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff
Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1226 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
1278. Id. at 1374, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1279. Id. at 1380, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688 (emphasis added).
1280. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
1281. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
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Reissue

Patent holders seeking to correct mistakes in an issued patent may
1282
file for reissue.
Prior to enactment of the America Invents Act, 35
U.S.C. § 251 stated, in relevant part, that when any patent is “through
error without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly
inoperative or invalid . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or
less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall . . .
reissue the patent . . . for the unexpired part of the term of the
1283
original patent.”
The statute also commands that “[n]o new matter
1284
shall be introduced into the application for reissue.”
It is axiomatic that a patentee may not use a reissue application to
regain subject matter relinquished during prosecution to secure the
1285
original patent claims.
Accordingly, courts must determine what
types of error are, or will be, correctible under the statute and
whether the application for reissue seeks to capture new matter or
1286
recapture matter surrendered during patent prosecution.
1.

Correctible error
The Federal Circuit further defined “correctible error” in In re
1287
Tanaka.
The patent holder sought a reissue application to add a
1288
narrower, dependent claim.
The Board, in a seven-judge panel,
held that 35 U.S.C. § 251 does not permit reissue applications that
“simply add narrow claims” when the patent holder fails to make an
1289
assertion of inoperativeness or invalidity.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed. The court noted two requirements under § 251: the
original patent must be “wholly or partly inoperative or invalid,” and

1282. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
1283. Id. Under the AIA, and effective September 6, 2012, 35 U.S.C. § 251 no
longer contains the words “without any deceptive intention.” Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20(d)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 251). In addition, the AIA amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 257
indicate that inequitable conduct occurring during the prosecution of a patent
application may be purged during other postgrant examination. § 12(c)(1), 125
Stat. at 325–26.
1284. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
1285. See In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that the “recapture rule” prohibits a “patentee from
regaining through reissue the subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to
obtain allowance of the original claims” (citing Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998
F.2d 992, 995, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
1286. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (outlining the first step for a court in
applying the recapture rule as “determin[ing] whether and in what ‘aspect’ the
reissue claims are broader than the patent claims”).
1287. 640 F.3d 1246, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1288. Id. at 1247–48, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331–32.
1289. Id. at 1248, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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Only the
no deceptive intent may give rise to the underlying error.
1291
first requirement applied in Tanaka.
1292
The court seized onto a footnote from In re Handel, a decision
from its predecessor court, and stated that “the Board’s
determination is contrary to long-standing precedent . . . and flies
1293
counter to principles of stare decisis.”
The court unequivocally
held that § 251 permits “adding dependent claims as a hedge against
1294
The court admitted that its
possible invalidity of original claims.”
holding has not previously been “formally embodied in a holding” by
either the court or its predecessor, but characterized the Handel
footnote as “a considered explanation of the scope of the reissue
authority of the [US]PTO in the context of a detailed explanation of
1295
the reissue statute.”
Judge Dyk dissented. Distinguishing the prior case law cited by the
1296
court, Judge Dyk argued that the Tanaka issue was novel.
Judge
Dyk found no support in the language or purpose of § 251 for using a
reissue application merely to include narrower claims, which, as
Judge Dyk asserted, does not require making a correction to the
1297
original patent.
Judge Dyk relied on a Supreme Court case, Gage v.
1298
Herring, in which the court disallowed a reissue where the inventor
sought to add a new and broader claim but not alter any of the
1299
original claims.
Judge Dyk clarified that when a patentee seeks not
to alter the original claims, but only to add new claims, the patentee
1290. Id. at 1249, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332–33 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1564, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1750, 1753 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that the Tanaka court applied
the standard pursuant to the patent statute prior to the effective date of amendments
to § 251.
1291. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332–33.
1292. 312 F.2d 943, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 460 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
1293. See Tanaka, 640 F.3d at 1249, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332–33 (admonishing
that the Handel court stated “[n]early a half century ago” that it is proper to ask that
a reissue be granted if dependent claims were added as a hedge against the possible
invalidity of original claims (citing Handel, 312 F.2d at 946 n.2, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 462 n.2)).
1294. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332–33 (quoting Handel, 312 F.2d at 946 n.2,
136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 462 n.2).
1295. Id. at 1250, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333–34.
1296. Id. at 1252, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1297. Id. at 1253, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
1298. 107 U.S. 640 (1883).
1299. See Tanaka, 640 F.3d at 1253–54, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting Gage to mean that reissue is unavailable unless a correction
of something in the original is required). The majority distinguished Gage,
explaining that Gage did not address whether the patentee must surrender an
original claim or part thereof. Id. at 1251 n.1, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 n.1
(majority opinion). The court instead interpreted Gage as invalidating a reissue
because the patentee sought to broaden the scope of his claims. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1334 n.1.
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must identify an error in the original claim, making it necessary to
1300
Judge Dyk’s dissent concluded that the new
obtain the reissue.
dependent claim had no impact on Tanaka’s rights under the
1301
original claims, thereby invalidating the reissue.
2.

Impermissible recapture
Courts also invalidate reissue applications when the patentee seeks
to recapture subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the
original application—which is precisely what the Federal Circuit
1302
The Mostafazadeh
concluded occurred in In re Mostafazadeh.
application involved semiconductor packaging, whereby a computer
chip, mounted on a lead frame, was supported by an attachment
1303
pad.
The patent applicants overcame rejection of all their
originally filed claims by amending the claims to require “circular
1304
The applicants explicitly relied on the novelty
attachment pads.”
of the attachment pad’s circular shape in overcoming the examiner’s
1305
rejection.
A year after the patent issued, the applicants filed a
reissue application and sought to eliminate the circular aspect of the
1306
attachment pad.
The applicants argued that the circular
attachment pad limitation was “unduly limiting,” rendering the
1307
Applicants argued that the
original claims partially inoperative.
recapture rule was avoided because, in retaining the general
attachment pad limitation, they had not recaptured the entirety of
what was surrendered during prosecution, and the reissue claims
added limitations to another claim element that were “narrowing
1308
relative to the surrendered [subject matter].”
If the patentee materially narrows the reissue claims with respect to
the surrendered subject matter as compared to the original claims,
1309
the patentee avoids violating the recapture rule.
As a preliminary
matter, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s rejection of the
reissue application but concluded that the Board relied on an
1310
incorrect portion of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.

1300. Id. at 1254, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336–37 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1301. Id. at 1255, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1302. 643 F.3d 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1303. Id. at 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640.
1304. Id. at 1356–57, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640–41 (emphasis added).
1305. Id. at 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641.
1306. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641.
1307. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1308. Id. at 1361, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1309. Id. at 1358–59, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641–42.
1310. Id. at 1359–60, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642–43.
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The court explained that the reissue claims are broader than the
patented claims because the “surrendered subject matter has been
1311
The court then rejected
reclaimed in whole or substantial part.”
both the reissue applicants’ arguments, first clarifying that an
applicant cannot avoid a recapture violation by recapturing only a
portion of what the applicant surrendered, and then holding that
applicant’s attempt to materially narrow its claims was irrelevant
because the narrowing limitations were unrelated to the surrendered
1312
subject matter.
J.

Burden of Overcoming the Presumption of Validity
1313

The Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership
reaffirmed that § 282 of the Patent Act not only presumes the validity
of each claim of an issued patent, but also requires that a challenger
seeking to overcome that presumption do so by clear and convincing
1314
evidence.
The Court further affirmed that the clear and
convincing evidence standard is the same irrespective of whether the
examiner considered the allegedly invalidating evidence during
1315
prosecution.
It is well established that when a patent challenger
relies on the same prior art the patent examiner considered during
prosecution, the challenger must also overcome the deference due to
“a qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its
1316
job.”
Conversely, the judgment of the USPTO may be less
1317
persuasive where the Office did not have all material facts before it.
Because new evidence supporting an invalidity defense may carry
more weight in an infringement action than evidence previously
considered by the USPTO, a challenger’s burden to establish
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to
1318
sustain.
Although decided several months before i4i, the Federal Circuit’s
1319
decision in Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enterprises, Inc. is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s holding. In Tokai, the Federal Circuit rejected
1311. Id. at 1360, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
1312. Id. at 1361, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
1313. 131 S. Ct. 2238, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (2011).
1314. Id. at 2249–50 & n.8, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864–65 & n.8.
1315. Id. at 2251, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
1316. PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated in part by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
1317. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866–67.
1318. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866–67.
1319. 632 F.3d 1358, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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the patentee’s argument that a patent challenger should face a
greater burden of overcoming the presumption of validity because a
subset of the asserted prior art references were considered during
1320
Beginning from the premise that the standard of
prosecution.
1321
proof is clear and convincing evidence, the court agreed that “a
party challenging validity shoulders an enhanced burden if the
invalidity argument relies on the same prior art considered during
1322
examination by the [USPTO].”
However, the USPTO is not
granted a greater level of deference when the Examiner did not
examine evidence upon which an invalidity argument rests. Thus,
the enhanced burden level does not apply when only some of the
1323
asserted prior art was considered by the USPTO.
In her dissent, Judge Newman did not dispute the increased
burden faced when asserted references had been considered by the
USPTO, but she argued that the previously unexamined reference
1324
was cumulative to one of the disclosed prior art references.
Judge
Newman concluded that Easton merely went “over the same ground
travelled by the [US]PTO” and therefore failed to meet its burden in
1325
showing that the USPTO was wrong.
V. UNENFORCEABILITY
A. Inequitable Conduct
The Federal Circuit’s frustration with the overuse and abuse of
asserting inequitable conduct in nearly every major patent case came
1326
to a head in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., where the
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, tightened the standards for
1327
In 1984, Therasense, Inc. (now
establishing inequitable conduct.
Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc.) and Abbott Laboratories (collectively
“Abbott”) filed a patent application that led to U.S. Patent No.
1328
5,820,551 (“the ’551 patent”).
The ’551 patent pertained to
disposable blood glucose test strips for testing whole blood without a
1320. Id. at 1366–67, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678–79.
1321. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678–79.
1322. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678–79.
1323. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
1324. Id. at 1378, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1325. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa
& Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 770–71 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated in part by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1326. 649 F.3d 1276, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
1327. Id. at 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1328. Id. at 1283, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
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During prosecution, the examiner rejected the claims
membrane.
over another Abbott patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (“the ’382
1330
patent”), which disclosed that the use of a membrane was optional.
In response to the rejection, Abbott’s patent attorney and director of
research and development submitted a declaration stating that one
skilled in the art would have read the ’382 patent specification to
1331
require a membrane when used with whole blood.
However,
Abbott represented that the invention did not require a membrane
when it prosecuted the European counterpart to the ’382 patent
1332
several years earlier.
In 2004, Becton, Dickinson and Co. sued Abbott, seeking a
declaratory judgment that its blood glucose test strip did not infringe
Abbott’s U.S. Patent Nos. 6,143,164 (“the ’164 patent”) and 6,592,745
1333
(“the ’745 patent”).
Abbott countersued, alleging infringement of
1334
the ’164, ’745, and ’551 patents.
Abbott also sued Nova Biomedical
1335
The cases
Corp., Becton’s supplier, and Bayer Healthcare LLC.
1336
were consolidated in the Northern District of California.
The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement
1337
with respect to all asserted claims of the ’164 and ’745 patents.
Additionally, the court invalidated almost all the asserted claims of
the ’745 patent because of anticipation. Several of the asserted
claims of the ’551 patent were also invalidated because of obviousness
1338
due to the ’382 patent.
Further, the district court held the ’551
patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct because Abbott failed
to disclose to the USPTO the briefs it filed with the European Patent
1339
Office (EPO).
Abbott appealed and a panel of the Federal Circuit
upheld the judgments of invalidity, unenforceability, and
noninfringement, but the Federal Circuit granted Abbott’s petition
1340
for rehearing en banc.
Writing for a majority of the en banc court, Chief Judge Rader
traced the history of inequitable conduct as an equitable defense that
evolved from a trio of Supreme Court cases applying the unclean

1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.

Id. at 1282, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066–67.
Id. at 1283, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1283–84, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1284, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1284–85, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1285, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
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In
hands doctrine to patent cases involving egregious misconduct.
addition, the majority explained the divergence of inequitable
conduct from the doctrine of unclean hands and the fluctuations of
1342
the standards for intent and materiality over time.
Due to these
fluctuations, the court noted that the inequitable conduct doctrine
1343
has created problems for both courts and the entire patent system.
In response to the numerous unintended consequences, the court
explained that it was “tighten[ing] the standards for finding both
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been
1344
overused to the detriment of the public.”
First, as to the intent element, the majority held that an accused
infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
1345
patentee acted with specific intent to deceive the USPTO.
In
reaching this standard, the court noted that the gross negligence and
“should have known” standards are insufficient to satisfy the specific
1346
intent requirement.
In addition, the majority specifically noted
that in cases involving nondisclosure of information, “the accused
infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made
1347
a deliberate decision to withhold it.”
Second, the majority distinguished intent and materiality as two
distinct requirements, and asserted that a “sliding scale” may not be
1348
used to infer intent from materiality.
Instead, the majority
explained that a district court should weigh the evidence of intent to
1349
deceive independent of its materiality analysis.
The majority went
on to note that “[b]ecause direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare,
a district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial
1350
evidence.”
To meet the clear and convincing evidence standard,
however, the majority explained that the specific intent to deceive
must be “‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from

1341. Id. at 1285–87, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069–70.
1342. See id. at 1287, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (noting that although
inequitable conduct “emerged” from the unclean hands doctrine, the standards of
intent to deceive and materiality differ).
1343. Id. at 1289, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1344. Id. at 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1345. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1346. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1347. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1348. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
1349. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
1350. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
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Further, the majority explained that “[b]ecause
the evidence.’”
the party alleging inequitable conduct bears the burden of proof, the
‘patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the
accused infringer first . . . prove[s] a threshold level of intent to
1352
deceive by clear and convincing evidence.’”
Third, addressing the materiality element, the Federal Circuit
adopted a but-for materiality standard for establishing inequitable
conduct, consequently dismissing the definition of materiality in
1353
USPTO Rule 56.
This but-for standard of materiality requires that
a district court ascertain whether the USPTO—had it been aware of
1354
The
the undisclosed prior art—would have still allowed the claim.
appropriate standard for this assessment is preponderance of the
evidence, which broadly construes the claims, such that the finding of
1355
patentability is often consistent with the USPTO’s determination.
The majority, however, also carved out an exception to the but-for
materiality test; in cases where the patentee has engaged in
“affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material” because “a
patentee is unlikely to go to great lengths to deceive the [US]PTO
with a falsehood unless it believes that the falsehood will affect
1356
issuance of the patent.”
Since the district court applied the USPTO’s Rule 56 materiality
standard, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s finding of
materiality and remanded for determination under the but-for
1357
materiality standard.
Further, since the “district court found intent
to deceive based on the absence of a good faith explanation for
failing to disclose the EPO briefs,” the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s finding of intent and remanded for determination
1358
under the Federal Circuit’s specific intent analysis.
Ultimately, the
Federal Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s judgment of
obviousness, noninfringement, and anticipation while it vacated in
part its finding of inequitable conduct and remanded in part for

1351. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
1352. Id. at 1291, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Star, 537 F.3d at 1368, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008).
1353. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073–74.
1354. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073–74.
1355. Id. at 1291–92, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073–74.
1356. Id. at 1292, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal
Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 302 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1357. Id. at 1295–96, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
1358. Id. at 1296, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
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1359

further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
In a separate opinion, Judge O’Malley concurred in part and
1360
dissented in part.
Judge O’Malley joined the majority’s
conclusions regarding the standard for the specific intent to
1361
But, Judge O’Malley’s views diverged from the majority
deceive.
regarding materiality; she argued that a more flexible test should be
1362
adopted that would allow a district court remedial discretion.
Specifically, a district court should be able to render fewer than all
claims unenforceable; dismiss the action before it; or provide another
1363
remedy so long as it is “commensurate with the violation.”
Judge
O’Malley explained that she would deem conduct material where
(1) but for the conduct . . . the patent would not have issued . . .
(2) the conduct constitutes a false or misleading misrepresentation
of fact . . . or (3) the district court finds that the behavior is so
offensive that the court is left with a firm conviction that the
integrity of the [US]PTO process as to the application at issue was
1364
wholly undermined.

Finally, Judge O’Malley noted that she would have affirmed the
district court’s finding of materiality under her flexible and
1365
discretionary approach.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson, joined by Judges Gajarsa,
Dyk, and Prost, proposed adhering to the materiality standard set
forth in USPTO Rule 56 instead of the majority’s new adoption of a
1366
but-for materiality test.
The dissent raised two reasons for its
1367
First, the
preference of the USPTO’s Rule 56 materiality test.
USPTO is in the best position to know what information examiners
1368
need to conduct effective and efficient examinations.
Second, the
dissent criticized the majority’s higher but-for materiality standard,
claiming that it would disincentivize disclosure on the part of patent
1369
applicants.
Ultimately, the dissent stated that it would affirm the
district court’s finding that the ’551 patent was unenforceable
because that court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and
1359. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
1360. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1361. Id. at 1297, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
1362. Id. at 1297–99, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078–81.
1363. Id. at 1299, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078–81 (quoting Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1364. Id. at 1300, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
1365. Id. at 1300–01, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080–81.
1366. Id. at 1302–03, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082–95 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
1367. Id. at 1303, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
1368. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
1369. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
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because its analysis was consistent with patent law’s approach to
1370
inequitable conduct.
Ultimately, Therasense dramatically reshaped the law governing
inequitable conduct. Those changes, in combination with the
Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
1371
Inc.,
in which the court clarified the heightened pleading
requirements of inequitable conduct under Federal Rule of Civil
1372
are likely to have a significant effect on the
Procedure 9(b),
frequency of inequitable conduct allegations raised in future patent
cases. Therasense and Exergen are also likely to shift the timing of
inequitable conduct allegations such that they will be raised later in
the pretrial stage of a case, likely after the parties engage in discovery.
Following Therasense, the Federal Circuit addressed inequitable
conduct in four additional cases in 2011. In American Calcar, Inc. v.
1373
American Honda Motor Co., the Federal Circuit, inter alia, vacated
the district court’s inequitable conduct decision and remanded for
the district court to reconsider its decision under the guidelines set
1374
forth in Therasense.
American Calcar, Inc. (“ACI”) asserted that
American Honda Motor Company, Inc. infringed fifteen ACI patents
associated with a vehicle computer system through which drivers
could acquire information about the vehicle and control various
1375
aspects of it through a touch-screen.
The court divided the nine
1376
The two groups relevant
patents at issue on appeal into six groups.
to the Federal Circuit’s inequitable conduct decision were the
1377
“Three-Status patent” and the “Search patents.”
Before filing the
applications for the Three-Status and Search patents, the inventors
borrowed an Acura 96RL vehicle and examined the car’s navigation
1378
system.
Although the 96RL system was described in the
“Background” section of ACI’s patent applications, the description
was limited to the system’s navigation features, not its driver interface
1379
features.
In relevant part, the jury found the Three-Status patent was “invalid
as anticipated by the [Acura] 96RL” and declared an advisory verdict
1370. Id. at 1319–20, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092–95.
1371. 575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1372. Id. at 1328–29, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
1373. 651 F.3d 1318, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1503, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011).
1374. Id. at 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1375. Id. at 1323, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1376. Id. at 1323–28, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140–43.
1377. Id. at 1327–28, 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142, 1148
1378. Id. at 1328, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
1379. Id. at 1328–29, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
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of no inequitable conduct with regard to the Three-Status and Search
1380
The district court then found, contrary to the advisory
patents.
verdict, that the inventors had engaged in inequitable conduct
during prosecution of the Three-Status and Search patents, and held
1381
the patents unenforceable.
In so doing, the district court held that
because of the material nature of the information that ACI withheld,
a conclusion that the patents were unenforceable due to inequitable
1382
conduct could rest on less evidence of intent.
ACI appealed
several of the district court’s rulings, including the inequitable
1383
conduct determinations, and Honda cross-appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the ThreeStatus and Search patents were unenforceable for inequitable
1384
conduct.
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the district court was not obligated to adopt the jury’s advisory verdict
1385
on inequitable conduct.
The court held that when confronted
with an equitable inquiry, it is obligated to resolve the facts
1386
surrounding issues of materiality and intent without a jury.
The court explained, “to prove inequitable conduct, the accused
infringer must provide evidence that the applicant (1)
misrepresented or omitted material information, and (2) did so with
1387
the specific intent to deceive the [US]PTO.”
In accordance with
Therasense, but-for materiality is necessary to prove inequitable
1388
In other words, the court stated, “[w]hen an applicant
conduct.
fails to disclose prior art to the [US]PTO, that prior art is but-for
material if the [US]PTO would not have allowed a claim to issue had
1389
the USPTO been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”
Applying the new materiality standard, the Federal Circuit agreed
with Honda that, because the district court had invalidated the claim
for the Three-Status patent—a decision that ACI did not appeal—the
1390
withheld 96RL information was material.
The court then held that
even though the jury found the Search patents valid, the undisclosed
96RL information might be material if it would have led the USPTO
1380. Id. at 1330, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
1381. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
1382. Id. at 1332, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1383. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1384. Id. at 1332–36, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146–48.
1385. Id. at 1333, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146–47.
1386. Id. at 1333–34, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146–47.
1387. Id. at 1334, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1388. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1389. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1390. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291–92, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073–74 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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to deny issuance under its preponderance of the evidence
1391
Because the district court’s opinion did not allow the
standard.
Federal Circuit to make that inference, it vacated the decision and
1392
remanded for further findings on materiality.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the district court applied
an incorrect standard in determining whether the ACI inventors had
1393
the specific intent to deceive the USPTO.
Under Therasense, the
party asserting inequitable conduct “must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew
1394
that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.”
In this instance,
[a]lthough the court performed a detailed analysis of the facts
withheld, it made no holding that any of the inventors knew that
the withheld information was in fact material and made a
deliberate decision to withhold it. Instead, it relied on the sliding
scale standard that [the Federal Circuit] . . . rejected en banc in
1395
Therasense . . . .

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s finding
1396
of intent and remanded that issue as well.
1397
the
In Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Commission,
Federal Circuit, inter alia, reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
action and, in so doing, determined that Delano Farms Co.’s
inequitable conduct claim was pleaded with sufficient specificity to
1398
survive a motion to dismiss.
Delano Farms brought a declaratory judgment suit against the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the California
Table Grape Commission, an agency of the State of California,
seeking, among other things, a determination that several patents
assigned to the USDA and licensed to the Commission were
1399
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
In particular, Delano
Farms asserted that Dr. Ramming, an inventor and employee at the
USDA, knew of an alleged prior use and appreciated that the use
could be material, but withheld from the USPTO with intent to
1391. Id. at 1335, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1392. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147–48.
1393. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1394. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1395. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1396. Id. at 1335–36, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1397. 655 F.3d 1337, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1546, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26139 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).
1398. Id. at 1350, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1399. Id. at 1340, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
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1400

The Commission further argued that the Federal Circuit
deceive.
should uphold the district court’s decision because Delano Farms
had not alleged facts that would lead to a conclusion that individuals
at the USDA had withheld information with an intent to deceive the
1401
USPTO.
The Federal Circuit rejected the Commission’s argument, finding
that Delano Farms’ complaint sufficiently pleaded inequitable
1402
conduct under Exergen and Therasense because it “alleged that Dr.
Ramming had detailed knowledge that the Commission had
[investigated] prior use of the patented varieties, had learned of
multiple instances of such use, and had encouraged those in
1403
possession of the patented varieties to cease such use.”
In addition,
the complaint alleged that “[t]he Commission and Dr. Ramming
discussed the fact that public uses and sales of the new varieties prior
to seeking patent protection could jeopardize the Commission’s
1404
patenting program.”
Finally, the court rejected the Commission’s
argument that, as a federal employee, the presumption of regularity
should attach to Dr. Ramming’s actions and preclude a conclusion
that he may have acted with deceptive intent because “[e]ven if
1405
relevant, that presumption is not absolute.”
In doing so, the court
stated that if the complaint was sufficient to allege inequitable
conduct, it could overcome the presumption of regularity with
1406
respect to Dr. Ramming.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected
the Commission’s alternative basis for affirmance, and reversed in
1407
part and remanded.
1408
In Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Federal Circuit, inter
alia, affirmed the district court’s decision that, as a matter of law, U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,879,370 (“the ’370 patent”) and 5,643,312 (“the ’312
1409
patent”) were not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
Cordis Corp. owns the ’312 and ’370 patents, which relate to
“balloon-expandable coronary stents” with “undulating longitudinal
sections” that were used in the treatment of obstructed blood
1400. Id. at 1350, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1401. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1402. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836 (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc); Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1318, 1330,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656, 1660, 1669 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
1403. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1404. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1405. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1406. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1407. Id. at 1350, 1352, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836, 1837.
1408. 658 F.3d 1347, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1409. Id. at 1350, 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330, 1338.
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1410

Robert Fischell prosecuted the application of the ’312
vessels.
patent pro se, but he retained an attorney, Mr. Rosenberg, to
1411
prosecute the patent’s foreign counterparts.
During prosecution
of the ’312 patent, Rosenberg sent Fischell an EPO Search Report
1412
The EPO Search Report
regarding a foreign counterpart.
identified and categorized six references, where “Category ‘X’
documents were ‘particularly relevant if taken alone,’ [and] Category
‘Y’ documents were ‘particularly relevant if combined with another
1413
document of the same category.’”
Although U.S. Patent No.
4,856,516 (“Hillstead”), one of the four Y references, was directed to
a stent “constructed from an elongated wire bent to define a series of
relatively tightly spaced convolutions or bends,” Mr. Rosenberg’s
1414
accompanying letter focused on the X reference.
During the bench trial, Fischell testified that he would customarily
“look at the pictures and see if the pictures [in the references] look
1415
like the invention.”
Rosenberg testified that when reviewing EPO
search reports, he would “carefully” examine the “X” references but
1416
“just scan” for “Y” references.
Both Rosenberg and Fischell,
however, stated that they did not remember seeing Hillstead until
April of 1998, even though Hillstead had been identified in the EPO
1417
search report and appeared in their files since at least July of 1995.
Hillstead was not disclosed to the USPTO during prosecution of the
’312 patent, but was disclosed in an Information Disclosure
Statement (IDS) while prosecuting the ’370 patent, which issued
1418
from a continuation application from the ’312 patent application.
Hillstead was one of about seventy references disclosed in the IDS,
1419
and the IDS did not note that Hillstead was of any specific interest.
Cordis sued Boston Scientific Corp. and Boston Scientific Scimed,
1420
Inc. (collectively “BSC”) for infringing the ’370 and ’312 patents.
After a separate bench trial on unenforceability, the district court
found both patents unenforceable because of inequitable conduct in
1421
light of Hillstead.
On a first appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that
1410. Id. at 1350–51, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330–31.
1411. Id. at 1351, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1412. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1413. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1414. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1415. Id. at 1352, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1416. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1417. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331–32.
1418. Id. at 1353, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1419. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1420. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1421. Id. at 1353–54, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2011 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

923

the reference to Hillstead was material, but remanded for additional
1422
On remand, the district court
findings regarding intent to deceive.
found that BSC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1)
deceptive intent, and (2) “that the nondisclosure of Hillstead during
the ’312 prosecution carried over and affected the later ’370
1423
patent.”
The court therefore reversed the inequitable conduct
1424
Cordis appealed issues relating to infringement, and
judgment.
BSC cross-appealed the district court’s finding that the patents were
1425
not unenforceable because of inequitable conduct.
On that appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected BSC’s argument that
Cordis waived any challenge to the district court’s initial inequitable
conduct finding with respect to the ’312 patent because the court can
address waived issues “when they are necessary to the resolution of
1426
The court decided that
other issues directly before it on appeal.”
the “enforceability of the two patents [was] inextricably linked”
because “the enforceability of the ’312 patent [was] a predicate issue
necessary to [the] determination of the enforceability of the ’370
1427
patent” under BSC’s taint theory of inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit similarly rejected BSC’s additional arguments,
finding no error in the district court’s decision to issue supplemental
1428
findings of fact and no clear error in the findings themselves.
The
district court found that Rosenberg’s letter forwarding the EPO
Search Report called attention to a different reference, not Hillstead,
and that when Hillstead was later brought to Fischell’s attention, he
1429
promptly disclosed it to the USPTO.
Although Fischell did not
emphasize Hillstead in the IDS he submitted, the district court found
1430
that Fischell had relied on Rosenberg’s advice.
Thus, the Federal
Circuit noted that “[t]his appears to be a case where BSC proved the
threshold level of intent to deceive, but that proof was rebutted by . . .
1431
Fischell’s good faith explanation.”
Further, while the court found
“substantial evidence calling into question . . . Fischell’s veracity,” the
court “‘gives great deference to the district court’s decisions

1422. Id. at 1354, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332–33.
1423. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1424. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
1425. Id. at 1350, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1426. Id. at 1359, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
1427. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1428. Id. at 1360–61, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337–38.
1429. Id. at 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1430. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1431. Id. at 1361 n.6, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 n.6 (citing Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290–91, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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1432

Accordingly, the Federal
regarding credibility of witnesses.’”
Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that BSC failed to
prove inequitable conduct in the ’312 and ’370 patent
1433
prosecutions.
1434
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the Federal Circuit, inter alia,
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
failed to prove inequitable conduct by clear and convincing
1435
evidence.
Michael Powell owns U.S. Patent No. 7,044,039 (“the
1436
’039 patent”), which is directed to guards for radial arm saws.
After its employees experienced numerous costly injuries operating
arm saws to cut raw lumber, Home Depot reached out to Powell, with
whom it had a business relationship for many years for the
1437
installation and repair of radial arm saws.
In response, Powell
developed a saw guard and presented his prototype to Home Depot,
1438
which ordered several for use and testing.
Powell, however, could
not reach an agreement to supply the guards at the price Home
1439
Without Powell’s knowledge, Home Depot
Depot wanted.
communicated with another company, permitted it to inspect
Powell’s invention, and then asked it to build a virtually identical
1440
machine at a price less than what it paid Powell for the prototypes.
1441
Powell then sued Home Depot for infringement.
The jury found that Home Depot “willfully and literally infringed
1442
The
the ’039 patent” and awarded Powell $15 million in damages.
district court increased the damages by an additional $3 million and
awarded $2.8 million in attorneys’ fees, bringing the final judgment
against Home Depot to over $23.9 million, including prejudgment
1443
1444
interest.
Home Depot appealed.
The Federal Circuit rejected Home Depot’s argument that Powell
committed inequitable conduct by failing to update a Petition to
1445
Make Special.
Powell had submitted such a petition seeking
1432. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 n.6 (quoting Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378–79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1433. Id. at 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1434. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
1435. Id. at 1235, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1436. Id. at 1226, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1437. Id. at 1227, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1438. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1439. Id. at 1228, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1440. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1441. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1442. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1443. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1444. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1445. Id. at 1234–35, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750–51.
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expedited review on the grounds that he was obligated to
1446
manufacture and supply devices embodying the claims sought.
Even though it became clear that Home Depot would not use his
guards, Powell did not update his petition; the USPTO granted the
petition and accordingly proceeded to review Powell’s patent
1447
application on an expedited basis.
The Federal Circuit held that
after its en banc decision in Therasense “[w]here, as here, the patent
applicant fails to update the record to inform the [US]PTO that the
circumstances which support a Petition to Make Special no longer
1448
exist—that conduct does not constitute inequitable conduct.”
That was so because such conduct “obviously fails the but-for
materiality standard and is not the type of unequivocal act, ‘such as
the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit,’ that would rise to the
1449
level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’”
Thus, based on the
change in law effected by Therasense, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that Home Depot failed to establish
1450
inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.
VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
As claims define the scope of a patentee’s rights under a patent,
claim construction often determines the outcome of a validity or
1451
infringement analysis.
When construing claim terms, courts
1452
generally give them their “ordinary and customary meaning,” “the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the
1453
art in question at the time of the invention.”
For guidance, the en
1446. Id. at 1235, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (citing USPTO, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02 (8th ed. Rev. 8,
2010)).
1447. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
1448. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1072–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
1449. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292–93,
99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074).
1450. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1451. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The first step [in an infringement
analysis] is determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be
infringed.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996); see also Smiths
Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1415, 1418–19 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It is well-established that the first step in any validity
analysis is to construe the claims of the invention to determine the subject matter for
which patent protection is sought.”).
1452. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1453. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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1454

banc Federal Circuit held in Phillips v. AWH Corp. that courts must
first look to the intrinsic evidence, including the claims themselves,
1455
the specification, and the prosecution history.
For further help,
courts may consider extrinsic evidence, such as inventor and expert
1456
As the Federal
testimony, learned treatises, and dictionaries.
Circuit explained, these sources “can help educate the court
1457
regarding the field of the invention.”
Over the past year, the
Federal Circuit has continued to use this approach. Yet, regardless of
the seemingly clear guidance of Phillips, claim construction remains a
1458
difficult task.
A. Claim Language
In claim construction, the claim itself provides substantial guidance
1459
as to the meaning of a particular term.
Courts generally “prefer[]
a claim interpretation that harmonizes the various elements of the
1460
claim to define a workable invention.”
To achieve this harmony,
courts often consider the context of the surrounding words in the
1461
For example, in Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate
asserted claim.
1462
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit used two other limitations in
1463
the same claim to glean the meaning of the disputed term.
The patent in Lexion Medical discloses an apparatus and methods
for heating and humidifying gas to a predetermined and preset
1464
temperature for use during laparoscopic procedures.
Claim 11, a
claim on appeal, provides:
11.A method of providing heated, humidified gas into a patient for
an endoscopic procedure comprising the steps of:
a) directing pressure- and volumetric flow rate-controlled gas . . .

1454. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
1455. Id. at 1314–17, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327–29.
1456. Id. at 1317–18, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329–31.
1457. Id. at 1319, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1458. Courts, even when presented with largely identical evidence, often construe
the same claim terms differently. See Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1324, 1326–27, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(observing that seven separate lawsuits in different district courts involved common
claim construction and infringement issues, and that of the district courts that
considered three terms, no two construed all three terms the same way).
1459. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1460. Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1356, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–16,
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328).
1461. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327).
1462. 641 F.3d 1352, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1463. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
1464. Id. at 1354, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
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into a chamber . . . ;
b) sensing the temperature of the gas as it exits the chamber to
determine if it is within the predetermined range; and
c) actuating the heating means if the temperature of the gas is
without the predetermined range;
d) humidifying the gas within the chamber; and
e) flowing the gas into the delivery means such that the gas
enters the patient humidified and having a temperature within
2°C of the predetermined temperature and thus providing the
1465
gas.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that
limitation (e) of claim 11 did not require that the temperature range
1466
always be within 2°C of the predetermined temperature.
According to the court, “[b]ecause limitations (b) and (c) imply that
gas leaving the chamber will fluctuate briefly outside of the
predetermined range, the range of the gas entering the patient
through a tube leading from the chamber, as described by limitation
1467
Thus, “[i]n the context of
(e), must have the same fluctuations.”
1468
this particular invention, ‘within’ does not mean ‘always within.’”
Instead, “[r]eading limitations (b), (c), and (e) together shows . . .
the claimed invention will tolerate and correct minor fluctuations
1469
outside of the 4°C range of limitation (e).”
Agreeing with the
district court that the specification also permitted minor fluctuations
outside of the 2°C in limitation (e), the Federal Circuit held that
“[t]he district court correctly interpreted ‘having a temperature
within 2°C of the predetermined temperature’ not to require the
claimed device to always be with 2°C of the predetermined
1470
temperature.”
1471
the Federal Circuit again
In Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd.,
considered the context of the surrounding words in an asserted claim
to determine the meaning of an ambiguous term. In Markem-Imaje, a
panel majority held that the district court erred in construing the
claimed phrase “drive the spools” as limited to rotation, excluding
1472
the prevention of rotation by the application of a holding torque.
Although the district court acknowledged that the ordinary meaning
1465. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
1466. Id. at 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391–92.
1467. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
1468. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
1469. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
1470. Id. at 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
1471. 657 F.3d 1293, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam),
reh’g denied, No. 2010-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23484 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2011).
1472. Id. at 1300, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
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of “drive” encompassed not only the rotation of the spools but also
the application of a holding torque that prevents the spool from
rotating, it determined that other words in the claim narrowed the
1473
Specifically, the district court reasoned that
meaning of “drive.”
the use of the word “control” in the claim clause “controls said
motors to drive the spools” evidenced the patentee’s intent that
1474
“control” and “drive” mean different things.
The Federal Circuit,
however, concluded that “‘drive’ need not be narrowly construed
merely because a broader construction would make it similar to the
word ‘control’ . . . used in the claim,” particularly where “[n]othing
in the specification or the overall invention as presented in the claim
and as argued to the patent examiner requires the narrow
1475
construction.”
1476
the patents-in-suit
In IGT v. Bally Gaming International Inc.,
1477
related to a networked system of gaming machines.
The parties
disputed the term “one” as in “issuing a command over the network
to one of said preselected gaming devices” and “paying at said one
1478
gaming device in accordance with the command.”
Specifically, the
parties disagreed about whether “one” should be construed to
require only one command to be sent to only one machine during a
1479
promotional period.
The Federal Circuit answered “no,” holding
that the meaning of “one” was clear from the surrounding words in
1480
Cautioning that “[e]xtracting a single word from a
the claim.
claim divorced from the surrounding limitations can lead
construction astray,” the court determined that “one” clearly modifies
the number of machines that will receive a particular command, but
1481
not the number of commands to be issued.
Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the
patent, courts also look to other claims when construing a claim
1482
term.
For example, in Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings,
1483
Inc., a panel majority held that the term “spring metal adaptor” did

1473. Id. at 1298, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071–72.
1474. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1475. Id. at 1299, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
1476. 659 F.3d 1109, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1477. Id. at 1112, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
1478. Id. at 1115–16, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
1479. Id. at 1116, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
1480. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
1481. Id. at 1116–17, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
1482. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
1483. 632 F.3d 1246, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1025, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9463 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
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1484

The technology in Arlington
not include a “‘split’ limitation.”
Industries related to an improved electrical connector, which is used
1485
to connect cable to a junction box.
The claim at issue was directed
to an electrical connector comprising, among other elements, a
1486
The district court construed the term to
“spring metal adaptor.”
1487
mean a split spring metal adaptor.
The court reasoned that the
split allowed the adaptor to narrow when inserted into the electrical
1488
The Federal Circuit majority
junction box, permitting it to spring.
disagreed, holding that the term should be construed based on the
1489
words’ ordinary and customary meanings.
As such, the limitation
of “spring metal adaptor” simply required the adaptor to be made of
1490
spring metal.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied, in
1491
The majority
part, on the doctrine of claim differentiation.
observed that two other claims specified the spring metal adaptor as
“split circular,” or “being less than a complete circle,” while the claim
1492
at issue included neither modifier.
Thus, the court observed that
reading “split . . . into the term ‘spring metal adaptor’ would render
1493
these additional modifiers superfluous.”
1494
Similarly, in American Piledriving Equipment, Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed two district courts’ claim constructions
1495
based, in part, on the doctrine of claim differentiation.
In
American Piledriving, the Federal Circuit reviewed the construction of
1496
The claimed invention
the same claim terms by two district courts.
1497
related to “counterweights for so-called ‘vibratory’ pile drivers.”
In
one of the figures, exemplary counterweights consisted of an
1498
eccentric weight portion “integral” to a cylindrical gear portion.
The court noted that the key term “integral” appears in independent
1499
claims 1, 6, and 11, but not independent claim 16.
Nevertheless,
1484. Id. at 1249, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
1485. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
1486. Id. at 1250, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
1487. Id. at 1252, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
1488. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
1489. Id. at 1253–56, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814–16.
1490. Id. at 1253, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
1491. Id. at 1254–55, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–16.
1492. Id. at 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
1493. Id. at 1254–55, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
1494. 637 F.3d 1324, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1495. Id. at 1337, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1496. See id. at 1327, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002–03 (reporting that the district
courts for the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of California
adopted different constructions for “two key claim terms”).
1497. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1498. Id. at 1329, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1499. Id. at 1334, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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the court held that claim 16 and its dependent claim 19 informed the
1500
Claim 16 recited “an eccentric weight
meaning of “integral.”
1501
portion connected to said cylindrical gear portion.”
In comparison,
dependent claim 19 recited “said eccentric weight portion is integral
1502
Relying on the doctrine of
with said cylindrical gear portion.”
claim differentiation, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district
courts that the term “integral” must be narrower than “connected to”
1503
and, therefore, must refer to a single-piece counterweight.
1504
In Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., the technology at
issue related to software products designed to track lost or stolen
1505
The disputed term “semi-random rate” was
laptop computers.
construed by the Special Master, and adopted by the district court, as
“normally taking place exactly once at a randomly chosen time
during each occurrence of a repeating predetermined time
1506
interval.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim
1507
Specifically, dependent
language supported the construction.
claim 27 further narrowed independent claim 25’s method of
sending messages to the host “at a semi-random rate” with the step of
“identifying if more than one remote monitoring means transmits the
same unique identification to the central monitoring means within the
1508
same selected time period as another.”
According to the Federal
Circuit, the “‘same selected time period’ refers to the period in which
messages [were] sent to the host, which is the ‘semi-random rate’ of
claim 25.
This claim language, therefore, commends the
interpretation that ‘semi-random rate,’ as used in these claims, refers
1509
to calls within a particular time period.”
1510
Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Troy involved a reissued
1511
patent relating to a handguard device for attachment to a firearm.
The Federal Circuit compared the language of the claims at issue
with the other claims in the patent to construe the claims at issue as
1500. Id. at 1335–36, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1501. Id. at 1335, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1502. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1503. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. The court also held that the prosecution
history supported this construction. See infra Part VI.C.
1504. 659 F.3d 1121, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1505. Id. at 1124, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
1506. Id. at 1135, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651–52 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1507. Id. at 1137, 1141, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652, 1656.
1508. Id. at 1137, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1509. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1510. 659 F.3d 1345, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1511. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
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covering a “barrel nut-only attachment design,” even though the
1512
Specifically, claims 31
specification did not disclose such a design.
through 36, the claims at issue, required only a yoke/barrel nut
1513
attachment point that would support a handguard piece.
In
contrast, claims 1 through 29 explicitly required an attachment point
at the receiver sleeve and at the barrel nut; claim thirty also required
1514
a receiver sleeve attachment point.
The failure of claims 31
through 36 to mention a receiver sleeve attachment point was a
“substantive difference” that strongly suggested that the inventor
intended those claims to cover a handguard accessory completely
supported by a single attachment point at the barrel nut without the
1515
receiver sleeve.
According to the court, a different “construction
would eviscerate the plain meaning of claim language and ignore
substantive differences between claims regarding an issue that is a
1516
focal point of the invention.”
Worth mentioning, however, is the
Federal Circuit’s note with “extreme disfavor” that Atlantic
Research’s claim construction arguments on appeal alleged error in
the very claim construction it had advocated at the district court
1517
level.
1518
the patent-in-suit covered
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
1519
radial arm saw safety guards.
The appellant challenged the district
court’s construction of “table top” as erroneous because the district
court did not require that a table top function as a horizontal work
1520
surface to support lumber while being cut.
The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that independent claims 1 and 4 recite
“‘a work surface mounted to the table top’ and ‘a planar top work
1521
surface mounted on the table top,’ respectively.”
Because it is the
work surface, not the table top, that supports the workpiece,
imposing the additional functional limitation would conflate “the
1522
role of the claimed ‘table top’ and ‘work surface.’”
When appropriate, courts also look to claims in related patents to
construe terms in the patent-in-dispute. For example, in August

1512. Id. at 1354, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1513. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1514. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1515. Id. at 1354–55, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1516. Id. at 1355, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
1517. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
1518. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
1519. Id. at 1226, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1520. Id. at 1232–33, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
1521. Id. at 1233, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (citation omitted).
1522. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
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1523

Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., the Federal Circuit examined not
only the language of the claim at issue but also claims of the parent
1524
patent.
The claim at issue was directed to a system for “inspecting
1525
The
integrated circuits printed on substrates such as wafers.”
1526
Under
district court construed wafer to include a part of a wafer.
1527
this construction, “a single wafer can be a plurality of wafers.”
The
Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the claim at issue itself
1528
The
distinguished between a single wafer and multiple wafers.
claim recited “a wafer provider for providing a wafer to the test plate”
and “a visual inspection device for visual inputting of a plurality of
1529
known good quality wafers.”
According to the court,
[t]he most logical reading of these claim limitations is that the
wafer provider provides a single object called a wafer to the test
plate, and that visual inspection and training requires more than
one of these objects. Reading this otherwise renders any difference
1530
between the singular and the plural terms superfluous.

The court further examined the language of the claims in the
parent patent, observing that those claims recited a similar viewing,
1531
But, the
recognizing “a plurality of known good wafers” limitation.
parent patent claims also required “each and every wafer provided to
the test plate” to be aligned at the exact same location and
1532
orientation.
If a wafer provided to the test plate included a
plurality of wafers, the court explained, some of the wafers would not
1533
be aligned to the exact same location.
Based on both the patentin-suit and parent patent claims’ language, the Federal Circuit
concluded that a wafer is a singular object and, thus, a sole wafer is
1534
not itself a plurality of wafers.
B. Specification
As a part of a “fully integrated written instrument,” claims do not
1535
stand alone.
Instead, they are read in view of the specification,
1523. 655 F.3d 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1524. Id. at 1284, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1525. Id. at 1282, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
1526. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769–70.
1527. Id. at 1283, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
1528. Id. at 1284, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1529. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1530. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1531. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1532. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1533. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1534. Id. at 1285, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1535. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
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which “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
1536
On the other hand, a court must avoid reading
disputed term.”
1537
The line
limitations from the specification into the claims.
between properly reading a claim in light of the specification and
improperly importing a limitation from the specification into the
claim, however, can be so fine that when either principle is invoked,
even the judges on the same reviewing panel sometimes disagree
1538
among themselves.
1.

Cases finding specification limiting
In some cases, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the limiting
effect of the specification. For example, in Hologic, Inc. v. SenoRx,
1539
Inc.,
a panel majority explained that the disputed claim term
should have been construed in view of the specification and held that
1540
the district court erred in its claim construction.
The technology
in Hologic relates to a type of radiation therapy in which a balloon is
inserted into the body at or near a tumor—called balloon
1541
brachytherapy.
As recited in independent claim 1, the apparatus
comprised an expandable outer surface and a radiation source
“asymmetrically located and arranged within the expandable
1542
surface.”
The district court interpreted the term as not limiting
1543
the “claimed asymmetry to asymmetry about the longitudinal axis.”
A Federal Circuit panel majority disagreed, concluding that the
claimed radiation source is “located and arranged so as not to be on
1544
the longitudinal axis of the expandable surface.”
The majority, observing that claim 1 did not specify any reference
to define the relative concept of asymmetry, looked to the
specification to ascertain what the inventors contemplated as their

967, 978, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S.
370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1536. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Vitronics Corp v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1537. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
1538. See id. at 1323–24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334–35 (stating that even with
the formula that courts have in place it still remains a difficult task to determine
“whether a person of skill in the art would understand the embodiments” of the
specifications, leading to disagreement).
1539. 639 F.3d 1329, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1974 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1540. Id. at 1335–38, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1980–82.
1541. Id. at 1330, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1975.
1542. Id. at 1331, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1976 (emphasis omitted).
1543. Id. at 1332–33, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1978.
1544. Id. at 1335, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1980 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1545

According to the majority, “[a]ll the descriptions of the
invention.
invention contemplating the placement of a radiation source
1546
describe displacement from the longitudinal axis of the balloon.”
Even though one sentence, upon which the district court relied in its
claim construction, did not identify any reference in describing
asymmetry, it was followed “directly and in the same paragraph” by
two examples, both of which specifically dictate asymmetry of the
1547
Because the
location of radiation about the longitudinal axis.
specification “consistently and exclusively” showed “radiation sources
located asymmetrically about the longitudinal axis,” the majority
concluded that the disputed term must be so construed to properly
1548
reflect the conceived invention.
1549
Similarly, in Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
another majority panel at the Federal Circuit reasoned that one of
the claim terms should be limited in light of the specification, and
1550
thus held that the district court erred in its claim construction.
The technology in Retractable Technologies related to syringes with
1551
needles that retract into the syringe body after use.
The asserted
claims generally “recit[e] a syringe assembly that contains a ‘body’
1552
The district court “concluded that
and a ‘retraction mechanism.’”
1553
the term ‘body’ was not limited to a one-piece structure.”
The
Federal Circuit panel majority disagreed, emphasizing that claim
1554
language must always be read in light of the written description.
The majority thus explained that even though a dependent claim
specifically limited the “body” to a “one-piece body,” “any

1545. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1980.
1546. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1980.
1547. Id. at 1336, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1980.
1548. Id. at 1338, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981–82. Judge Friedman dissented. In
his opinion, the majority improperly imported the “longitudinal axis” limitation
from the specification into the claims. Id. at 1339, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1982
(Friedman, J., dissenting). The majority and Judge Friedman also disagreed on the
importance of the language from other claims in this case. Judge Friedman noted
that while there was no suggestion, or even hint, in claim 1 of a longitudinal axis, the
limitation “with respect to a longitudinal axis” was explicitly recited in two other
independent claims. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1982. The majority discounted this
difference because the sufficiently different wording of the other claims did not
justify an entirely different reading of claim 1 that was not supported by its own
language or the specification. Id. at 1336–37, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981 (majority
opinion).
1549. 653 F.3d 1296, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 659 F.3d 1369, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1550. Id. at 1305, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41.
1551. Id. at 1298, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1552. Id. at 1299, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1553. Id. at 1302, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
1554. Id. at 1305, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41.
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presumption created by the doctrine of claim differentiation [was]
‘overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written
1555
description.’”
According to the majority, even though there was a possibility that
the term “body” could include “a syringe body composed of more
1556
than one piece,” the specification dictated otherwise.
The
specification, the majority noted, distinguished the invention from
prior art syringes comprised of multiple pieces and expressly stated
1557
that the syringe “features a one piece hollow body.”
The
specification did not disclose any body with multiple pieces; each
embodiment described and each figure showed a syringe with a one1558
piece body.
Acknowledging “the fine line between construing the
claims in light of the specification and improperly importing a
limitation from the specification into the claims,” the majority
concluded that the specification defined the scope of the actual
1559
invention as only including syringes with a one-piece body.
1560
In his
Chief Judge Rader dissented on this claim construction.
opinion, the claim language itself makes clear that “body” is not
1561
limited to a one-piece structure.
The “one-piece” limitation is the
only difference between an independent and dependent claim,
making the presumption under the doctrine of claim differentiation
that “body,” standing alone, did not include that limitation especially
1562
strong.
Nothing in the specification rebutted this strong
presumption because it contains neither a special definition for the
1563
term “body” nor a disavowal of claim scope.
In contrast, the
specification’s consistent use of the modifier “one-piece” strongly
implies that “body,” standing alone, should not be construed as
1564
inherently requiring one-piece.
Chief Judge Rader thus concluded
that the majority improperly imported the “one-piece” limitation
from, and confined the claims to specific embodiments in, the
1565
specification.
Later, the Federal Circuit denied the plaintiff-appellee’s petition to

1555.
1556.
1557.
1558.
1559.
1560.
1561.
1562.
1563.
1564.
1565.

Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (citation omitted).
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.
Id. at 1311–12, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part).
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
Id. at 1312, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245–46.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
Id. at 1313, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
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1566

Judge Moore,
review the construction of the term “body” en banc.
1567
According to Judge
joined by Chief Judge Rader, dissented.
Moore, even though “[c]laim construction is the single most
important event in the course of a patent litigation,” the court’s rules
on this issue “are still ill-defined and inconsistently applied,”
especially on the use of the specification in the interpretation of
1568
claim language.
In this case, the plain meaning of the term “body”
1569
“include[d] both single and multi-piece syringe bodies.”
Otherwise, the “one piece” modifier in the specification and
1570
dependent claim would have been superfluous.
In addition, the
patent contained no “disclaimer or special lexicography” on the
1571
disputed “body.”
The panel majority construed the term based on
the examples with a “one piece” body, “an indication in the
specification that the invention ‘features a one piece’ body,” as well as
1572
“the disclosure that the syringe ‘can be molded as one piece.’”
Thus, in Judge Moore’s opinion, the panel majority erred in its claim
construction by tailoring “its scope to what the panel believe[d] was
1573
the ‘actual invention.’”
Because this case illustrated “a
fundamental split within the court,” she dissented from the denial of
1574
the en banc review.
The Federal Circuit also limited the reach of the doctrine of claim
1575
differentiation in American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co.,
in which it affirmed the district court’s construction of the term
1576
“messages” to require the format disclosed in the specification.
The asserted patents dealt with multiple aspects of vehicle computer
systems, including sending messages via electronic car-mail to a
vehicle specific address, as opposed to the vehicle owner’s e-mail

1566. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370, 100
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam).
1567. Id. at 1370–73, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715–17 (Moore, J., dissenting from
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
1568. Id. at 1370, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
1569. Id. at 1372, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1570. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1571. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1572. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1573. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1574. Id. at 1373, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717. Judge O’Malley also dissented on
the ground that the Federal Circuit should have taken this case to revisit Cybor Corp.
v. FAS Technologies, Inc., which required de novo review in claim construction. Id.,
100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1455–56, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1173–74 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
1575. 651 F.3d 1318, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1503, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011).
1576. Id. at 1337, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
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1577

An independent claim at issue recited “messages
address.
1578
The district court construed
including identifiers of the vehicles.”
1579
the term “messages” to require the format of “vehicleid@domain.”
The Federal Circuit, pointing to both the summary and the detailed
description of the invention, agreed that “[g]iven the manner in
which the specification emphasizes the similarity of a car-mail
message to a typical e-mail message,” a car-mail message must have an
1580
address that has a means of identification unique to each vehicle.
The Federal Circuit held so despite the fact that a dependent claim
specifically added the limitation “the messages comprise addresses
1581
containing the respective identifiers of the vehicles.”
According to
the court, “the doctrine of claim differentiation is not a conclusive
basis for construing claims,” and the specification may, as it does in
1582
this case, override the effect of the doctrine.
1583
Similarly, in Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, the Federal Circuit
held that the specification “unequivocally compels” the district
1584
The patents-in-suit related to
court’s claim construction.
information processing systems for inputting information from a
document, storing portions of the inputted document information in
the system’s memory according to its content instructions, and
formatting the information contained in the stored documents for
1585
use by a computer program.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s constructions of the terms “document,” “file,”
“extract,” and “template,” limiting them to information that
1586
originated from a hard copy document.
The court observed that
the written description “repeatedly and consistently define[d] the
invention as a system that processes information derived from hard
1587
copy documents.”
Indeed, the “Background of the Invention,” the
“Summary of Invention,” and the detailed description of the
1588
invention all contained statements supporting such constructions.
More importantly, the court noted that the statements regarding the
1577. Id. at 1323, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1578. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (emphasis omitted).
1579. Id. at 1329, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
1580. Id. at 1337, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
1581. Id. at 1324, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
1582. Id. at 1337, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
1583. 653 F.3d 1314, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1522 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1584. Id. at 1323, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
1585. Id. at 1317, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
1586. Id. at 1321, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1587. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1588. See id. at 1321–22, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527–28 (noting that “[i]n total,
the term ‘hard copy document’ appears over 100 times in the common disclosure of
the ’697, ’673, and ’162 patents”).
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invention described the invention in its totality and were not
1589
Accordingly,
confined to “specific embodiments or examples.”
such a clear import of the specification should trump the rule of
1590
claim differentiation.
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the
1591
narrow construction.
1592
In IGT v. Bally Gaming International, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
construed the claim language “paying at said one gaming device in
accordance with the command” to mean that “the command caused
an extra payment to the user at the gaming device that the gaming
1593
device would not have paid out.”
According to the court, the
specification strongly supported such a construction because the only
command discussed anywhere in the specification in conjunction
with payment was a reconfiguration command that would cause the
gaming device to pay out money and not simply inform the player
1594
that he won.
The court noted that throughout the specification’s
entirety, only reconfiguration commands are discussed: “[t]he
abstract discusses only reconfiguration commands; the summary of
the invention discusses only reconfiguration commands; the detailed
description of the invention and system overview discusses only
reconfiguration commands” and “[i]n every example in the
specification, the command which is responsive to the predetermined
1595
event reconfigures the system to pay.”
1596
In Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., the patents-in-suit
1597
related to a portable keyboardless computer.
The district court
construed the term “keyboardless” to mean “without a mechanically
1598
The Federal Circuit agreed with the
integrated keyboard.”
construction and the underlying analysis, pointing out that the
specification criticized the drawbacks of mechanical keyboards, and
1599
distinguished simulated keyboards from the mechanical ones.
Thus, in accordance with the specification, the patented invention
could include a “simulated keyboard” such as “a keyboard that is
1600
produced on-screen.”
The specification also distinguished between

1589.
1590.
1591.
1592.
1593.
1594.
1595.
1596.
1597.
1598.
1599.
1600.

Id. at 1322, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
Id. at 1323, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
659 F.3d 1109, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1121, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
Id. at 1120, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
659 F.3d 1376, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1379, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
Id. at 1382, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
Id. at 1382–83, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
Id. at 1382, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
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integrated and peripheral keyboards—stating that an external
keyboard may be hooked up, but describing no device that has a
1601
As a result, the Federal Circuit
mechanically integrated keyboard.
1602
affirmed the district court’s construction of “keyboardless.”
1603
In Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., the district court,
adopting the findings of a Special Master, construed the term “semirandom rate” as including a time interval component, finding that
the specification limited the entire invention to placing one call per
1604
time interval.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the construction but
1605
It emphasized that even though
disagreed with the reasoning.
sometimes, “a patentee’s consistent reference to a certain limitation
or a preferred embodiment as ‘this invention’ or the ‘present
invention’ can serve to limit the scope of the entire invention,” that
1606
was not always the rule.
The use of the phrase “present invention”
or “this invention” does not limit the scope of the invention “where
the references to a certain limitation as being the ‘invention’ are not
uniform, or where other portions of the intrinsic evidence do not
1607
support applying the limitation to the entire patent.”
The Federal Circuit observed that the patent-at-issue’s specification
in Absolute Software “does not uniformly refer to a one-call-per-time1608
period limitation as being co-extensive with the entire invention.”
Specifically, the court referenced part of the specification that
expressly described a predetermined time interval’s features as being
optional features of the “present invention,” including the Remote
Site monitored apparatus’ programming and the transmission of a
1609
When the term “semi-random
random call during that interval.
rate” appeared in the specification, however, it referred specifically to
1610
a once-per-week time interval.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit
concluded that although the entire invention was not limited to a
time interval aspect, the specification’s use of “semi-random rate” was
consistent with requiring a time interval limitation for construing that
1611
term.

1601. Id. at 1383, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
1602. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
1603. 659 F.3d 1121, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1604. Id. at 1135–36, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651–52.
1605. Id. at 1136, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1606. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1607. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652 (citing Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d
1311, 1320–22, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
1608. Id. at 1137, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1609. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1610. Id. at 1137–38, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1611. Id. at 1138, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653–54.
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2.

Cases finding specification nonlimiting
In contrast to the cases discussed above, the Federal Circuit has
rejected the practice of importing limitations from the specification
into claims and emphasized the practice’s impropriety. For example,
1612
the majority
in Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
held that the district court misconstrued the term “spring metal
1613
adaptor” by improperly importing a “split” limitation.
According
to the majority, the Federal Circuit has occasionally defined claim
terms by implication, but only “if the specification manifests a clear
intent to limit the term by using it in a manner consistent with only a
1614
single meaning.”
In Arlington Industries, the patent-in-suit did not
1615
As the majority noted, only one of the four
show such an intent.
embodiments expressly described an opening to permit a spring
1616
action.
In addition, even though the drawings of the adaptor in
the claim always depicted an incomplete circle, the court noted that
“drawings in a patent need not illustrate the full scope of the
1617
invention.”
Finally, differences between the claims and the
1618
Thus, the
prosecution history did not support a split limitation.
1619
disputed term simply meant an adaptor made of spring metal.
1620
Similarly, in American Piledriving Equipment, Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit rejected a district court’s claim construction
because it improperly imported a limitation from the preferred
1621
embodiment into the claims.
In that case, the claimed invention
1612. 632 F.3d 1246, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1025, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9463 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
1613. Id. at 1249, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812; see supra Part VI.A (discussing the
Federal Circuit’s use of limitations to determine the meaning of disputed terms).
1614. Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
1615. See id. at 1254–55, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–16 (noting that a “[r]eview
of the intrinsic evidence reveal[ed] no intent to limit the term ‘spring metal adaptor’
by using it in a manner that excludes unsplit adaptors”).
1616. Id. at 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
1617. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
1618. Id. at 1255, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816 (noting that in the “same
[prosecutor’s] office action, the examiner objected to, but did not reject, originally
filed claim 2” and claim 2 “depended from claim 1”).
1619. See id. at 1253, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814 (holding that the district court
erred by constructing the terms “spring metal adaptor” and “spring steel adaptor”
with a “split” limitation). Judge Lourie dissented from this claim construction,
stating that “claim differentiation should not enlarge claims beyond what the
specification tells us the inventors contemplated as their invention.” Id. at 1258, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
observed that no disclosure or drawing showed adaptors with a complete circle. Id.,
97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. Thus, according to Judge Lourie, the claims should
be construed consistent with what the inventors contemplated their invention to
include—only adaptors with an opening. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1620. 637 F.3d 1324, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1621. See id. at 1327, 1337, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003, 1009 (rejecting the claim
construction of the District Court for the Northern District of California and
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1622

The court
related to counterweights for vibratory pile drivers.
noted that the claims at issue recited that the eccentric weight
1623
portion has “at least one insert-receiving area formed therein.”
The specification recited that “[t]he bottom portion of the
counterweight is cast having insert receiving areas or bores
substantially parallel to the center bore and extending fully through
1624
the gear portion and fully through the eccentric weight portion.”
The court noted, however, that the specification contained no
evidence indicating that the insert-receiving area is required to
consistently extend fully through the gear portion or the eccentric
1625
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the District
weight portion.
Court for the Northern District of California erred in requiring the
1626
insert-receiving area extend fully through both portions.
1627
In Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., the panel majority held that
the district court erred in construing the claims to require “some
1628
method of deriving a tension measurement.”
The majority agreed
with Zipher’s argument that the claims did not explicitly contain a
tension measurement requirement, and that construing the claims as
such would import a limitation from the specification into the
1629
claims.
According to the panel, “[t]hat a device will only operate if
certain elements are included is not grounds to incorporate those
1630
elements into the construction of the claims.”
Thus, the court held
that even though “‘some method of deriving a tension measurement’
may be required to make a claimed device operational, it is not
1631
proper to incorporate that method into the claim construction.”

affirming the construction of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia).
1622. Id. at 1327, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003; see supra notes 1494–503 and
accompanying text (discussing the claim terms at issue, and the court’s construction
of these terms, in American Piledriving Equipment).
1623. Am. Piledriving Equip., 637 F.3d at 1337, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1624. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1625. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1626. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1627. 657 F.3d 1293, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam),
reh’g denied, No. 2010-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23484 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2011).
1628. Id. at 1301, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1629. Id. at 1300–01, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
1630. Id. at 1301, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
1631. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. Judge Newman dissented; in her opinion,
the majority’s conclusion “ignore[d] the paramount importance of the specification
in claim construction.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (Newman, J., dissenting).
She agreed with the district court that although the claim did not explicitly include
terms for measuring tension, the specification described the invention as requiring
“some method of deriving a tension measurement, whether directly or indirectly.”
Id. at 1301–02, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1632

In August Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd, the Federal Circuit held
that “[a] plurality of wafers means more than one physically distinct
1633
wafer.”
The appellant argued that such a construction excluded
1634
1635
The court rejected this argument.
the preferred embodiment.
The court noted that both parties to the case agreed that a whole
wafer is usually diced into many dies, each die containing an entire
1636
functional circuit.
The court acknowledged that the specification
disclosed using both multiple dies and multiple wafers while the
1637
claims at issue covered only the latter.
But, “[t]he mere fact that
there is an alternative embodiment disclosed” but not encompassed
by the court’s claim construction “does not outweigh the language of
the claim,” particularly where other unasserted claims in the parent
1638
patent covered the excluded embodiments.
1639
the Federal
In Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Hemcon, Inc.,
Circuit held that the district court erred in construing the term
1640
“biocompatible.”
In that case, the patent-in-suit claims polymer pGlcNAc, a compound useful in trauma units for treating serious
1641
wounds.
Each claim required that the p-GlcNAc be
1642
The district court rejected the parties’ proposed
“biocompatible.”
constructions and adopted its own, concluding that “biocompatible pGlcNAc” meant p-GlcNAc polymers “‘with low variability, high purity,
and no detectable biological reactivity as determined by biocompatibility
1643
tests.’”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that parties can only raise
specific claim construction arguments for the first time on appeal if
their arguments “‘protect the original breadth [of the party’s
proposed] claim construction by rejecting the imposition of an
additional limitation not required or recited by [that claim

1632. 655 F.3d 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1633. Id. at 1286, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
1634. Id. at 1285, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771–72.
1635. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
1636. Id. at 1282, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
1637. Id. at 1285, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
1638. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (quoting TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips &
Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1373, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1254, 1263 (Fed.
Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1639. 659 F.3d 1084, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, No. 20101548, 2012 WL 858700 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc).
1640. Id. at 1092–93, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262–63.
1641. Id. at 1087, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
1642. Id. at 1088, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. Biocompatibility “refers to the
extent to which the p-GlcNAc causes a negative biological reaction . . . when placed
in contact with human tissue.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
1643. Id. at 1089, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (citation omitted).
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1644

Specifically, the claim construction arguments on
construction].’”
appeal must be consistent with the arguments that were offered by
1645
that same party in the court below.
In this case, the district court’s
addition of the “no detectable biological reactivity” requirement
imposed an additional claim limitation that narrowed the scope of
1646
the claims.
Thus, the appellant did not waive its right to argue that
the district court improperly added the “no reactivity” limitation
merely because it did not further argue the claim construction
1647
below.
Regarding the construction itself, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court erred in requiring “no detectable biological
1648
reactivity.”
The court noted that the specification clearly allowed
biocompatible p-GlcNAc to show a small amount of biological
1649
In addition, even though the p-GlcNAC tested in the
reactivity.
specification’s working example exhibited no detectable biological
reactivity under any of the disclosed biocompatibility tests, the court
determined that this “single example” was not indicative of the claims
1650
being so limited.
1651
the district court
In IGT v. Bally Gaming International, Inc.,
construed the term “predetermined event” to mean “the occurrence
1652
of one or more conditions chosen in advance.”
It explained that
the predetermined event can occur randomly, as long as the
1653
The Federal Circuit affirmed
condition itself is chosen in advance.
1654
the district court’s construction.
The court noted that the claims
and the specification at issue “only require that some condition be
1655
Thus,
met in order for the system to issue the claimed command.”
although the specification includes examples of nonrandom
conditions, those examples are insufficient to redefine the term to
have anything other than the plain meaning determined by the
1656
district court.
1644. Id. at 1093, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (alterations in original) (quoting
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1645. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1646. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1647. Id. at 1093–94, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1648. Id. at 1092, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1649. Id. at 1093, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1650. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1651. 659 F.3d 1109, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1652. Id. at 1118, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529–30 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1653. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
1654. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
1655. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
1656. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
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C. Prosecution History
In addition to consulting the specification, courts also consider a
1657
patent’s prosecution history in construing claim terms.
Even
though the prosecution history sometimes lacks the clarity of the
specification, and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes,
it can still “inform the meaning of the claim language by
demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and
whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of
1658
prosecution.”
1659
In American Piledriving Equipment v. Geoquip, Inc., based on claim
differentiation, the Federal Circuit interpreted the term “integral” to
1660
mean “formed or cast of one piece.”
It then examined the
1661
During prosecution,
prosecution history to “remove[] all doubt.”
to distinguish the invention from the prior art, the applicant argued
that the claims’ recitation of “integral” cylindrical gear and eccentric
weight portions meant that “they [were] simply components of the
1662
‘one-piece’ counterweight.”
During litigation, the patentee argued
that the claims were not amended, the statement was unnecessary to
overcome the prior art, and the examiner explicitly disagreed with
1663
the applicant’s statement.
The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, reasoning that, regardless of whether the examiner
agreed, the applicant’s statement concerning “integral” “still
inform[ed] the proper construction of the term” and served as a
1664
“disavowal of broader claim scope.”
Similarly, the panel majority in Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport
1665
Fittings, Inc. relied on claim differentiation and declined to import
any limitation from the specification, concluding that the term
1666
The
“spring metal adaptor” did not impose a “split” limitation.
majority then reviewed the prosecution history to confirm this
1667
construction.
During the prosecution of a parent application, to
1657. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
1658. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1659. 637 F.3d 1324, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1660. Id. at 1334–35, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1661. Id. at 1336, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008–09.
1662. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
1663. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1664. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1665. 632 F.3d 1246, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1025, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9463 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2011); see supra
Parts VI.A, VI.B.2 (examining claim language and instances where the Federal
Circuit discussed the impropriety of importing claim limitations).
1666. Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
1667. Id. at 1255, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
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distinguish from prior art, the applicant amended two claims to add
the limitation “less than a complete circle” to the term “spring metal
1668
The USPTO allowed the amended claims, reasoning
adaptor.”
that the inventors and USPTO understood the unmodified term to
1669
The applicant, when filing the
encompass unsplit adaptors.
continuation application that resulted in the patent-in-suit, added the
1670
claim at issue without the additional limitation.
Thus, the
prosecution history supported the construction of “spring metal
1671
adaptor” without the “split” limitation.
1672
In Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., the district court
held that the “‘processor for executing said data collection
application’ require[d] that ‘the recited function must be performed
(namely, executing the application and the libraries to facilitate data
1673
collection operations).’”
The patentee-appellant argued that the
term required only that the device be programmable or configurable
to execute the data collection application, even if it did not execute
1674
the application.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court’s construction, observing that “[t]he patentee [was] bound by
its representations made and actions . . . taken in order to obtain the
1675
patent.”
During prosecution of the patent at issue, the Federal
Circuit noted that the applicant narrowed its claims to “executing
data collection applications that work with functional libraries” in
1676
response to the examiner’s rejection based on prior art.
D. Extrinsic Evidence
Even though less reliable, extrinsic evidence “can shed useful light
on the relevant art” and thus may be useful to the court, especially
1677
when considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.
1678
the
In AIA Engineering Ltd. v. Magotteaux International S/A,
Federal Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment of invalidity
because the district court erred in its construction of the claim term

1668. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
1669. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
1670. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
1671. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
1672. 659 F.3d 1376, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1673. Id. at 1381, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (citation omitted).
1674. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
1675. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
1676. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
1677. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–19, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1678. 657 F.3d 1264, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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1679

This case concerned a patent for composite wear
“solid solution.”
1680
As
products used for crushing and grinding abrasive materials.
originally issued, claim 1 described a “porous ceramic pad consisting of
a homogeneous solid solution of 20 to 80% of Al2O3 and 80 to 20% of
1681
The patentee later obtained a reissue patent with, among
ZrO2.”
other amendments, the term “solid solution” replaced by “ceramic
1682
composite.”
This amendment, the Federal Circuit held, did not
broaden the scope of the reissue claim because the two terms were
1683
synonymous.
The court first construed the term “homogeneous ceramic
composite” to mean “an aggregation of relatively consistent grains of
at least Al2O3 and ZrO2, wherein each of the Al2O3 and ZrO2 retains a
1684
The court
distinct composition and/or crystal structure.”
explained that this construction is supported not only by the intrinsic
1685
evidence, but also by the expert testimony.
For example, AIA
Engineering Ltd.’s scientific expert cited an introductory materials
science and engineering textbook as evidence “that a person skilled
in the art at the time of the invention would have understood
‘composite’ to mean ‘a material that is a mixture or combination of
two or more materials, each of which has and retains a distinct composition
1686
and/or crystal structure.’”
Magotteaux International’s expert agreed,
further declaring that the statements in the specification were
1687
consistent with the experts’ understanding.
Similarly, according to the court, the extrinsic evidence was
“particularly illuminating” in supporting the conclusion that
“homogeneous solid solution” is a synonym for “homogeneous
1688
ceramic composite.”
Otherwise, the claimed solid solution would
1689
The
not be physically possible, as both parties’ experts agreed.
court concluded that, “although ‘solid solution’ had an ordinary
meaning in the art,” the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and
1690
applied a special meaning to the term.
Other times, extrinsic evidence confirms the claim construction
1679. Id. at 1267–68, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1680. Id. at 1268, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1681. Id. at 1269, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (citation omitted).
1682. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
1683. Id. at 1272, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
1684. Id. at 1273, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1685. Id. at 1274, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094–95.
1686. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 (citation omitted).
1687. Id. at 1274–75, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1688. Id. at 1277–78, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
1689. Id. at 1277, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098–99.
1690. Id. at 1279, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
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1691

based on intrinsic evidence. For example, in In re NTP, Inc., the
Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s construction of the term
1692
“electronic mail message.”
In the reexamination of the patents-insuit, “‘claims . . . are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
1693
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’”
The court
observed that, based only on the claim language, an electronic mail
message must include a destination address and the capability to
1694
enter message content.
Because this broad construction would
encompass prior art technologies that the inventors excluded, the
1695
court turned to the specification and extrinsic evidence.
The
Background Art section described “electronic mail” from the
perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention, by describing several common items of an electronic
message: the destination address, an identification of the originating
1696
Although this statement
processor, the subject, and the message.
1697
did not rise to the level of inventor lexicography, it, in combination
with expert testimony echoing the same definition, provided a basis
for the court to confirm that an electronic mail message must include
a destination address and must have the capacity to include an
address of an originating processor, message content, and a
1698
subject.
Analyzing the extrinsic evidence as a whole, the Federal Circuit
1699
held in CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc. that the district
court erred in its heavy reliance on one portion of inventor testimony
1700
and thus erred in its reading of the claim at issue.
In that case, the
claim at issue was directed to an apparatus for determining whether
1701
As issued, it contained a
an e-mail sender is an authorized sender.
drafting error when reciting a “computer being programmed to detect

1691. 654 F.3d 1279, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1277, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24881 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011).
1692. Id. at 1288–90, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486–88.
1693. Id. at 1287, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (alterations in original) (quoting In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827, 1830
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1694. Id. at 1289, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486–87.
1695. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1696. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1697. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1698. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487–88.
1699. 654 F.3d 1353, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1700. Id. at 1360–61, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1701. Id. at 1355–56, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611–12.
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1702

The district court
analyze the electronic mail communication.”
found three “reasonable and possible corrections to rectify that
drafting error: (1) delete the word ‘detect,’ (2) delete the word
‘analyze,’ or (3) add the word ‘and’ between the words ‘detect’ and
1703
The Federal Circuit concluded that the claim was not
‘analyze.’”
indefinite because it had the same scope and meaning under each of
the three possible meanings, requiring an e-mail to be detected and
1704
analyzed.
It held so despite the testimony of a co-inventor, who
also prosecuted the patent, that he was not sure what was meant by
1705
“detect analyze.”
According to the court, this “confused
statement[] . . . merely related to his recollection of how he intended
1706
to draft the claim.”
In addition, the co-inventor testified that the
apparatus required both detection and analysis to operate, and that
the claim at issue would have the same meaning under any of the
1707
three proposed interpretations.
Viewing the testimony as whole,
the Federal Circuit held that the computer recited in the claim at
1708
issue must be programmed to “detect and analyze” the e-mail.
1709
In Harari v. Lee,
Harari added a claim that was a “substantial
1710
cop[y]” of a claim from the Lee patent to provoke an interference.
In that case, the Federal Circuit construed a term of the copied claim
in the pending application in view of the specification of the
1711
reference patent from which the claim was copied.
The Board
construed the term “accessing a bit line” to encompass accessing
1712
more than one bit line.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. It
acknowledged its holding in a previous case that the indefinite article
“a” meant “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the
1713
transitional phrase “comprising.”
The court cautioned that there
was no “hard and fast rule that ‘a’ always means one or more than
1714
Instead, the meaning of limitation must be discerned in
one.”
1715
light of the claim and specification.
In this case, the plain

1702.
1703.
1704.
1705.
1706.
1707.
1708.
1709.
1710.
1711.
1712.
1713.
1714.
1715.

Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1356, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
Id. at 1358–61, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613–15.
Id. at 1360–61, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
Id. at 1361, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
656 F.3d 1331, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1340, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (alteration in the original).
Id. at 1341–42, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
Id. at 1340, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058–60.
Id. at 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60 (citation omitted).
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
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1716

language of the claim indicated that only a single bit line was used.
In addition, the court considered the disclosure of the Lee patent,
1717
from which Harari copied his claim.
The Lee specification did not
disclose accessing more than one bit line at a time, but instead
1718
As a
described traversing through memory, bit line by bit line.
result, the court concluded that “a bit line” in Harari’s copied claim,
1719
“as read in light of the Lee specification,” required a single bit line.
E. Special Claim Construction: Means-Plus-Function Claims
A means-plus-function claim recites “purely functional limitations”
1720
and provides no structure that performs the recited function.
Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 dictates that courts shall construe
such a claim “to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
1721
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”
Whether
certain claim language invokes paragraph 6 of § 112 is an exercise in
1722
claim construction.
In general, where the claim language does not recite the term
“means,” courts presume that the limitation does not invoke § 112,
1723
paragraph 6.
To rebut this presumption, one must demonstrate
that “the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or
else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for
1724
performing that function.”
The presumption, however, is strong
1725
For example, in Inventio AG v.
and not readily overcome.
1726
Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., the challenger failed to rebut
the presumption that the claimed “modernizing device” and
1727
“computing unit” were not means-plus-function limitations.
The
Federal Circuit first clarified that a court can properly consult both
the intrinsic record and the relevant extrinsic evidence in
1716. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60.
1717. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1718. Id. at 1342, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1719. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1720. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
1721. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
1722. Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1723. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1724. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1725. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1726. 649 F.3d 1350, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1727. Id. at 1357–60, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118–20. The court, however,
declined to provide construction because “the parties did not develop how these
terms should be construed should § 112, ¶ 6 not apply.” Id. at 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1116.
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determining whether a claim recites “sufficiently definite
1728
As such, the court examined the intrinsic evidence,
structure.”
1729
including both the claim language and the specification.
According to the claims, the “modernizing device” was connected to
1730
a computing unit and either an elevator control or floor terminals.
The written description confirmed this connection and further
1731
depicted the internal components of the modernizing device.
It
also showed how the elements and components were connected
1732
together.
Therefore, the court concluded that the term
1733
After
“modernizing device” conveyed structure to skilled artisans.
performing a similar analysis, the court reached a similar conclusion
1734
regarding the term “computing unit.”
Conversely, the use of the term “means” in a claim triggers a
rebuttable presumption that paragraph 6 of § 112 governs the
1735
construction of the claim term.
This presumption can be rebutted
“if the claim limitation itself recites sufficient structure to perform
1736
As the Federal Circuit held in
the claimed function in its entirety.”
1737
Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC,
to overcome the
presumption, one may rely on extrinsic evidence in its “sufficiently
1738
Expert testimony that the terms
definite structure” analysis.
“fractional rate encoding means” and “trellis encoding means” were
used in publications and published patents and were “self-descriptive
to one of ordinary skill in the art,” supported the conclusion that the
1739
terms themselves conveyed sufficient structure.
Thus, the district
court erred in construing the two terms as means-plus-function
1740
Because the patent-inelements governed by § 112, paragraph 6.
suit adopted the common meanings of these terms and did not limit
them to anything specific, they should have been construed
1741
accordingly.
1728. Id. at 1357, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117–18.
1729. Id. at 1357–60, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118–20.
1730. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118–19.
1731. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1732. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1733. Id. at 1359, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1734. Id. at 1359–60, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119–20.
1735. Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1340, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1393, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1736. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402 (citing TI Grp. Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v.
VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1135, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1334–35 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
1737. 641 F.3d 1331, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1738. Id. at 1341, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
1739. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
1740. Id. at 1340, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
1741. Id. at 1341, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
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To construe a means-plus-function claim limitation, the court must
first define the particular function of the limitation and then identify
1742
1743
In In re Aoyama,
the corresponding structure for that function.
the Federal Circuit held that the means-plus-function limitation had
no permissible construction because the specification did not disclose
1744
any corresponding structure to perform the recited function.
In
that case, the court defined the function of the limitation at issue,
“reverse logistics means for generating transfer data,” as generating
1745
transfer data.
The specification and the prosecution history linked
1746
But
this function to the flowchart of Figure 8 of the specification.
as the Board found, “[t]here [was] no structure or algorithm for
generating transfer data disclosed in the discussion of Figure 8 at
1747
Specification paragraphs[] 0088–93.”
Indeed, Figure 8 “fail[ed] to
describe, even at a high level, how a computer could be programmed
to produce the structure that provide[d] the results described in the
1748
boxes.”
Because the means-plus-function limitation lacked
“sufficient disclosure of structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6,” it had
1749
no permissible construction.
1750
In Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., the district court
held the claim term “means for cross-referencing” indefinite because
the specification did not contain an “‘algorithm’ adequate to provide
1751
structure for this function.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed,
holding that the term was supported by the “structure, materials, or
1752
acts” in the specification.
The court emphasized that a patentee
may express a “procedural algorithm ‘in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or
1753
in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.’”
It was
undisputed that the recited steps were “carried out by known
computer-implement operations, and [were] readily implemented”

1742. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1296–97, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
1743. 656 F.3d 1293, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1744. Id. at 1298, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
1745. Id. at 1297, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
1746. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
1747. Id. at 1298, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1748. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1749. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
1750. 659 F.3d 1376, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1751. Id. at 1384, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
1752. Id. at 1386, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696.
1753. Id. at 1385, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697 (quoting Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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1754

Therefore, even though the specification in this
by skilled persons.
case did not include a mathematical algorithm, the specification’s
1755
recitation in prose of the algorithm was sufficient.
1756
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the Federal Circuit held that
Home Depot failed to rebut the presumption, in the absence of the
word “means,” that the term “dust collection structure” is not a
1757
means-plus-function element.
First, the claim had sufficiently
definite structure in requiring that the dust collection structure be
connected to a cutting box interior, wherein the physical
characteristics of the dust collection structure allow dust to pass from
1758
the cutting box and be collected by the dust collection structure.
In addition, the specification depicted component parts of the dust
collection structure and disclosed the details of how this structure
1759
functions to collect dust.
Furthermore, the prior art showed that
the term “dust collection structure” is used by persons of skill in the
pertinent art to designate structure and had a reasonably well
1760
understood meaning in the art.
Therefore, the claimed “dust
1761
collection structure” was not a means-plus-function limitation.
VII. INFRINGEMENT
The Federal Circuit decided numerous cases involving
infringement in 2011. In those cases, the court considered issues
related to literal infringement (including cases involving product
claims with process steps or functional language and infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)), the doctrine of equivalents, indirect
infringement, infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), and willful
infringement.
A. Literal Infringement
Two steps are involved in a determination of literal
1762
infringement.
The court first construes the asserted patent claims
by determining their scope and meaning, and then compares the

1754. Id. at 1386, 100 U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) at 1697–98.
1755. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697–98.
1756. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
1757. Id. at 1230, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747–48.
1758. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1759. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1760. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1761. Id. at 1231, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1762. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1318, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1013, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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construed claims to the allegedly infringing device to determine
1763
whether all the limitations are met.
1.

Cases finding infringement
1764
In Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
literal infringement of a patent directed to a “chess-like, light1765
reflecting board game” with movable key playing pieces.
Although
the infringement dispute in this case centered on the term
“movable,” the defendant did not argue that the district court erred
in its construction of that term, and the Federal Circuit did not
1766
Instead, the defendant argued that the
review that construction.
district court “improperly broadened its construction” of this term
when it compared the construed claims to the allegedly infringing
1767
device.
Specifically, the defendant argued that the claim term
“movable” was improperly broadened to permit the capability of
1768
movement “during game set up.”
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, affirming
the district court’s construction of the term “movable” that
1769
incorporated the capability of movement during game setup.
The
court distinguished the claimed “movable key playing pieces” from
the prior art by noting that, “while the ‘key pieces disclosed in [the
prior art] are permanently fixed to the game board and, therefore,
cannot be moved prior to or during game play,’ the key pieces of the
[patent-in-suit] ‘may be positioned in different spaces at the
1770
beginning of each game’” during setup, for example.
As a result,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had not
expanded its construction of the term “movable” during the second
1771
step of infringement analysis.
Because it was undisputed that the
defendant’s pieces were able to be physically positioned in different
places on the game board, the court found that they met the
“movable” limitation, and affirmed the district court’s grant of
1772
summary judgment of literal infringement.
1763. Id. at 1318–19, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
1764. 637 F.3d 1314, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1765. Id. at 1316, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
1766. Id. at 1319, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
1767. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
1768. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1769. The district court construed “movable” as “capable of movement as called for
by the rules of the game or game strategy.” Id. at 1317, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
1770. Id. at 1320, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017 (citation omitted).
1771. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1772. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
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1773

the Federal Circuit
In August Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd.,
remanded for a limited trial on infringement regarding one claim
element because of a flawed claim construction, but decided not to
1774
require retrial regarding a second claim limitation.
The patent at
issue was “directed to a system and a method for inspecting
integrated circuits printed on . . . wafers,” where an illuminator
1775
strobed according to the velocity of the wafer.
The Federal Circuit
upheld the district court’s construction of the strobing limitation as
“based at least in part on ‘the rate of change of the position of the
wafer’” because there was no “clear disavowal” of that construction
1776
The jury’s verdict of infringement also was
during prosecution.
upheld because there was substantial evidence that the accused
product strobed based on the rate of change of the position of the
1777
wafer.
The evidence showed the accused product strobed more
frequently as the wafer moved faster and the position circuit was
1778
disabled unless the wafer was moving.
As a result, the Federal
Circuit concluded that there was no error in the district court’s
analysis of the issue and held that “the district court need not include
1779
the strobing limitation in its retrial on infringement.”
1780
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the jury’s verdict that the defendant literally infringed a patent
1781
directed to safety guard technology for radial arm saws.
On
appeal, the defendant challenged the district court’s denial of the
defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL)
1782
on infringement.
The defendant argued that when a claim lists
elements separately, the accused device must contain a separate
1783
structure for each of those claim elements in order to infringe.
Specifically, the defendant argued that the terms “cutting box” and
“dust collection structure” are distinct terms that can only be
infringed by a device that has a separate structure for each of those
1784
claimed elements.
Because the front half of the accused product’s
cutting box met the “cutting box limitation,” while the rear half of
1773. 655 F.3d 1278, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1774. Id. at 1286–87, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772–73.
1775. Id. at 1282, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
1776. Id. at 1286–87, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (citation omitted).
1777. Id. at 1287, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1778. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1779. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1780. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
1781. Id. at 1241, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
1782. Id. at 1227, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1783. Id. at 1231, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1784. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
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the cutting box met the “dust collection structure” limitation, the
defendant argued that the accused product could not infringe
because there were not separate structures for those claimed
1785
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that
elements.
the specification does not teach that the “cutting box” and the “dust
1786
collection structure” must be separate components.
Rather, the
specification taught that the cutting box could also function as a
1787
Additionally, the court noted that the
“dust collection structure.”
jury was entitled to rely on expert testimony, which indicated that the
“dust collecting structure” limitation was met by the accused
1788
product.
As a result, the Federal Circuit concluded that the jury’s
verdict of literal infringement was supported by substantial evidence
and affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for JMOL
1789
regarding literal infringement.
2.

Cases finding no infringement
1790
In Tessera, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the ITC’s finding of no infringement of a patent
directed to a method of encapsulating a semiconductor chip in which
a “protective barrier” prevented encapsulation material from
1791
obstructing exposed terminals in the “top layer.”
Because the
claims required the “protective barrier” of the accused product to be
in contact with the “top layer,” infringement turned upon the
determination of what layer in the accused product was the “top
1792
layer.”
The term “top layer” was construed as the layer that carried
1793
The accused product contained a
the semiconductor terminals.
solder mask layer that covered both a copper wiring layer and an
1794
underlying laminate substrate layer.
Holes in the solder mask layer
exposed the copper wire terminals, and during encapsulation a
protective barrier contacted the solder mask layer to prevent
1795
obstruction of the exposed copper terminals.
The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the
1785. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1786. Id. at 1231–32, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1787. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1788. Id. at 1232, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748–49.
1789. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1790. 646 F.3d 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2011) (No. 11-903).
1791. Id. at 1361, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71.
1792. Id. at 1365, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1793. Tessera did not argue that the claim construction was incorrect because it
had proffered that construction. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
1794. Id. at 1362, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871–72.
1795. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
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determination that the laminate substrate layer in the accused
product carried the semiconductor terminals and therefore was the
1796
Because the laminate substrate layer in the accused
“top layer.”
product was not in contact with the “protective barrier,” the court
1797
The Federal
affirmed that the accused product did not infringe.
Circuit characterized as “disingenuous” the patentee’s argument that
the solder mask layer in the accused product was part of the “top
layer” because “the patent describ[ed] ‘solder mask’ as the preferred
material for the ‘protective barrier’ and depict[ed] the ‘protective
1798
barrier’ as separate and distinct from the ‘top layer.’”
1799
the Federal Circuit
In Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
affirmed the district court’s JMOL that the asserted claim to a
balloon-expandable stent with “undulating” sections was not literally
1800
infringed.
In its analysis of whether the accused product satisfied
the “undulating sections” limitation of the asserted claim, the court
reasoned that the patentee was foreclosed from arguing that a single
curve could satisfy that limitation by an argument, made during
prosecution of a parent application to the patent-in-suit, which
distinguished an “undulating” structure from a prior art structure
1801
that was “merely curved.”
The court, therefore, found no error in
the district court’s clarification of its construction of the term
“undulating” as requiring a change of direction where the curve
1802
extends beyond the point of inflection.
The Federal Circuit also
disregarded expert testimony based upon an “incorrect
understanding of the claim construction” and instead relied upon
1803
engineering drawings and photographs of the accused product.
These visuals showed that the accused stent lacked the “change in
1804
direction required for literal infringement.”
The court noted that
this analysis was consistent with the expert testimony based on the
1805
correct construction, but not the jury’s verdict.
As a result, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the jury’s verdict of infringement was
not supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the district
1806
court’s grant of JMOL that the claim was not literally infringed.
1796.
1797.
1798.
1799.
1800.
1801.
1802.
1803.
1804.
1805.
1806.

Id. at 1365, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873–74.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id. at 1365–66, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
658 F.3d 1347, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1350, 1358, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333, 1336.
Id. at 1356–57, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id. at 1356, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
Id. at 1357–58, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335–36.
Id. at 1358, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
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1807

the Federal
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL on the jury’s
1808
verdict of noninfringement.
The patents at issue involved a
method of curing tobacco that substantially prevents the formation of
1809
The Federal Circuit noted that
tobacco-specific nitrosamines.
expert testimony was required to establish infringement and the jury
1810
could either credit or discredit the testimony before it.
Thus, the
court concluded it was “not unreasonable for the jury to discredit the
testimony of [the plaintiff’s] expert” in favor of the defendant’s
expert testimony and “find that the [defendant’s] patents were not
1811
In light of the plaintiff’s heavy reliance on its expert
infringed.”
testimony as its “primary evidence of infringement,” and the jury’s
apparent discrediting of that testimony, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for JMOL of
1812
infringement.
1813
In Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant infringed three of its patents concerning a
“method, apparatus, and system” for finding lost or stolen electronic
devices that used software on an “agent” device to send the device’s
location to a “host” system using a global network, such as the
1814
Internet.
The defendant counterclaimed for infringement of its
own patent, which was directed to “an agent that makes surreptitious
calls to a central monitoring site” to “monitor the performance of an
electronic device” and “detect the misuse of software” on that
1815
device.
The district court entered summary judgment of
1816
The
noninfringement for both the defendant and the plaintiff.
Federal Circuit, however, vacated summary judgment of
noninfringement of the plaintiff’s patents and affirmed summary
1817
judgment of noninfringement of the defendant’s patent.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
1818
judgment of noninfringement of the defendant’s patent.
The
district court found that the plaintiff’s product did not meet the

1807.
1808.
1809.
1810.
1811.
1812.
1813.
1814.
1815.
1816.
1817.
1818.

655 F.3d 1364, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1924 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1378, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–35.
Id. at 1367–68, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
Id. at 1378, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934 (internal quotation marks omitted).
659 F.3d 1121, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1125–27, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643–46.
Id. at 1126, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1128, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 1141, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
Id. at 1135, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

958

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

[Vol. 61:785

claimed “semi-random rate” limitation because the product called the
monitoring center every 24.5 hours after the completion of the last
1819
The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s product met the
call.
“semi-random rate” limitation because the time when a call is
initiated can vary based on differences regarding when the previous
1820
call ended.
For example, the length of the calls can vary due to a
1821
As
significant load on the plaintiff’s system or Internet availability.
a result, the defendant argued that the interval between calls can
1822
become so varied that they are “random.”
The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that even if the exact timing of future
calls could not be predicted with certainty, the next call would always
1823
be initiated 24.5 hours after the end of the previous call.
The
Federal Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s product did not infringe
as a matter of law because the “[p]atent’s randomness requirement is
not satisfied by mere unpredictability,” where that unpredictability was
1824
the result of unusual circumstances.
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
1825
noninfringement of the defendant’s patent.
The Federal Circuit, however, also reviewed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the plaintiff’s
1826
patents and vacated those rulings.
The claim term “global network
communication links” was construed as “the identification of one or
more (perhaps less than all) of the connections (either direct or
indirect) between two nodes in the Internet (one of the nodes may
be the electronic device itself) used to enable data transmission
1827
The district
between said electronic device and said host system.”
court found that the accused product furnished only one IP address
(i.e., node) and, therefore, the accused product did not infringe as a
1828
1829
matter of law.
The Federal Circuit disagreed.
The Federal Circuit explained that under the district court’s claim
construction, “if the agent provide[d] the IP addresses of both the
agent and host,” it satisfied the “global network communication

1819. Id. at 1129, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646–47.
1820. Id. at 1139, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1821. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1822. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1823. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1824. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1825. Id. at 1141, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
1826. Id. at 1125, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
1827. Id. at 1130, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1828. Id. at 1132, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
1829. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
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Although it was undisputed that when the agent
links” limitation.
provided the message packet to the host system, the message packet
contained at least the agent IP address, and that when that message
packet arrived at the host system it contained both the agent IP
address and the host IP address, the record was unclear as to how the
1831
host IP address was provided to that packet.
The district court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that the agent, as opposed to any other component, furnished,
1832
supplied, or made available the host IP address.
The Federal
Circuit disagreed, explaining that the district court failed to draw a
1833
reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff.
Specifically, the
Federal Circuit explained that, because the agent provided the
agent’s IP address in the packet and that packet contained both the
agent and host IP addresses when it arrived, a reasonable jury could
1834
find that the agent provided both the agent and host IP addresses.
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was a genuine issue of
material fact and vacated the district court’s summary judgment of
1835
noninfringement.
The plaintiff also appealed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of noninfringement based on the failure to meet the
1836
claim’s “contacting . . . without signaling” limitation.
The Special
Master noted that there was no indication that the patentee intended
1837
to limit “contacting” to only the initiation of communication.
Therefore, the district court concluded that a beep at any time before
the communication terminated was sufficient to avoid the “contacting
1838
. . . without signaling” limitation.
Accordingly, since the accused
product beeped at the end of communication with the host, the
1839
The
district court found that the accused product did not infringe.
1840
Federal Circuit disagreed.
The Federal Circuit noted that because the Special Master
construed the term “contacting” as “getting in touch with or
communicating with,” the accused product infringed if it did not
1830.
1831.
1832.
1833.
1834.
1835.
1836.
1837.
1838.
1839.
1840.

Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id. at 1133, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1134, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650–51.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

960

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

[Vol. 61:785

beep while initiating communication or did not produce a beep while
1841
Whether the accused product beeped as part of
communicating.
the communication with the host was a question of fact; accordingly,
the Federal Circuit concluded that summary judgment of
1842
noninfringement should be vacated.
Additionally, the court
explained that even if “getting in touch with or communicating with”
meant only that “getting in touch with” was synonymous with
“communicating with,” the summary judgment of noninfringement
1843
should be vacated.
Specifically, there were issues of material fact
regarding the permissible length of the temporal gap between the
communication and the beep for the communication to be
1844
considered to have been made without signaling.
3.

Product claims with process steps or functional language
1845
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s JMOL of noninfringement of a patent concerning
a software registration system that was intended to prevent copying of
1846
software.
The claim was directed to a remote registration station,
which only allowed the user to have full access to the software if the
1847
system determined that the software installation was legitimate.
As
part of this process, the registration system used a “local licensee
unique ID generating means” to combine information entered by the
1848
user into a “local licensee unique ID.”
The user’s information was
“also sent to the vendor’s system,” which executed an algorithm to
1849
create a “remote licensee unique ID” for the user.
Then the
“remote licensee unique ID” was compared to the “local licensee
unique ID” by a “mode switching means,” which would enter the
1850
software into “use mode” if the two IDs matched.
Once the
program entered the “use mode,” the user was given full access to the
1851
software.
Addressing infringement, the Federal Circuit first examined
whether the accused products contained a “licensee unique ID

1841. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
1842. Id. at 1135, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
1843. Id. at 1134–35, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
1844. Id. at 1135, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
1845. 632 F.3d 1292, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 420 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1846. Id. at 1295–97, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207–08.
1847. Id. at 1296, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
1848. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
1849. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
1850. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
1851. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
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1852

The Federal Circuit explained that the
generating means.”
“licensee unique ID generating means” was a means-plus-function
claim, with the function being “to generate a local or remote licensee
unique ID” and the structure being “a summation algorithm or a
1853
The Federal Circuit explained
summer and equivalents thereof.”
that because the accused product performed the same function as
the patent, the issue was whether a reasonable jury could conclude
that the accused product contained a “summation algorithm”
1854
structure when it also contained additional structural components.
The court explained that although the literal scope of a properly
construed means-plus-function limitation is limited to the structure
disclosed in the specification and its equivalents, the range of
equivalent structures broadens when “the disclosed physical structure
1855
The
is of little or no importance to the claimed invention.”
Federal Circuit determined that there was no indication that the
1856
“summation algorithm” structure was critical to the function.
In
light of that fact, the court concluded that a reasonable jury would
not be precluded from finding that the structural components of the
1857
accused products were “summation algorithms.”
The Federal Circuit also explained that the enhanced functionality
of the accused products did not prevent the accused products from
1858
being considered equivalents of the “summation algorithm.”
The
court indicated that two structures can still be equivalent when
performing the same function, even if they would not be equivalent
1859
when performing different functions.
As a result, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the enhanced functionality of the accused
product did not prevent it from being considered an equivalent of
1860
the “summation algorithm” in the asserted patent.
The Federal Circuit also considered whether the accused products
met the claimed limitations of a “registration system” and a “mode
1861
switching means.”
When a user of the accused products agreed to
the end user license agreement, but had not yet initiated product

1852. Id. at 1302–07, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212–15.
1853. Id. at 1302, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1854. Id. at 1304, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1855. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213–14 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1856. Id. at 1305, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1857. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1858. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1859. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1860. Id. at 1306–07, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1861. Id. at 1307–08, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–17.
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activation, the user was provided with a grace period during which
1862
The
the user could access some of the features of the product.
user was not provided full access to the product until the user
1863
initiated product activation.
The defendant argued that while the
user’s access during the grace period was “full use” according to the
end user license agreement, the accused product did not infringe
because it did not satisfy the “registration system” and “mode
1864
switching means” limitations at that time.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that unless
the user activated the product, the user was not entitled to the rights
granted by the end user license agreement and did not have full use
1865
of the product.
Therefore, “full use” did not occur until after the
1866
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
initiation of product activation.
determined that “the jury had substantial evidence” to conclude that
after initiation of Product Activation, the accused product included a
1867
“registration system” and “mode switching means.”
The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the product
did not infringe because licensing and registration did not occur
concurrently, concluding that the patent was not limited to situations
1868
where activation and licensing were concurrent.
Accordingly, the
court reversed the district court’s JMOL of noninfringement on the
basis of the “registration system” and “mode switching means”
1869
limitations.
The Federal Circuit also explained that a single party can infringe a
claim even when other parties are necessary to complete the
1870
environment in which the claimed element functions.
With
respect to the “remote registration station,” the claim defined the
environment in which the registration station must function,
including a registration system with “local licensee unique ID
1871
generating means” and “mode switching means.”
The defendant
argued alternatively that the court could affirm the JMOL of
noninfringement because the plaintiff had not proved direct
1872
infringement.
Specifically, the defendant argued that it did not
1862.
1863.
1864.
1865.
1866.
1867.
1868.
1869.
1870.
1871.
1872.

Id. at 1307, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1308, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216–17.
Id. at 1307, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1307–08, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216–17.
Id. at 1308, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216–17.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
Id. at 1309, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
Id. at 1308, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
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infringe because it “did not supply or use the end users’ computers
that implemented the local licensee unique ID generating means and
1873
The Federal Circuit agreed with the
mode switching means.”
district court that requiring an end user’s participation “would be
akin to importing a method step into [the] software system” and
explained that, although other parties are necessary to complete the
claimed environment of the “local licensee unique ID generating
means” and “mode switching means,” only the defendant makes or
1874
uses the remote registration station.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the defendant made and used the remote registration
1875
station in the environment required by the claims.
1876
In Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., the Federal Circuit
determined that the preamble only limited the environment where
1877
As a
the claim operates, not the claimed method or system itself.
result, the Federal Circuit determined that the accused infringer did
not need to practice the steps recited in the preamble to infringe the
1878
claims.
The claims at issue were directed to a patented method
1879
and system for guarding against check fraud and forgery.
The
preamble of the system and method claims contained steps for
1880
In discussing the method claim, the
encrypting and printing.
Federal Circuit explained that the defendant could “use” the method
by validating checks that were encrypted and printed according to
the preamble, even though the defendant itself did not encrypt and
1881
print the checks.
In discussing the system claim, the Federal
Circuit indicated that, “[a]lthough a patented system is ‘used’ when a
party ‘controls the system as a whole and obtains benefit from it,’” the
claimed system does not include a computer for encryption, or a
printer, because the encrypting and printing steps are in the
1882
The court explained that the system claims included a
preamble.
scanner and a data processing device for decryption and reencryption, and thus, the defendant could infringe “simply by
1883
controlling the scanner and the decrypting computer.”
1873. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
1874. Id. at 1309, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217–18.
1875. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
1876. 641 F.3d 1368, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1877. Id. at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973.
1878. Id. at 1374–75, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973.
1879. Id. at 1371, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971.
1880. Id. at 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973.
1881. Id. at 1374, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973.
1882. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973 (quoting Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest
Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1285, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1702 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
1883. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1973.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s summary
1884
judgment determination of no direct infringement.
4.

Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
The infringement provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, section 202,
provides that the submission of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) that describes a drug claimed in a patent is an
1885
act of infringement.
Although the Federal Circuit has previously
indicated that consideration of material outside of the four corners of
an ANDA might be appropriate where compliance with the ANDA
1886
was not dispositive of the infringement issue,
in the case In re
1887
the Federal Circuit held that courts
Brimonidine Patent Litigation,
cannot assume that a company will not act in full compliance with its
representations to the FDA and manufacture a drug outside of the
1888
parameters of the ANDA.
Although the pH range provided in the
defendant’s ANDA was lower than the pH limitation claimed in the
plaintiff’s patent, the district court held that the product proposed in
1889
the defendant’s ANDA would infringe.
The district court reasoned
that because the pH of the formulation drops while it is stored, the
defendant would take this drop into account by producing a
formulation with a pH that is higher than described in the ANDA,
1890
thereby infringing the patent.
The Federal Circuit disagreed,
noting that it was undisputed that if the defendant complied with its
ANDA, it would never manufacture or sell a product with an
1891
infringing pH.
Because a company is bound by the representations
in its ANDA, the defendant could not legally sell its proposed product
1892
As a result,
with a pH that is different than proposed in its ANDA.
the Federal Circuit refused to assume that the defendant would not
act “in full compliance with its representations to the FDA” in its
ANDA, and reversed the district court’s finding that the defendant’s
1893
filing of the ANDA was an act of infringement.
1884. Id. at 1372–73, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1972.
1885. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006).
1886. In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., 643 F.3d 1366, 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1878, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, No. 11-800, 2012 U.S. LEXIS
2363 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
1887. 643 F.3d 1366, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No.
11-800, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2363 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
1888. Id. at 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
1889. Id. at 1377, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
1890. Id. at 1377–78, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886–87.
1891. Id. at 1378, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
1892. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
1893. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
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1894

the Federal
In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
Circuit held that although the development of information for
regulatory approval is exempted from infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), that exception does not apply to information that may
be routinely reported to the FDA after marketing approval has been
1895
obtained.
In this case, the plaintiff’s patents were directed to
methods of comparing immunization schedules, identifying
schedules associated with a lower risk of chronic diseases, and
1896
vaccinating pursuant to the identified lower risk schedules.
The plaintiff argued that two defendants infringed because they
participated in studies that evaluated the association between
1897
vaccinations and the development of diseases.
The plaintiff also
argued that one defendant induced infringement by licensing
technology and providing recommendations regarding an
1898
immunization schedule.
The district court granted summary
judgment that those activities were exempted from infringement
1899
In the Federal Circuit case, the
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
defendants
argued
that
reporting
vaccine
relationships,
recommending immunization schedules in view of the relevant
scientific literature, or other activities in conformity with FDA
regulations are within the infringement safe-harbor of 35 U.S.C. §
1900
271(e)(1).
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’
arguments and vacated the district court’s grant of summary
1901
judgment of noninfringement.
The Federal Circuit explained that
those activities were not exempt from infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) because they were not related to producing information
for an Investigational New Drug Application (INDA) or New Drug
Application (NDA), and were not a phase of research possibly
1902
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
leading to marketing approval.
held that the district court erred in applying the infringement
exemption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to the defendants’ acts of
“providing vaccines,” “advising on immunization schedules,” and
1903
“reporting adverse vaccine effects to the FDA.”
As a result, the

1894.
1895.
1896.
1897.
1898.
1899.
1900.
1901.
1902.
1903.

659 F.3d 1057, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1070, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
Id. at 1060–61, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495–96.
Id. at 1070, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
Id. at 1070–72, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503–04.
Id. at 1071–72, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
Id. at 1072, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
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Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment of
1904
noninfringement.
Although the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary
judgment of noninfringement for two defendants, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a grant of summary judgment of noninfringement for a
1905
third defendant.
The district court granted the third defendant’s
motion for summary judgment of noninfringement because the
plaintiff failed to show evidence of any involvement in the allegedly
1906
infringing study.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that even if the
defendant did not participate in the study, the defendant infringed
1907
The Federal
the patents when it reviewed and evaluated the study.
Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the plaintiff did not offer
any evidence demonstrating that the defendant participated in the
study or evaluated the claimed association between vaccination and
1908
the development of disease.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
1909
The
affirmed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.
Federal Circuit also noted that the district court accepted the premise
that the defendants could infringe the asserted claims by
participating in studies to evaluate the association between the timing
1910
of vaccination and the risk of developing diseases.
The Federal
Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s view that its claims covered
“thinking” about the claimed subject matter is not correct because
the patent’s “technological/scientific contribution to knowledge is
not insulated from analysis, study, and experimentation for the
1911
twenty years until patent expiration.”
As a result, the Federal
Circuit indicated that, on remand, the district court could consider
whether a scientific investigation to evaluate the association between
the timing of vaccination and the risk of developing diseases could be
subject to preclusion by the patentee, or would be permissible under
1912
patent principles.
B. Doctrine of Equivalents
A claim that is not literally infringed can still be infringed under
1913
the doctrine of equivalents.
The essential inquiry under the
1904.
1905.
1906.
1907.
1908.
1909.
1910.
1911.
1912.
1913.

Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
Id. at 1070, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id. at 1069, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id. at 1070, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id. at 1059–60, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
Id. at 1073, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
Id. at 1072, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
Id. at 1073, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33,
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doctrine of equivalents is whether the accused product or process
contains elements that are identical or equivalent to each of the
1914
This inquiry is determined by
claimed elements in the patent.
applying the function-way-result test, which analyzes whether an
element of the accused product performs substantially the same
1915
function, in substantially the same way, to obtain the same result.
1916
In American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of summary judgment of
noninfringement of the defendant’s Radio patent under the doctrine
1917
of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit explained that the plaintiff
failed to meet its evidentiary burden of providing particularized
testimony that the accused satellite receivers performed substantially
the same function, in substantially the same way, to obtain the same
1918
result as the claimed system on a limitation-by-limitation basis.
The
Federal Circuit held that generalized testimony from one of the
inventors as to the overall similarity between the claims and the
accused infringer’s product was insufficient to “create a genuine issue
1919
of material fact.”
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit explained that
a finding of equivalence “would vitiate th[e] claim limitation [at
issue] by rendering it meaningless;” therefore, such a theory of
1920
equivalence was “legally insufficient.”
1921
the
In Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
Federal Circuit noted that it was well settled that a patentee cannot
use the doctrine of equivalents to capture prior art alternatives when
the specification criticized those alternatives and excluded them from
1922
the literal scope of the claims.
The patents at issue involved
syringes where the needle was retracted into the body of the syringe
1923
after the needle was used.
In the district court case, the jury found
infringement and the district court subsequently denied the
1924
defendant’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement.
The defendant
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710–11 (2002).
1914. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997).
1915. Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
1916. 651 F.3d 1318, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1503, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011).
1917. Id. at 1339, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1918. Id. at 1338–39, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1919. Id. at 1339, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1920. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1921. 653 F.3d 1296, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 659 F.3d 1369, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1922. Id. at 1307, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1923. Id. at 1298, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1924. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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1925

appealed the district court’s denial of that motion.
The Federal Circuit construed the claim term “body” as a one-piece
1926
structure.
The defendant argued that because the patent
“specifications criticize[d] prior art syringes that contain multiple
bodies,” the plaintiff could not argue that the multiple-piece-bodied
1927
product infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal
Circuit agreed, noting that the specifications expressly stated that the
1928
Moreover, the
invention had a body constructed of a single piece.
one-piece structure was used to distinguish the claimed invention
1929
from the prior art in the specification.
The Federal Circuit
explained that although infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact, the issue of whether statements in
1930
the specification limit the scope of equivalents is a question of law.
1931
Citing L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc., the Federal
Circuit also indicated that it is well-settled law that a patentee cannot
use the doctrine of equivalents to capture prior art alternatives when
the specification criticizes those alternatives and excludes them from
1932
the literal scope of the claims.
As a result, the Federal Circuit
concluded that a syringe “body” that included more than one piece
1933
Accordingly,
could not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement and held that the
1934
accused product does not infringe as a matter of law.
1935
In Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that the
plaintiff did not infringe the defendant’s patent under the doctrine
1936
of equivalents.
That patent was directed to an agent that makes
surreptitious calls to a central monitoring site in order to monitor the
performance of an electronic device and detect the misuse of
1937
software.
The Federal Circuit examined whether the plaintiff’s
product had an equivalent of the claimed “semi-random rate”
1925. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1926. Id. at 1305, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41.
1927. Id. at 1307, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1928. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1929. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1930. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1931. 499 F.3d 1303, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1932. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1307, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242 (citing L.B.
Plastics, 499 F.3d at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344–45).
1933. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1934. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
1935. 659 F.3d 1121, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1936. Id. at 1139–40, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1937. Id. at 1126, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
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limitation by examining whether the difference between the
1938
plaintiff’s product and the claim limitation was insubstantial.
Specifically, the court examined whether the element of the accused
product and the claim limitation performed substantially the same
1939
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.
The Federal Circuit noted that the functions of the claimed “semirandom rate” limitation were to detect piracy and prevent users from
1940
detecting when the agent will make the next call to the central site.
In contrast, the function of the 24.5-hour interval in the accused
product was to prevent all the calls from being made at the same time
1941
to reduce the load on the servers.
Although the defendant pointed
to marketing materials for the plaintiff’s product that mentioned the
secrecy and undetectability of the plaintiff’s product, the Federal
Circuit rejected this argument because there was no evidence that
those statements related to the 24.5-hour interval and not other
1942
features of the plaintiff’s product.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit
noted that the 24.5-hour interval does not prevent users from
1943
detecting when the next call will be made.
Thus, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s product does not infringe under
1944
the doctrine of equivalents.
1.

Burden of proof
Both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents are issues of fact, which must be proven by a
1945
preponderance of the evidence.
In Siemens Medical Solutions USA,
1946
Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence even when an alleged equivalent is
1947
claimed in a separately issued patent.
The plaintiff’s patent was
directed to a radiation detector with cerium-doped lutetium
1948
oxyorthosilicate (“LSO”) scintillator crystals and a photodetector.
1938. Id. at 1139–40, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1939. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1940. Id. at 1140, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1941. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1942. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1943. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1944. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1945. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1269, 1279, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 647 F.3d 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1946. 637 F.3d 1269, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 647 F.3d 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1947. Id. at 1283, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
1948. Id. at 1275, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
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In the district court, the jury found that the plaintiff’s patent was
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, even though the alleged
equivalent was separately claimed in a patent licensed to the
1949
The defendant appealed, arguing that the district
defendant.
court legally erred in its jury instructions regarding proof of
1950
infringement.
Specifically, the defendant argued that because the
alleged equivalent is claimed in another patent, a finding of
equivalence implies that the other patent is invalid for obviousness,
1951
thereby constructively invalidating the other patent.
As a result,
the defendant argued that when an alleged equivalent is claimed in a
separately issued patent, infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents must be proven under the heightened evidentiary burden
1952
of clear and convincing evidence.
The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, explaining that the evidentiary burden is not changed,
even though it may be more difficult to prove equivalency under the
preponderance of evidence standard when an equivalent is separately
1953
patentable.
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the
jury’s finding of equivalence constructively invalidated the patent for
1954
four reasons.
First, equivalency and obviousness require different
1955
standards of proof.
The jury found infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents by a preponderance of the evidence, yet
overcoming the presumption of validity requires clear and convincing
1956
evidence.
The jury’s finding was under the lower evidentiary
standard; therefore, the jury’s finding could not invalidate the
1957
Second, the court also rejected the defendant’s argument
patent.
because equivalence and obviousness have different analytical
1958
frameworks.
The Federal Circuit explained that analysis under the
doctrine of equivalents typically requires the application of the
insubstantial differences test, usually via the function-way-result test,
while obviousness requires analysis under the four Graham v. John
1959
1960
factors.
Third, the finding of equivalency could not
Deere Co.
1949. Id. at 1276–78, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900–01.
1950. Id. at 1277–78, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1901.
1951. Id. at 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
1952. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
1953. Id. at 1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
1954. Id. at 1281–82, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904–05.
1955. Id. at 1282, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1956. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1957. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1958. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1959. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
1960. Siemens Med. Solutions, 637 F.3d at 1282, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904
(citation omitted).
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constructively invalidate the patent because equivalency is measured
at the time of infringement, while obviousness is analyzed at the time
1961
Fourth, the separate patent also was not
the invention was made.
constructively invalidated because the jury’s finding of equivalence
determined only the equivalency of the accused product and the
patent claim, and did not determine that the entire claim scope of
1962
the separate patent was equivalent to the asserted patent.
Since
invalidity analysis requires comparison between the prior art and the
claimed subject matter as a whole, the separate patent was not
1963
constructively invalidated.
As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed
that the district court did not err by instructing the jury that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence when an alleged equivalent is
1964
claimed in a separately issued patent.
2.

Prosecution history estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents
when an applicant surrenders subject matter by an argument made to
a patent examiner or by a narrowing amendment made for the
1965
purpose of patentability.
In American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda
1966
the Federal Circuit held that the plaintiff was barred
Motor Co.,
from asserting that its Service Provider patents were infringed under
1967
the doctrine of equivalents.
The plaintiff’s Service Provider patents
were directed to a system that identified a service provider when a
1968
vehicle needed maintenance.
The defendant argued that the
patents were not infringed because the patents identified a service
provider in response to the condition of the vehicle, while the
accused product only identified a service provider in response to a
1969
user request.
The defendant also argued that the accused product
could not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents due to
1970
prosecution history estoppel.
The Federal Circuit agreed that the plaintiff was barred from
1961. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1962. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904–05.
1963. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904–05.
1964. Id. at 1283, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
1965. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1340, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 2009-1503,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011).
1966. 651 F.3d 1318, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1503, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011).
1967. Id. at 1340, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52.
1968. Id. at 1324, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
1969. Id. at 1339, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
1970. Id. at 1339–40, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
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1971

The
asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Federal Circuit explained that during prosecution of the patents, the
inventors argued that the prior art taught away from the claimed
invention because the prior art identified a service provider in
response to the user’s selection, while the claimed invention
1972
identified a service provider in response to the vehicle’s condition.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the inventors
clearly and unmistakably surrendered that subject matter now sought
as an equivalent and consequently affirmed the district court’s
1973
finding of noninfringement.
C. Indirect Infringement—Induced Infringement
To establish induced infringement, the plaintiff has the burden to
show that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and
that the alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions
1974
would induce actual infringement.
In Advanced Software Design
1975
Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., the district court granted summary judgment,
finding no inducement of infringement because the plaintiff
“presented no evidence and has made no effort to build a case
showing [the defendant’s] actual knowledge or state of mind
1976
regarding infringement.”
On appeal, the defendant argued that
1977
there was no evidence of direct infringement by its customers.
The
Federal Circuit noted, however, that evidence that the defendant
knew of the patent-in-suit and instructed its customers about how to
use the accused infringing product was sufficient to create a genuine
1978
issue of material fact as to a specific intent to induce infringement.
The Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment ruling and
directed the district court to consider the sufficiency of evidence that
the defendant sold its accused infringing products to banks and
1979
helped them use it.
1980
In Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the issue
1971. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
1972. Id. at 1340, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52.
1973. Id. at 1340–41, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52.
1974. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238,
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d
544, 554, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1975. 641 F.3d 1368, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1976. Id. at 1376, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1974–75 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1977. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1975.
1978. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1975.
1979. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1975.
1980. 661 F.3d 629, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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In this case, the patent at issue was directed to
of infringement.
knives with blades that have frustoconical bearing faces, while the
1982
accused product, as sold, had blades with rounded bearing faces.
The plaintiff accused the defendant of indirect infringement, arguing
that when the rounded blades are used, the blades wear to become
1983
frustoconical.
At trial, the defendant had its patent attorney testify regarding an
unwritten opinion that he provided to the defendant as evidence of
1984
the defendant’s state of mind for inducement and willfulness.
Specifically, the defendant’s patent attorney testified that he
informed the defendant that it did not infringe because the plaintiff’s
“theory of indirect infringement required either an absence of
substantial non-infringing use (contributory infringement) or intent
to cause the infringing acts (inducement),” and the defendant lacked
1985
both.
Additionally, the attorney testified that he thought it was
unlikely that the defendant’s bearing faces became frustoconical
1986
The jury subsequently found that the
through wear from use.
1987
defendant did not infringe.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial,
arguing prejudice based on the testimony of the defendant’s patent
attorney and statements in the defendant’s closing argument
1988
regarding that testimony.
In its appeal, the plaintiff sought a new trial on the issue of
1989
The Federal Circuit applied regional circuit law,
infringement.
reviewing the district court’s decision to admit the disputed testimony
for abuse of discretion and analyzing whether substantial injustice
1990
resulted.
The plaintiff argued that the patent attorney’s testimony
regarding his noninfringement opinion was prejudicial because his
opinion was allegedly unfounded speculation from an incompetent
1991
expert.
The Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument as
falling short of establishing abuse of discretion and substantial
1992
injustice.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained that the patent
attorney’s opinion was relevant and admissible regarding the

1981.
1982.
1983.
1984.
1985.
1986.
1987.
1988.
1989.
1990.
1991.
1992.

Id. at 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
Id. at 636, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437–38.
Id. at 637, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id. at 637–38, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
Id. at 638, 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438–39, 1447.
Id. at 648, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
Id. at 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
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defendant’s “state of mind and [the mental state’s] bearing on
1993
Furthermore, the court noted that “it is
indirect infringement.”
within the province of the jury to make credibility determinations
regarding the competence of [the attorney’s] advice, and the
1994
reasonableness” of the defendant’s reliance on that advice.
The
court also noted that the plaintiff’s argument that it was effectively
precluded from presenting its infringement theory to the jury was not
1995
persuasive.
The court noted that the record did not support that
the defendant’s blades ever infringed, and therefore, the plaintiff
could not establish intent or the absence of a substantial
1996
noninfringing use.
Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s closing
argument was prejudicial because it incorrectly characterized its
patent attorney as an authority on the legal and factual issues of
1997
infringement.
The defendant argued that its statements regarding
its attorney’s testimony in the closing argument did not prejudice the
plaintiff in light of the judge’s clear instructions that only the judge
1998
would explain the law to the jury.
The Federal Circuit noted that
the plaintiff’s failure to contemporaneously object to the defendant’s
closing argument raised “the threshold of prejudice” that it must
establish to be entitled to a new trial, and then affirmed that a new
1999
trial was not warranted.
D. Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)
Although the patentee bears the burden of proving infringement
by a preponderance of the evidence, an exception is permitted for
2000
process claims under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) in certain circumstances.
2001
In Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Laboratories,
the Federal
Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
infringement of claims directed to a method of producing a creatine
2002
formulation with increased bioavailability.
The Federal Circuit
held that, in actions involving a process claim under 35 U.S.C. §
1993. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1994. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1995. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1996. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1997. Id. at 648, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
1998. Id. at 648–49, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446–47.
1999. Id. at 649, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
2000. Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 2010-1445,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18984 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 2011).
2001. 651 F.3d 1303, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1445, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18984 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 2011).
2002. Id. at 1306, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
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271(g), a rebuttable presumption that the imported product was
2003
Specifically, the court
made by the patented process can exist.
held that a rebuttable presumption exists if there is a substantial
likelihood that the product was made by the patented process and
the plaintiff was unable to determine the process used to make the
2004
product after making a reasonable effort.
The court explained
that in actions alleging the infringement of process claims under 35
U.S.C. § 271(g), the accused infringer is in a far better position to
2005
determine the actual manufacturing process than the patentee.
Therefore, fairness dictates that the accused infringer reveal this
2006
process or face the presumption of infringement.
The court noted in this case that although the patentee sought
discovery on the manufacturing process, the accused infringer failed
2007
to produce documentation regarding that process.
Additionally,
the court noted that an expert concluded that the patented method
2008
was “most likely” used to manufacture the accused product.
As a
result, the Federal Circuit stated that under 35 U.S.C. § 295, the
burden of establishing that the product was not made by the
2009
patented process was properly on the accused infringer.
The
Federal Circuit explained that because the accused infringer offered
no argument regarding why or how the process used to create the
accused product did not infringe the patent, the district court
properly granted the patentee’s motion for summary judgment of
2010
infringement.
E. Willful Infringement
2011

Under In re Seagate Technology, LLC,
willful infringement is
2012
established under both an objective and a subjective prong. First,
under the objective prong, a patentee must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
2013
high likelihood that its actions infringed a valid patent.
Second,
under the subjective prong, the patentee must show that the risk of
2003. Id. at 1314, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2004. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006)).
2005. Id. at 1314–15, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2006. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2007. Id. at 1315, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2008. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2009. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2010. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
2011. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
2012. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71.
2013. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
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infringement was either known or so obvious that it should have been
2014
known to the accused infringer.
2015
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
if there was a reasonable conclusion that the accused infringer did
not infringe, the patentee cannot establish infringement under the
2016
objective prong.
In this case, the Federal Circuit explained that
the plaintiff did not meet the threshold of establishing willful
infringement under the objective prong because the plaintiff did not
present any evidence regarding why the accused infringer could not
have reasonably concluded that the accused products did not meet
the “licensee unique ID generating means,” “licensee unique ID,” or
“registration system”/“mode switching means” limitations of the
2017
patent.
In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the
infringement of the “licensee unique ID generating means”
limitation was a complicated issue, which was made even more
complicated because analysis of equivalence is an intensely factual
2018
inquiry.
The Federal Circuit explained that because the plaintiff
did not show that a reasonable jury would find the defendant’s
conduct objectively reckless under the objective prong, the court did
2019
not need to address the subjective prong.
The court also rejected
plaintiff’s argument of copying, explaining that evidence of copying
is only relevant to the subjective inquiry in a case of direct
2020
infringement.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
2021
district court’s grant of JMOL of no willful infringement.
2022
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the defendant appealed the
denial of its renewed motion for JMOL, arguing that it did not
willfully infringe a patent directed to safety guard technology for
2023
radial arm saws.
Specifically, the defendant argued that because
the plaintiff was denied a preliminary injunction and because the
inequitable conduct case was close, the defendant’s actions did not

2014. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
2015. 632 F.3d 1292, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 420 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2016. Id. at 1310, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
2017. Id. at 1310–11, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218–19.
2018. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2019. Id. at 1311, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2020. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219 (citing DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1880 (Fed.
Cir. 2009)).
2021. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2022. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
2023. Id. at 1227, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744–45.
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2024

satisfy the objective prong of the willful infringement inquiry.
Conversely, the plaintiff argued that the jury’s verdict of willful
infringement was supported by substantial evidence because the
defendant’s only argument regarding objective reasonableness was
2025
The plaintiff further
related to issues that were not before the jury.
argued that willful infringement under the objective prong is a
2026
question of fact reserved for only the jury.
The Federal Circuit explained that under the objective prong of
the willful infringement inquiry, the court decides whether an
accused infringer’s reliance on a particular issue or defense was
reasonable when the resolution of that issue or defense is a matter of
2027
law.
When the resolution of an issue or defense is a factual matter,
however, the jury properly decides whether reliance on that issue or
2028
The Federal Circuit stated that when
defense was reasonable.
“separate issues of fact and law are presented by an alleged infringer
as defenses to willful infringement, the objective recklessness inquiry
2029
may require analysis by both the court and the jury.”
Here, the denial of a preliminary injunction and the question of
unenforceability were both issues of law that were properly
2030
considered by the district court in analyzing the objective prong.
The Federal Circuit determined that there was no error in the district
court’s determination that the objective prong of the willfulness
inquiry was met despite the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s
preliminary injunction because that denial was based on a claim
2031
construction that was later modified or abandoned.
The Federal
Circuit also determined that there was no error in the district court’s
determination that the objective prong of the willfulness inquiry was
met despite the defendant’s argument that the issue of inequitable
2032
conduct was close.
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit
2033
noted that after Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
the
failure of the plaintiff to update its Petition to Make Special was “not
2034
As a result,
but-for material or affirmative egregious misconduct.”
the Federal Circuit concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by
2024.
2025.
2026.
2027.
2028.
2029.
2030.
2031.
2032.
2033.
2034.

Id. at 1235–36, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id. at 1236, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id. at 1236–37, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
Id. at 1237, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
649 F.3d 1276, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Powell, 663 F.3d at 1237, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
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substantial evidence and affirmed the district court’s denial of the
2035
plaintiff’s motion for JMOL.
VIII. REMEDIES
A. Permanent Injunctions
2036

The Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. decision
in 2006 forced the Federal Circuit to abandon categorical rules for
2037
applying the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief.
This
traditional four-factor framework requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
2038
disserved by a permanent injunction.
2039

In Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.,
the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for entry for
2040
The Federal Circuit’s decision clarified
permanent injunction.
that while broad classifications and categorical rules are not
appropriate following eBay, the Federal Circuit’s pre-eBay
jurisprudence informs the application of the four-factor injunction
2041
inquiry and should not be ignored.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction,
the Federal Circuit first discussed the Supreme Court’s eBay decision
2042
and its effect on the analysis for injunctive relief.
While the
Supreme Court made clear that broad classifications and categorical
rules were not appropriate and jettisoned the presumption of
irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of
injunctive relief, the Federal Circuit stated that it does not follow that
courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as
2043
property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.
The
2035. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
2036. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
2037. See id. at 393, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (holding that a patent holder
should not be categorically denied the opportunity to satisfy the four-factor test
simply because the patent holder chooses to license its patents or because the patent
holder does not practice the patents commercially).
2038. Id. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
2039. 659 F.3d 1142, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2040. Id. at 1145, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
2041. Id. at 1149–50, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661–62.
2042. Id. at 1148–50, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661–62.
2043. See id. at 1149, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (“Although eBay abolishes our
general rule that an injunction normally will issue when a patent is found to have
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Federal Circuit reiterated that it has decided many cases involving a
patentee seeking to permanently enjoin a competitor upon an
adjudication of infringement, and it had developed legal standards
that inform the four-factor framework and the question of
2044
While none of these legal standards alone may
irreparable harm.
justify an irrebuttable presumption that an injunction should issue,
the Federal Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion
2045
by ignoring those standards and substituting its own.
Turning to the first of the four equitable injunction factors, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in relying
2046
exclusively on the presence of additional competitors and on the
2047
“non-core” nature of Robert Bosch LLC’s wiper blade business.
In
addition, the Federal Circuit held that the district court committed a
“clear error of judgment” when it concluded that Bosch failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm in light of Bosch’s evidence to the
contrary, including: “(1) the parties’ direct competition; (2) loss in
market share and access to potential customers resulting from Pylon’s
introduction of infringing beam blades; and (3) Pylon’s lack of
2048
financial wherewithal to satisfy a judgment.”
Given those facts, the
Federal Circuit concluded that there was no rational basis for finding
2049
that Bosch failed to show irreparable harm.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the second and third factors of
the four-part test favored Bosch, while the fourth factor was
2050
neutral.
Regarding the second factor, the adequacy of money
damages, the Federal Circuit agreed with Bosch that the questionable
been valid and infringed, it does not swing the pendulum in the opposite direction.
In other words, even though a successful patent infringement plaintiff can no longer
rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a permanent
injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental
nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.”).
2044. Id. at 1150, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63.
2045. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
2046. See id. at 1151, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–64 (concluding that the district
court legally erred by finding that “the presence of additional competitors, without
more, cuts against a finding of irreparable harm”). The court noted that “[w]hile
the existence of a two-player market may well serve as a substantial ground for
granting an injunction—e.g., because it creates an inference that an infringing sale
amounts to a lost sale for the patentee—the converse is not automatically true.” Id.,
100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
2047. Id. at 1152, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. The Federal Circuit noted that
“the fact that an infringer’s harm affects only a portion of a patentee’s business says
nothing about whether that harm can be rectified.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1664 (citation omitted). Injuries affecting a “non-core” aspect of a patentee’s
business are “equally capable of being irreparable as ones that affect more significant
operations.” Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664.
2048. Id. at 1150–51, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
2049. Id. at 1155, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666.
2050. Id. at 1155–56, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666–67.
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financial condition of both Pylon and its parent company, including
Pylon’s potential inability to pay for its past infringement, suggested
2051
With respect to the
that money damages would be inadequate.
third factor, the balance of hardships, the court opined that “[a]
party cannot escape an injunction simply because it is smaller than
2052
the patentee or because its primary product is an infringing one.”
Failure to enjoin the defendant, the court reasoned, would result in
Bosch competing against its own patented invention, with the
resultant harms of lost market share, lost business opportunities, and
price erosion, which would place “a substantial hardship on
2053
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that the fourth
Bosch.”
2054
factor, public interest, was neutral.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial
of Bosch’s motion for entry of a permanent injunction and remanded
2055
for entry of an appropriate injunction.
B. Preliminary Injunctions
In 2011, the Federal Circuit also had an opportunity to clarify the
requirements for a preliminary injunction. While the decision to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound
2056
discretion of the district court, courts consider four factors when
determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate:
(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of
hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction’s favorable
2057
impact on the public interest.

In General Protecht Group, Inc. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co.,

2058

the

2051. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666–67.
2052. Id. at 1156, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v.
AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 568 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
2053. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
2054. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
2055. Id. at 1157, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. In response to Judge Bryson’s
dissent, advocating for a remand to permit the district court to weigh the factors in
light of the Federal Circuit’s clarification of the relevant issues, the majority noted
that, while the usual situation would be to remand, it did not do so here “[b]ecause
the undisputed evidence conclusively shows that permanent injunctive relief is
warranted in this case,” and “[r]emand is particularly inappropriate here because it
would only delay relief to which Bosch currently is entitled.” Id. at 1156–57, 100
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667–68.
2056. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
2057. Amazon.com, Inc. v. barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
2058. 651 F.3d 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a
preliminary injunction to enforce a forum selection clause in a
2059
In an earlier action brought by Leviton
settlement agreement.
Manufacturing Co. against General Protecht Group, Inc. (“GPG”)
and other parties in the District of New Mexico, Leviton alleged that
GPG infringed two of Leviton’s patents pertaining to ground fault
2060
circuit interrupters.
The parties reached a settlement agreement
in which Leviton covenanted not to sue GPG and its codefendants for
infringement of the two patents-in-suit based on the products
currently accused of infringement and an anticipated new product
2061
The settlement agreement also
that had not yet been marketed.
included a forum selection clause indicating that “[a]ny dispute
between the Parties relating to or arising out of this [Settlement
Agreement] shall be prosecuted exclusively in the . . . District of New
2062
Mexico.”
Thereafter, Leviton filed a complaint with the ITC and in the
Northern District of California against GPG and its distributors,
alleging infringement of two new patents that were continuations of
2063
the two patents upon which the settlement agreement was based.
GPG informed Leviton that it believed it had a license to practice the
newly asserted patents under the settlement agreement and that
Leviton was required to bring its case in the District of New Mexico
2064
pursuant to the agreement’s forum selection clause.
Failing to
reach agreement, GPG filed suit in the District of New Mexico
seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and
2065
breach of contract.
GPG also sought a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction against Leviton’s litigation of the dispute
2066
outside of New Mexico.
The district court granted the preliminary
injunction, finding a likelihood of success on the merits “because
GPG had asserted a defense of implied license, which likely triggered
the forum selection clause, and because GPG was likely to succeed on
2067
The district court also found that the
the merits of this defense.”
other three preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm,

2059. Id. at 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2060. Id. at 1357, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
2061. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277–78.
2062. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2063. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2064. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2065. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2066. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2067. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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balance of hardships, and public interest—favored entry of the
2068
2069
Leviton appealed.
injunction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the four traditional
2070
factors of a preliminary injunction analysis,
noting that in cases
“involving an injunction against participation in a district court suit
for patent infringement and an ITC investigation under section 337
of the Tariff Act,” the Federal Circuit applies its own procedural
2071
Federal Circuit law required the court to sustain its grant or
law.
denial of a preliminary injunction unless the district court had
abused its discretion, or applied an erroneous legal standard or
2072
clearly erroneous findings of fact.
The Federal Circuit first considered GPG’s likelihood of success on
2073
the merits, specifically with respect to the forum selection clause.
2074
the
Applying its holding in Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc.,
court determined that the case “relates to or arises out of” the
settlement agreement because the outcome of the dispute regarding
the scope of the settlement agreement would determine whether
2075
Leviton could sustain its infringement action.
The Federal Circuit next considered GPG’s likelihood of success
2076
The court noted that the
on its implied license defense.
controlling case on the implied license question is TransCore, LP v.
2077
Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.,
and the court reaffirmed
that “legal estoppel refers to a narrow[] category of conduct
encompassing scenarios where a patentee has licensed or assigned a
right, received consideration, and then sought to derogate from the
2078
right granted.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Leviton’s attempts to
2079
distinguish TransCore.
First, the court attributed no importance to the fact that the claims
2068. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2069. Id. at 1359, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2070. Id. at 1359–66, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278–84.
2071. Id. at 1359, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (citing Tex. Instruments Inc. v.
Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674, 1676 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
2072. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (citing Tex. Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1328, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676).
2073. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278–79.
2074. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2075. Gen. Protecht, 651 F.3d at 1359, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2076. Id. at 1360–63, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279–82.
2077. 563 F.3d 1271, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2078. Gen. Protecht, 651 F.3d at 1360, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (alteration in
original) (quoting TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1279, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2079. Id. at 1361–63, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280–82.
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in the continuation applications were narrower than the previously
2080
The continuation claims were based on the same
asserted claims.
disclosure as the previously licensed patents, and the same products
2081
were accused in the earlier and present suits.
Thus, by filing the
new suits, “Leviton’s actions . . . unquestionably derogated from
2082
GPG’s rights under the Settlement Agreement.”
The court noted
that if Leviton did not intend its license of these products to extend
to claims in continuation patents, “it had an obligation to make that
2083
clear.”
Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that:
where, as here, continuations issue from parent patents that
previously have been licensed as to certain products, it may be
presumed that, absent a clear indication of mutual intent to the
contrary, those products are impliedly licensed under the
continuations as well. If the parties intend otherwise, it is their
2084
burden to make such intent clear in the license.

Second, the Federal Circuit rejected Leviton’s argument that the
mutual intent of the parties distinguished the case from the facts in
2085
TransCore.
Specifically, the court rejected Leviton’s assertion that
the parties intended the Settlement Agreement to be a “walk away”
2086
agreement that preserved Leviton’s rights to sue on other patents.
While the court acknowledged that the settlement agreement
contained language indicating the possibility of future litigation
between the parties, the agreement did not “address the question of
whether the parties intended that continuations could be asserted
2087
against the same products.”
Since Leviton did not reserve this
right, the court reasoned that “[t]he question of mutual intent . . . is
2088
controlled by TransCore.”
Finally, the court also rejected Leviton’s argument that TransCore
does not apply because it conflicts with Jacobs v. Nintendo of America,
2089
Inc., an earlier Federal Circuit decision that Leviton alleged should
2090
While the court acknowledged
control as the first-decided case.
that Jacobs had stated that a covenant not to sue was sufficient to
release an accused infringer of liability for infringement, Leviton
2080.
2081.
2082.
2083.
2084.
2085.
2086.
2087.
2088.
2089.
2090.

Id. at 1361–62, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280–81.
Id. at 1361, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id. at 1362, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
370 F.3d 1097, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Gen. Protecht, 651 F.3d at 1362–63, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281–82.
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admitted that Jacobs did not hold that a covenant not to sue does not
2091
Rather, Leviton’s position was that
give rise to an implied license.
2092
Jacobs supported its argument only “by negative inference.”
Thus,
the Federal Circuit concluded that “nothing in the reasoning or
holding of Jacobs that conflicts with TransCore or supports, by
‘negative inference’ or otherwise, the proposition advanced by
2093
Leviton.”
The Federal Circuit then analyzed the remaining factors in
determining a preliminary injunction: irreparable harm to the
2094
moving party, balance of the hardships, and public interest.
The
court agreed with GPG that the district court properly found that
GPG would likely be irreparably harmed in the absence of a
preliminary injunction because it would be deprived of its bargainedfor forum and would likely be forced to litigate the same issues on
2095
multiple fronts at the same time.
The court also concluded that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
balance of hardships favored the injunction for essentially the same
2096
reasons.
Further, the Federal Circuit determined that public policy favors
2097
The court rejected Leviton’s
enforcing the forum selection clause.
argument that the injunction contravenes public interest by
hindering an ITC investigation because the injunction would not
2098
enjoin the ITC action; rather, the injunction enjoined Leviton.
The Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]here is no public interest
served by excusing a party’s violation of its previously negotiated
contractual undertaking to litigate in a particular forum,” and thus
2099
affirmed the district court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction.
C. Damages
Title 35 of the United States code, § 284 provides that, “[u]pon
finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
2091. Id. at 1363, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281–82.
2092. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2093. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
2094. Id. at 1363–66, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282–84.
2095. Id. at 1363–65, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282–83.
2096. See id. at 1365, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (noting that, while GPG would
have to litigate on two fronts and would be deprived of its bargained-for forum,
Leviton could realize the same relief in district court as in the ITC).
2097. Id. at 1365–66, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283–84.
2098. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2099. Id. at 1366, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
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In
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”
2011, the Federal Circuit had several occasions to address the
calculation of reasonable royalties, but perhaps the most significant
decision was the Federal Circuit’s wholesale rejection of the “25
percent rule” as a “fundamentally flawed tool” for determining a
2101
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.
1.

Notice
Title 35 of the United States Code, § 287(a) provides in part that,
[i]n the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered
by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof
that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued
to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered
2102
only for infringement occurring after such notice.

As discussed in Part II.F., the Federal Circuit found actual notice of
2103
In particular, Monsanto
infringement in Monsanto Co. v. Bowman.
Co. sent Bowman a letter in 1999 specifically notifying Bowman of
Monsanto’s patents covering Roundup Ready soybeans and
informing Bowman that the “[p]lanting of seed that is covered by a
patent would be making the patented invention and using the
2104
patented invention.”
The district court’s record contained this
letter, and the record was attached to Bowman’s memorandum in
2105
The
opposition to Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment.
letter:
(1) identified the allegedly infringing product (Roundup Ready
soybeans), (2) enclosed a Technology Agreement identifying the
patents covering the Roundup Ready soybeans, (3) explained that
Bowman would infringe the identified patents by planting any
unlicensed Roundup Ready seeds, and (4) informed Bowman that
he could not pay a fee to save Roundup Ready seeds, but may
license seeds only through the purchase of new seeds subject to the
2106
Technology Agreement.

The Federal Circuit found that the letter was an “affirmative
communication to the alleged infringer of a specific charge of

2100. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
2101. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1203, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 420 F. App’x. 992 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
2102. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
2103. 657 F.3d 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2104. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2105. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
2106. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
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2107

and was
infringement by a specific accused product or device,”
“sufficiently specific to support an objective understanding that the
2108
recipient may be an infringer.”
Thus, the court concluded that
Bowman planted Roundup Ready seeds with actual notice that
2109
Monsanto considered this activity to infringe its patents.
Accordingly, because the Federal Circuit held that Bowman received
actual notice under § 287(a), the court did not need to reach the
issue of constructive notice through marking, and Monsanto was
2110
entitled to recover damages for infringement.
2.

Lost profits
In Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
2111
Plastics, Inc., the Federal Circuit clarified the degree to which a jury
2112
In that case, the
is permitted to consider lost profit damages.
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to permit the
jury to consider lost profit damages, but ultimately vacated and
remanded the district court’s reduction of the jury’s damages
2113
award.
The Federal Circuit first considered Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc.’s argument that the district court erred by allowing the
jury to consider lost profits damages because Siemens Medical
Solutions USA, Inc. failed to demonstrate that it would have made
2114
Saint-Gobain’s sales “but for” the infringement.
In particular,
Saint-Gobain argued that there was a three-supplier, not a twosupplier market, and that it could have switched to an available
2115
acceptable noninfringing alternative.
The court, however,
determined that the lost profits award was supported by substantial
evidence, including that (1) the products manufactured by the
alleged third supplier did not compete in the same market, and (2)
the alleged alternative was not available at the time of the
infringement and was not an acceptable alternative because it had
2107. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d
1334, 1345, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2108. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs.
Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1373, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2109. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
2110. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
2111. 637 F.3d 1269, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 647 F.3d 1373, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2112. Id. at 1287–89, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09.
2113. Id. at 1274–75, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
2114. Id. at 1287–89, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09.
2115. Id. at 1288, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
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several disadvantages as compared to the patented and accused
2116
Accordingly, the court held that the district court did
products.
not commit legal error by permitting the jury to consider lost profits
2117
damages.
The Federal Circuit next determined that the district court did not
err by reducing the jury’s damages award in light of evidence
suggesting that the defendant made, but did not sell, all of the
2118
The court, however, concluded that
infringing products at issue.
the district court erred by failing to consider any damages related to
“mak[ing]” the products that might not have been sold because the
2119
evidence indicated that the products were manufactured.
The
Federal Circuit stated that a district court that “eliminates a lost
profits award with regard to a portion of the infringing devices . . .
must then determine an appropriate measure of damages for that
2120
portion.”
The court thus vacated and remanded on the issue of
2121
damages from the additional products that were manufactured.
3.

Reasonable royalty
Given the difficulties of proving lost-profit damages, many
patentees resort to seeking a reasonable royalty. In 2011, the Federal
Circuit had several occasions to consider and clarify methods of
calculating royalties and permissible ranges of reasonable royalty
2122
awards.
2123
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit rejected
the “25 percent rule” for calculating infringement damages as a
fundamentally flawed tool for determining a royalty rate in a

2116. Id. at 1288–89, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09.
2117. Id. at 1289, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
2118. Id. at 1289–90, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909–10.
2119. See id. at 1290, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (noting that “[o]ne who ‘makes’
a patented invention without authorization infringes the patent” (citing 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (2006))).
2120. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (citing Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v.
TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1355, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953,
1963–64 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The Federal Circuit stated that failure to determine an
appropriate measure of damages for that portion overlooks the requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 284 that damages be “adequate to compensate for the infringement.” Id., 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
2121. Id. at 1291, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11.
2122. See, e.g., Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d
1292, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 420 F. App’x
992 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2123. 632 F.3d 1292, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 420 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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In reaching this conclusion, the court,
hypothetical negotiation.
inter alia, affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial on damages
2125
and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited asserted U.S.
Patent No. 5,490,216 (“the ’216 patent”) against Microsoft
Corporation, claiming that Microsoft’s Product Activation feature
2126
infringed the ’216 patent.
On remand following a first appeal, the
jury, after hearing testimony from Uniloc’s expert applying the 25
percent rule and indicating that the entire market value was $19
billion, returned a verdict of, inter alia, infringement and awarded
2127
The district court granted a new
Uniloc $388 million in damages.
trial on damages on the improper use of the entire market value rule,
but rejected Microsoft’s arguments challenging the 25 percent
2128
rule.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the 25 percent rule and
2129
Uniloc’s expert’s application of the entire market value rule.
The
court noted its passive toleration of the 25 percent rule where the
rule’s acceptability was not the focus of an appeal, but held that “the
25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation”
because it is “an abstract and largely theoretical construct [that] fails
to satisfy [the] fundamental requirement” of providing “a basis in fact
to associate the royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular
2130
hypothetical negotiation at issue in the case.”
Rather than starting
with an arbitrary number of 25 percent, evidence of a reasonable
royalty “must be tied to the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case at issue,” such as the particular technology, industry,
2131
or party.
Thus, the court held that Microsoft was entitled to a new
trial on damages because the testimony of Uniloc’s expert was
2132
“inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected Uniloc’s expert’s application of
the entire market value rule, even as a check on the damages
calculation because it was undisputed that the Product Activation
feature did not create the basis for customer demand or substantially

2124.
2125.
2126.
2127.
2128.
2129.
2130.
2131.
2132.

Id. at 1315, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
Id. at 1323, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
Id. at 1295, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
Id. at 1300–01, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210–11.
Id. at 1301, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
Id. at 1312–18, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220–24.
Id. at 1315–17, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222–24.
Id. at 1317–18, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
Id. at 1315, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
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2133

Thus, the disclosure of
create the value of the component parts.
the $19 billion revenue figure “skew[ed] the damages horizon for the
2134
jury.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of a new trial on damages and expressed no opinion on the
excessiveness or reasonableness of the damages awarded by the
2135
jury.
2136
In Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed a
question of reasonable royalties and affirmed the district court’s
determination that defendants Cordis Corporation and Norman
Noble, Inc. willfully infringed Spectralytics, Inc.’s U.S. Patent No.
2137
5,852,277 (“the ’277 patent”) and that a 5 percent royalty should
2138
apply to Noble’s infringing sales.
The Federal Circuit held that the 5 percent royalty awarded by the
2139
The court explained that a
jury to Spectralytics was not excessive.
party challenging a jury damages verdict “must show that the award is,
in view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high or so
outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of a
2140
reasonable royalty.”
The court also noted that, in accordance with
35 U.S.C. § 284, the damages awarded should be “in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
2141
infringer.”
Because expert testimony established that a 20 percent
royalty was reasonable and appropriate in light of the trade practices
and the economic and competitive circumstances, and given that
Spectralytics did not appeal the jury’s 5 percent royalty rate, the court
concluded that the jury’s choice of a 5 percent royalty rate was not
2142
“outrageously high” and therefore not excessive.
2143
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the Federal Circuit, inter alia,
affirmed the district court’s denial of Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.’s

2133. Id. at 1318–21, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226–27.
2134. Id. at 1320, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
2135. Id. at 1323, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
2136. 649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
2137. Id. at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021–22.
2138. Id. at 1347, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
2139. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
2140. Id. at 1345, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018–19 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2141. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2142. Id. at 1347, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
2143. 663 F.3d 1221, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1409, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2012). The
facts are discussed in detail in Part V.A, supra.
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JMOL on the issue of damages and the district court’s award of
2144
attorneys’ fees.
The Federal Circuit rejected Home Depot’s challenges to the
2145
calculation of a reasonable royalty.
First, the court explained that a
reasonable royalty could be larger than Powell’s expected profits had
he sold the saw guards to Home Depot because (1) a reasonable
royalty is based on a hypothetical negotiation as of the time of
infringement, whereas the potential sale of the guards would have
2146
occurred several years prior; and (2) “[w]hile either the infringer’s
or the patentee’s profit expectation may be considered in the overall
reasonable royalty analysis, neither is an absolute limit to the amount
of the reasonable royalty that may be awarded upon a reasoned
2147
hypothetical negotiation analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors.”
Second, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the jury’s reasonable
royalty calculation was supported by substantial evidence primarily
because it fell within the range proposed by Powell’s damages
2148
expert.
The court reiterated that “[t]he jury was entitled to choose
a damages award within the amounts advocated by the opposing
2149
parties.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the damages
award was not “so outrageously high . . . as to be unsupportable as an
2150
estimation of a reasonably royalty.”
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Home Depot’s motion
2151
for JMOL on the issue of damages.
4.

Enhanced damages
2152
District courts have discretion whether to enhance damages.

2144. Powell, 663 F.3d at 1241–42, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
2145. Id. at 1237–41, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752–55.
2146. Id. at 1238, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
2147. Id. at 1238–39, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (citing Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
2148. Id. at 1239–40, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753–55.
2149. Id. at 1241, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (quoting Spectralytics, Inc. v.
Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12,
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2150. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (alteration in original) (quoting Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2151. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755. Without significant analysis, the Federal
Circuit also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its determination
that this case was “exceptional” based on Home Depot’s “litigation misconduct and
vexatious and bad faith litigation,” and since Powell was the “prevailing party” under
35 U.S.C. § 285, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of attorneys’
fees. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2152. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1469, 44
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One context in which damages may be enhanced is following a
2153
In Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis
finding of willful infringement.
2154
Corp., the Federal Circuit clarified the extent to which a finding of
willful infringement may be considered in the context of the nine
2155
factors from Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. —factors that may be relevant
to determining enhancement of damages—and found that the
district court abused its discretion in denying Spectralytics’ request
2156
2157
for enhanced damages.
In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, an en
banc Federal Circuit set forth a willful infringement standard by
which failure to exercise due care by obtaining an exculpatory
opinion of counsel before commencing infringing activity was not of
2158
itself probative of willful infringement.
The Federal Circuit noted,
however, that Read set forth a “distinct and separate” enhanced
2159
According to Read, one relevant factor is
damages standard.
2160
whether there was an adequate investigation of patent rights.
The
Federal Circuit explained that “Seagate removed the presumption of
willful infringement flowing from an infringer’s failure to exercise
due care to avoid infringement, but Seagate did not change the
application of the Read factors with respect to enhancement of
damages when willful infringement under [35 U.S.C.] § 285 is
2161
found.”
In Spectralytics, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court erred in applying the Seagate willful infringement standard,
while discounting the Read enhanced damages criterion of whether
there was adequate investigation of adverse patent rights after willful
2162
infringement is found.
Thus, the Federal Circuit vacated and

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
2153. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
2154. 649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
2155. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Read, the
Federal Circuit identified factors that may be relevant to determination of whether
damages should be enhanced: (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the
ideas or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s
patent, investigated the patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or
that it was not infringed; (3) the infringer’s behavior in the litigation; (4) the
infringer’s size and financial condition; (5) the closeness of the case; (6) the
duration of the misconduct; (7) the remedial action by the infringer; (8) the
infringer’s motivation for harm; and (9) whether the infringer attempted to conceal
its misconduct. Id. at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435–36.
2156. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021.
2157. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
2158. Id. at 1368–69, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868–69.
2159. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348–49, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2160. Read, 970 F.2d at 829, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
2161. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021.
2162. Id. at 1348–49, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021.
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2163

Prejudgment interest
As noted above, 35 U.S.C. § 284 enables a successful complainant
2164
An agreement
to recover “interest and costs as fixed by the court.”
to the contrary, however, can preclude such an award, as was the case
2165
in Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc.
In that case, the Federal Circuit,
inter alia, reversed the district court’s decision to award SanofiAventis prejudgment interest in addition to actual damages specified
2166
by its settlement agreement with Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.
The dispute underlying this third appeal to the Federal Circuit
began in November 2001 when Apotex filed an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) seeking approval for the sale of generic
clopidogrel bisulfate tablets, marketed by Sanofi under the brand
name Plavix, before the expiration of U.S. Patent No. 4,847,265 (“the
2167
’265 patent”).
Apotex’s ANDA included a paragraph IV
2168
In response, Sanofi filed suit in
certification asserting invalidity.
2169
March 2002, alleging infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
Apotex counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of invalidity and
2170
unenforceability.
Prior to FDA approval, Sanofi and Apotex reached a tentative
2171
settlement agreement (“the March 2006 agreement”).
Under the
March 2006 agreement, Sanofi granted Apotex a future license under
the ’265 patent to sell Apotex’s generic product before patent
2172
expiration.
Sanofi also promised not to launch an authorized
2173
As a result of prior
generic during the pendency of the license.
litigation involving Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”), a
holding company of one of the plaintiffs, the March 2006 agreement
was subject to approval by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
2174
a consortium of state attorneys general.
The FTC objected to the

2163.
2164.
2165.
2166.
2167.
2168.
2169.
2170.
2171.
2172.
2173.
2174.

Id. at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021–22.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
659 F.3d 1171, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1183, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
Id. at 1174, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id. at 1175, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
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March 2006 agreement, including the provision precluding Sanofi’s
2175
launch of an authorized generic.
In response, Sanofi withdrew the March 2006 agreement and the
parties negotiated a second agreement in May 2006 (“the May 2006
2176
agreement”).
The May 2006 agreement did not expressly include
the limitation regarding authorized generics, but the BMS executive
negotiating on behalf of Sanofi orally promised that Sanofi would not
launch an authorized generic during the pendency of Apotex’s
2177
license.
BMS submitted the May 2006 agreement with certification
2178
Apotex,
for FTC approval, but did not disclose its oral promise.
2179
In
however, disclosed the oral promise to the FTC a week later.
response, the state attorneys general informed the parties that they
would not approve the May 2006 agreement, but promised to
2180
reconsider following an investigation into the oral agreement.
In July 2006, Apotex invoked its right under the May 2006
agreement to declare a regulatory denial and launched its generic
2181
product eight days later, prior to expiration of the ’265 patent.
Sanofi moved for a preliminary injunction, and the district court
2182
granted Sanofi’s motion.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
2183
Following a bench trial on
preliminary injunction in a first appeal.
liability, the district court held the ’265 patent not invalid and not
2184
unenforceable.
Infringement was not tried because Apotex
admitted to infringement under § 271(e)(2) and Sanofi never
amended its complaint to assert infringement under § 271(a)–(b)
2185
following Apotex’s generic product sales.
The district court’s
2186
decision was affirmed in a second appeal to the Federal Circuit.
Sanofi moved for summary judgment on damages and the district
court granted Sanofi’s motion, awarding 50% of Apotex’s net sales,
2187
per the May 2006 agreement, and prejudgment interest.
In
awarding prejudgment interest, the district court rejected Apotex’s
2175. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
2176. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
2177. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
2178. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
2179. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2180. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759. The government pursued charges against
BMS for failing to disclose the oral agreement and false certification to the FTC,
ultimately resulting in an admission of a violation by BMS and payment of a civil
penalty. Id. at 1176, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2181. Id. at 1175, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2182. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2183. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2184. Id. at 1176, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2185. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2186. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
2187. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759–60.
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arguments that the May 2006 agreement precluded such an award
and that prejudgment interest was not an available remedy under §
2188
2189
Apotex appealed.
271(e)(4)(c).
The Federal Circuit first determined that the district court erred by
2190
awarding prejudgment interest in light of the May 2006 agreement.
Specifically, the May 2006 agreement provided that “Sanofi agrees that
its actual damages for any past infringement by Apotex, up to the date on
which Apotex is enjoined, will be 50% of Apotex’s net sales of clopidogrel
products. . . . Sanofi further agrees that it will not seek increased
2191
damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.”
The court concluded that the
parties intended the phrase “actual damages” to include “all damages
2192
necessary to compensate Sanofi for Apotex’s infringement.”
Further, because prejudgment interest is a form of compensatory
damages, an additional award of prejudgment interest was not
2193
warranted.
The court construed the May 2006 agreement as supporting its
interpretation of “actual damages” by allowing Sanofi “actual
damages” but expressly excluding increased damages under § 284,
2194
which the court classified as punitive.
Additionally, the court
noted that in another section of the May 2006 agreement, the parties
expressly stated that prejudgment interest should be awarded and
specified how to calculate such interest, but did not do so when
2195
discussing actual damages.
The Federal Circuit rejected Sanofi’s
argument that it did not need to preserve the right to prejudgment
2196
interest because it has a statutory right to interest under § 284.
While acknowledging the “general rule awarding interest on damages
in patent infringement actions” in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, the court concluded that the May 2006 agreement was
2197
an agreement to the contrary.
Considering the May 2006
agreement as a whole and the principle that “[t]he law strongly favors
the settlement of all litigation, including patent disputes,” the Federal
Circuit held that “[b]y agreeing to a formula to calculate Sanofi’s

2188. Id. at 1177, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
2189. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
2190. Id. at 1178, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
2191. Id. at 1177, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2192. Id. at 1178, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761.
2193. Id. at 1178–79, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761.
2194. Id. at 1179, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761.
2195. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
2196. Id. at 1179–80, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
2197. Id. at 1180, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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‘actual damages’ in the May 2006 agreement, Sanofi gave up any
right to supplement its recovery with additional prejudgment
2198
interest.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant
2199
of prejudgment interest.
6.

Costs
While a prevailing party may recover costs in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the Federal Circuit
clarified the required elements of proof before a prevailing party may
recover copying costs related to its own document production in In re
2200
Ricoh Co. Patent Litigation.
In that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s award
of costs to Synopsys, Inc. under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and remanded for
2201
further proceedings.
Ricoh Co., Ltd. owns U.S. Patent No. 4,922,432 (“the ’432 patent”),
which claims a system and process for designing application-specific
2202
integrated circuits.
In January 2003, Ricoh asserted the ’432 patent
against several of Synopsys’s customers, and Synopsys responded by
2203
filing a declaratory judgment action against Ricoh.
Ultimately, the
district court granted Synopsys’s motion for summary judgment of
2204
noninfringement.
Ricoh appealed, and the Federal Circuit
2205
affirmed.
After judgment was entered, Synopsys, as the prevailing party, filed
2206
a bill of costs.
Ricoh contested the bill of costs and, ultimately, the
2207
Ricoh again
trial court awarded Synopsys nearly $939,000.
appealed, challenging three categories of costs: (1) the costs of an
electronic document database under § 1920(4); (2) exemplification
fees and copy costs under § 1920(4); and (3) deposition and
2198. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
2199. Id. at 1183, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765. Judge Newman dissented in part
on the issue of prejudgment interest because she agreed with the district court that
the May 2006 agreement did not alter the general rule that prejudgment interest is
awarded on damages for patent infringement. Id. at 1184–86, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1765 (Newman, J., dissenting in part). In her view, “[i]f the parties had intended
to prevent the award of interest they would have done so explicitly [because] the
award of interest is the statutory rule, not the exception.” Id. at 1184, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1766.
2200. 661 F.3d 1361, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1793 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2201. Id. at 1370–71, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
2202. Id. at 1363, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2203. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2204. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2205. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2206. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2207. Id. at 1363–64,100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
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2208

interpreter costs under § 1920(2) and (6), respectively.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s award of
$235,000 to Synopsys for a third-party electronic document database
2209
maintained by Stratify.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that such
costs were taxable as a means of document production because
electronic production of documents “can constitute ‘exemplification’
2210
The Federal Circuit
or ‘making copies’ under section 1920(4).”
determined, however, that because the parties had contractually
agreed during the litigation to share the cost of Stratify and never
indicated that the cost-sharing was only temporary, the parties’
2211
agreement was controlling.
Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s award of approximately $235,000 for Synopsys’s share
2212
of the database.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding approximately $323,000 in document copying
costs because Synopsys failed to establish its costs as required by §
2213
1920.
The Federal Circuit concluded that it was unable to
determine from Synopsys’s Revised Bill of Costs which documents
2214
Synopsis reproduced and to whom the documents were provided.
The court noted that, for a prevailing party to recover copying costs
related to its own document production, the party must establish in
connection with its Bill of Costs:
(1) “that the reproduced
documents were produced by it pursuant to Rule 26 or other
discovery rules;” (2) “that they were copied at the prevailing party’s
expense and at the request of the opposing party;” and (3) “that the
2215
copies were tendered to the opposing party.”
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court so the
parties could demonstrate which copies were produced pursuant to

2208. Id. at 1364, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
2209. Id. at 1364–67, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795–96.
2210. Id. at 1365, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795 (citing BDT Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit noted
that Congress amended § 1920(4) in 2008 by replacing the phrase “copies of papers”
with “making copies of any materials,” thus including the production of electronic
documents. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795 (citing Judicial Administration and
Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, § 6, 122 Stat. 4291, 4292
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1920).
2211. Id. at 1366–67, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796. The Federal Circuit
determined that the parties can agree to exceed or limit the allowable costs under §
1920 by contract. Id. at 1366, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.
2212. Id. at 1367, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.
2213. Id. at 1368, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
2214. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
2215. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797.
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2216

the rules of discovery and ultimately provided to Ricoh.
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the trial court’s award
of approximately $131,000 for transcriptions of depositions and
interpreter fees incurred during those depositions was not an abuse
2217
The court concluded that Ninth Circuit law clearly
of discretion.
stated that “a document need not be offered as evidence to have been
necessarily obtained for use in the case,” in accordance with §
2218
1920.
Thus, the district court did not err by including the costs for
all the depositions taken after determining that it was reasonable to
2219
expect they were for the purpose of trial preparation.
Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the award of costs for paper and
videotaped depositions as well as the costs for interpreters because
translation was necessary in connection with several of the
2220
depositions.
7.

Attorneys’ fees
Title 35 of the United States Code, § 285 permits a court to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in exceptional
2221
cases.
The Federal Circuit in 2011 reviewed instances where
attorneys’ fees were awarded for willful infringement, litigation
misconduct, and the filing of a baseless infringement action in bad
2222
faith for an improper purpose.
2223
also discussed above, the
In Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Spectralytics’
request for attorneys’ fees, and remanded the case for
2224
reconsideration.
The court explained that, although attorneys’
2216. Id. at 1368–69, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. The Federal Circuit also
indicated that the district court could “make a reasonable estimate of recoverable
copying costs based on an estimate of the total number of pages of discovery that
Ricoh requested be copied multiplied by a reasonable price per page.” Id. at 1369,
100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
2217. Id. at 1369–70, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798–99.
2218. Id. at 1369, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798 (citing Hagen-Dazs Co. v. Double
Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
2219. Id. at 1370, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
2220. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
2221. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
2222. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1320, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1522, 1526–27 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reviewing the assessment of attorneys’ fees
following a finding of various acts of litigation misconduct and the filing of baseless
infringement), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3531(U.S. Jan. 9, 2012) (No. 111112); Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1012, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reviewing the district court’s failure to assign attorney’s
fees following a finding of willful infringement), reh’g en banc denied, No. 2009-1564,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
2223. 649 F.3d 1336, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2009-1564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).
2224. Id. at 1349, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
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fees are not mandatorily awarded when willful infringement has been
found, precedent establishes that the district court should explain its
2225
Because the
decision when it chooses not to award attorneys’ fees.
district court did not separately analyze the issue of attorneys’ fees
but instead denied attorneys’ fees and enhanced damages in
conjunction, the Federal Circuit concluded that reconsideration of
2226
the request for attorneys’ fees was warranted.
2227
In Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and
2228
thus affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Eon-Net LP asserted several related patents claiming document
2229
processing systems against Flagstar Bancorp.
Before the district
court, Flagstar moved for summary judgment of noninfringement
because its document processing system was licensed from one of
2230
Eon-Net’s licensees.
Flagstar also moved for sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, alleging that Eon-Net did not
investigate or identify Flagstar’s allegedly infringing products prior to
2231
suit, rendering Eon-Net’s infringement allegations baseless.
The
district court granted both of Flagstar’s motions, and assessed
attorneys’ fees and costs against Eon-Net and its counsel
2232
(“Zimmerman”).
Eon-Net appealed the rulings, and the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded “because the district court failed to afford Eon-Net notice
and the opportunity to present its infringement and claim
2233
construction arguments during the briefing on the motions.”
On
remand, Eon-Net added infringement allegations for additional
patents and the district court construed the disputed claim terms to
require that the information being processed originate from a hard
2234
copy document.
In light of the district court’s construction, EonNet stipulated to noninfringement and Flagstar moved for attorneys’
fees and costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and renewed its Rule 11
2235
motion.
The district court granted Flagstar’s motions, finding the

2225. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood
Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
2226. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
2227. 653 F.3d 1314, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1522 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2228. Id. at 1323–24, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
2229. Id. at 1316–19, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2230. Id. at 1319, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2231. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2232. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2233. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2234. Id. at 1319–20, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2235. Id. at 1320, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
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2236

Eoncase exceptional and sanctioning Eon-Net and its counsel.
2237
Net and Zimmerman appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim
2238
construction and exceptional case finding.
The court applied a
two-step analysis to determine how attorneys’ fees should be assessed
2239
under § 285.
“First, a district court must determine whether the
prevailing party has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
2240
“Second, if the district court finds the case to
case is exceptional.”
be exceptional, the court must then determine whether an award of
attorney fees is appropriate and, if fees are appropriate, the amount
2241
of the award.”
Eon-Net appealed the district court’s exceptional
case finding but not the court’s determination of attorneys’ fees and
2242
costs.
The Federal Circuit noted that district court based its exceptional
case finding on Eon-Net’s litigation misconduct and its filing of a
baseless infringement action in bad faith for an improper purpose
2243
(i.e., bringing a lawsuit to obtain a nuisance value settlement).
The court determined that “[i]n toto, Eon-Net has failed to show that
the district court’s findings regarding Eon-Net’s litigation misconduct
2244
were clearly erroneous.”
The district court’s findings included that
Eon-Net: (1) destroyed relevant documents prior to the initiation of
its lawsuit against Flagstar and intentionally failed to implement a
document retention plan; (2) did not offer a claim construction for
any disputed claim terms, lodged incomplete and misleading
extrinsic evidence with the court, submitted declarations that
contradicted earlier testimony, and thus did not act in good faith
while engaging the claim construction process; (3) displayed a “lack
of regard for the judicial system;” and (4) had a “‘cavalier attitude’
2245
towards the ‘patent litigation process as a whole.’”
The Federal
2236. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526–27.
2237. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
2238. Id. at 1317, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
2239. Id. at 1323, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
2240. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529 (citing Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
339 F.3d 1324, 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1684–85 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The
Federal Circuit noted that it reviews the district court’s application of the proper
legal standard de novo and the district court’s exceptional case finding for clear
error. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529 (citation omitted).
2241. Id. at 1323–24, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc)).
2242. Id. at 1324, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
2243. Id. at 1320, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2244. Id. at 1326, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
2245. Id. at 1324–25, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530–31 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Circuit also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Eon-Net pursued objectively baseless infringement claims
because the written description of the patents-in-suit requires that the
information processed originate from a hard copy document, thus
2246
clearly claim construction.
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the record supported the
district court’s determination that Eon-Net acted in bad faith by
exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a
2247
nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.
The district court found
that Eon-Net and its related entities had filed over one hundred
lawsuits alleging infringement of one or more of the related patents,
and each complaint was followed by a “demand for a quick settlement
2248
at a price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation.”
While
the court agreed with Eon-Net that vigorously enforcing its patent
rights or offering standard licensing terms was not improper, “the
appetite for licensing revenue cannot overpower a litigant’s and its
counsel’s obligation to file cases reasonably based in law and fact and
2249
to litigate those cases in good faith.”
8.

Joint and several liability
In 2011, the Federal Circuit rejected a party’s attempt to avoid
2250
liability for damages in Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc.,
where the
Federal Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the district court’s holding that
Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp. were jointly and severally liable for
2251
Sanofi-Aventis’s damages.
In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected
Apotex’s argument that Apotex Inc. was not liable for damages under
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) because “Apotex Corp. alone imported the
2252
drug and made [the] commercial sales in the United States.”
The
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the May 2006
agreement governed liability because (1) the agreement broadly
defined “Apotex” as including “Apotex Inc.” and “Apotex Corp.”; (2)
the Chairman and CEO of Apotex Inc. signed the agreement on
behalf of both Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.; and (3) the parties
stipulated that “the acts of Apotex Corp. with respect to the subject
matter of this action were done at the direction of, with the
authorization of and with the cooperation, participation and
2246.
2247.
2248.
2249.
2250.
2251.
2252.

Id. at 1326, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
Id. at 1328, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
Id. at 1326–27, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
Id. at 1328, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
659 F.3d 1171, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1180–81, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
Id. at 1181, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
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assistance of Apotex Inc.”
2254
severally liable.

1001

Thus, Apotex Inc. was jointly and

IX. MISCELLANEOUS—ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF LIABILITY
A. False Marking
Title 35 of the United States Code, § 292(a) provides for a $500
fine for every offense whereby one “marks upon, or affixes to, or uses
in advertising” the word “patent” (or any word or number suggesting
the article is patented) on an unpatented article, for the purpose of
2255
deceiving the public.
A party alleging false marking pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 292 must establish the marking of an unpatented article and
2256
Prior to enactment of the America
intent to deceive the public.
2257
Invents Act (AIA), false marking also conferred standing on private
2258
The AIA
parties to bring qui tam actions in district court.
retroactively eliminates the qui tam provision, limiting standing to
recover damages under the statute to the United States and persons
2259
who have suffered a competitive injury as a result of false marking.
2260
Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, discussed below, applies § 292 as it
2261
stood prior to enactment of the AIA.
The AIA also provides for
virtual marking, wherein notice that an article is patented may be
provided through directions to an Internet site that “associates the
2262
patented article with the number of the patent.”
Should the
associated patent expire, however, virtual marking does not give rise
2263
to liability under § 292.
The Federal Circuit has held that in the context of § 292, an
“unpatented article” is an article “not covered by at least one claim of
2264
each patent with which the article is marked.”
In Juniper, the
Federal Circuit further clarified the definition of “unpatented article”
2253. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2254. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
2255. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006).
2256. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2257. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
2258. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Forest Grp., 590 F.3d at 1303–04, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1102–03.
2259. § 16 (b)(1)–(2) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(a)–(b)).
2260. 643 F.3d 1346, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1491 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2261. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495–96.
2262. § 16 (a)(1) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(a)).
2263. § 16 (b)(3) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 292(c)).
2264. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1598, 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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2265

Juniper Networks, Inc. appealed the district
to include websites.
court’s second dismissal of its false marking qui tam action for failure
2266
to state a claim.
Juniper asserted that Shipley maintained a website
2267
One 1997 post featured
that posted current projects of hackers.
project called Dynamic Firewall with a notation that the project was
2268
patent pending.
After Shipley’s patents issued in 2000 and 2001,
respectively, Shipley updated the Dynamic Firewall project
2269
announcement on the website to include the patent number.
Juniper later learned that the sole embodiment of Dynamic Firewall
was destroyed in 1999, prompting Juniper to sue Shipley for falsely
marking the website “and any firewall or other security products or
2270
services operating thereon.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that websites qualify as an
2271
The court explained that
“unpatented article” under the statute.
the same policy concerns implicated by falsely marking traditional
articles of manufacture or design equally apply to websites, which
“may both embody intellectual property and contain identifying
2272
markings.”
Turning to Juniper’s allegations, the court applied
2273
and held that nothing on Shipley’s website
regional circuit law
indicated that the patented software, Dynamic Firewall, was
2274
protecting the website.
Indeed, to the contrary, statements on the
website clearly established the patented software was not protecting
2275
Therefore, Juniper’s allegations against Shipley for
the website.
falsely marking its website failed to state a claim upon which the court
2276
could grant relief.
2265. Juniper, 643 F.3d at 1351, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494.
2266. Id. at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
2267. Id. at 1347–48, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
2268. Id. at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
2269. Id. at 1348–49, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492–93.
2270. Id. at 1349, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2271. Id. at 1350–51, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493–94.
2272. Id. at 1351, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494.
2273. The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to appeals of dismissals for
failure to state a claim. Id. at 1350, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493–94. Additionally,
because a false marking claim requires intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit applies
the heighted pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id., 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493–94; In re BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1310, 97
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2025, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For a more complete discussion of In
re BP Lubricants, see supra Part II.A.
2274. Juniper, 643 F.3d at 1351–52, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494–95.
2275. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1494–95 (“‘[I]t is beyond cavil that, when
considered in context, the reference to ‘functioning’ relates to the progress of the
project, not that the software was functioning or operating on the Website.’” (quoting
Juniper Networks v. Shipley, No. C 09-0696, 2010 WL 986809, at *8, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1934, 1941 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17 2010))).
2276. Id. at 1352, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
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B. Exhaustion Doctrine
Under the established doctrine of patent exhaustion, patent rights
2277
to an item are lost once the item is sold.
Patentee-licensors may be
chagrined to find, however, that their rights are exhausted based on
the language in their patent licensing agreements. For example, the
2278
Supreme Court held in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
that a licensee’s sale of component parts that substantially embody
the patent’s claims constitutes an authorized sale by the patentee and
2279
exhausted the patentee’s patents.
Thus, cases in which defendants
assert that they purchased the allegedly infringing products from a
purported licensee often turn on the court’s interpretation of the
contract that granted the license.
2280
One such case is Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC, in
which the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of
patent exhaustion where the patentee failed to discredit the
defendants’ authorized purchase of the accused products from a
2281
licensee.
Through a long series of assignments and spin-offs,
Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP owns, by assignment, the two
2282
patents-in-suit, which originally issued to AT&T Corporation.
AT&T previously licensed the same two patents to Rockwell
International Corporation, which agreement AT&T and Rockwell
amended in a 1995 Side Letter Agreement, granting Rockwell
2283
sublicensing rights.
Rockwell also experienced a reorganization
and a spin-off so that Conexant Systems, Inc. ultimately held, by
2284
Conexant sold the
assignment, a sublicense to the two patents.
allegedly infringing products to defendants, who asserted patent
2285
exhaustion in defense to Rembrandt’s infringement suit.
Rembrandt attempted to attack the validity of the series of
2286
assignments leading to Conexant’s sublicense.
The court, however,
found clear language in the contract that Rockwell could sublicense
its rights “to any future divested present business of Rockwell,” which
negated Rembrandt’s argument that Rockwell needed AT&T’s

2277. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1677 (2008).
2278. 553 U.S. 617, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008).
2279. Id. at 638, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
2280. 641 F.3d 1331, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2281. Id. at 1332, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
2282. Id. at 1333, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
2283. Id. at 1334–35, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
2284. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
2285. Id. at 1335–36, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397–98.
2286. Id. at 1336–37, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398–99.

PATENT.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1004

6/14/2012 6:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:785

2287

The court acknowledged that
written consent to grant sublicenses.
the law generally does not recognize a nonexclusive licensee’s right
to assign or further sublicense patent rights, unless a contract
2288
provides otherwise.
In this instance, the express language of AT&T
and Rockwell’s 1995 Side Letter Agreement expressly permitted such
2289
a sublicense.
The court also rejected Rembrandt’s assertion that
the products sold by Conexant were not the same as the products
Rockwell sold, which would negate the defendants’ patent exhaustion
2290
defense.
Again, the court turned to the contract language, which
did not identify specific models, referencing instead general,
2291
The court concluded that Conexant held a valid
functional terms.
sublicense, which was broad enough to cover the accused products,
2292
exhausting Rembrandt’s patent rights in those products.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held the patentee exhausted its rights
2293
in Tessera, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, where Tessera, Inc.,
the patentee-licensor, expressly authorized its licensees to sell the
2294
Tessera appealed
licensed products first and pay royalties later.
from the ITC’s decision that Tessera exhausted its patent rights as to
2295
products purchased from Tessera’s licensees.
Tessera argued that
patent exhaustion did not apply because some licensees were
indisputably late in royalty payments, rendering sales by those
2296
licensees unauthorized until such royalties were paid.
The fatal flaw in Tessera’s position, the court explained, stemmed
from its own patent licensing agreement language, which permitted
2297
payment of royalties at the end of a reporting period.
Thus,
Tessera’s licensing agreements expressly authorized licensees to sell
2298
the licensed products and pay royalties later.
Moreover, “[t]hat
some licensees subsequently renege or fall behind on their royalty
payments does not convert a once authorized sale into a non2299
authorized sale.”
The court noted that a contrary holding would
2287. Id. at 1337, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2288. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
2289. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
2290. Id. at 1338, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399–400.
2291. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399–400.
2292. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
2293. 646 F.3d 1357, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2011) (No. 11-903).
2294. Id. at 1369–71, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–78.
2295. Id. at 1363, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
2296. Id. at 1369, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–77.
2297. Id. at 1370, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
2298. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
2299. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
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produce absurd results, create uncertainty surrounding sales, “and
. . . be wholly inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of patent
exhaustion—to prohibit postsale restrictions on the use of a patented
2300
Accordingly, the court affirmed the ITC’s determination
article.”
that the sales were authorized and Tessera exhausted its patent rights
2301
in the accused products purchased from Tessera’s licensees.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has been reluctant to find patent
rights exhausted when the patented technology can replicate itself
and the patentee imposes valid, legal conditions on the invention’s
2302
use. In Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, the Federal Circuit once again
rejected a patent exhaustion defense by a grower who planted the
2303
progeny of patented, genetically engineered seeds.
Monsanto Co.
owns two patents directed to “Roundup Ready” soybeans, so-named
because the soybeans are genetically engineered to exhibit resistance
2304
to Roundup, a widely used herbicide.
All purchases of Roundup
Ready soybeans are subject to a limited-use license that restricts
2305
But
growers from saving or replanting any of the harvested crop.
Monsanto also authorizes growers to sell the seed resulting from the
harvested crop to local grain elevators as “commodity seed,” “a
2306
mixture of undifferentiated seeds harvested from various sources.”
Monsanto does not require the growers to impose restrictions on the
2307
grain elevators during the course of such a sale.
Bowman purchased Roundup Ready soybeans from one of
Monsanto’s licensees, executed the required limited-use license, and
2308
planted the patented seeds for a first harvest.
“Bowman also
purchased commodity seed from a local grain elevator . . . to avoid
paying the significantly higher price” of Roundup Ready seed for a
2309
second harvest.
Monsanto sued Bowman for infringement, and the
2310
district court awarded summary judgment to Monsanto.
Appealing the district court’s judgment, Bowman argued that
2311
Monsanto’s patent rights in the commodity seed were exhausted.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court explained that even if

2300.
2301.
2302.
2303.
2304.
2305.
2306.
2307.
2308.
2309.
2310.
2311.

Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
657 F.3d 1341, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1343, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1343–44, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
Id. at 1344–45, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id. at 1345, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
Id. at 1346, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
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Monsanto’s rights in the commodity were exhausted, “once a grower,
like Bowman, plants the commodity seeds containing Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready technology and the next generation of seed
2312
The
develops, the grower has created a newly infringing article.”
court reasoned that “[a]pplying the first sale doctrine to subsequent
generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights
2313
of the patent holder.”
Moreover, the court rejected Bowman’s
2314
analogy to Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., explaining
that seed does not substantially embody all later generations of seed
because there are other reasonable and intended uses for the seed
2315
besides planting, for example, use as feed.
Thus, the court held
the patent exhaustion doctrine inapplicable and affirmed the district
2316
court’s finding of infringement.
C. Implied License
Another potential pitfall for patentees seeking to enforce their
rights originates from implied licenses, which may result from
settlement agreements. In General Protecht Group, Inc. v. Leviton
2317
Manufacturing Co., the parties had previously entered a settlement
agreement granting a covenant not to sue for alleged infringement of
2318
Three years later,
the Leviton patents at issue in the litigation.
Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. again alleged infringement of the
2319
same products at issue in the original litigation.
This time,
however, Leviton asserted two patents that were continuations of the
applications that issued from the earlier patents Levitron had
2320
asserted in the prior settled dispute.
The Federal Circuit noted that, by definition, the newly asserted
continuations were based on the same disclosure as the previously
licensed patents and therefore “claim no new invention not already

2312. Id. at 1348, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
2313. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459
F.3d 1328, 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2314. Bowman argued that a seed “substantially embodies” all later generation
seeds because the record contained no information that the seeds’ “only reasonable
and intended use” was replanting to produce more seeds. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1229 (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2315. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
2316. Id. at 1349, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
2317. 651 F.3d 1355, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2318. Id. at 1357–58, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277–78.
2319. Id. at 1358, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
2320. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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2321

Relying on TransCore, L.P.
supported in the earlier issued patents.”
2322
v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp., the Federal Circuit stated
that where “continuations issue from parent patents that previously
have been licensed as to certain products, it may be presumed that,
absent a clear indication of mutual intent to the contrary, those
2323
products are impliedly licensed under the continuations as well.”
Thus, Levitron was obligated to clarify its intention that its license did
2324
The court
not extend to claims extended in continuous patents.
noted that, under TransCore, a licensor is estopped from “taking back
in any extent that for which [it] has already received
2325
consideration.”
Thus, in the present case, the court held that
Leviton’s actions unquestionably derogated from General’s rights
2326
under the settlement agreement.
D. Intervening Rights
The doctrine of intervening rights protects alleged infringers who
used, made, purchased, offered for sale, or imported a product
before the date of a reissue or reexamination that substantively
changed the claim scope such that the product subsequently
2327
infringes the reissued or reexamined claims.
Thus, no intervening
rights exist where the accused product allegedly infringes a claim that
2328
was in the original patent.
There are two types of intervening
2329
Absolute intervening rights “bar
rights: absolute and equitable.
claims for infringement based on specific products that were
2330
manufactured before the reissue or reexamination.”
Equitable
intervening rights “bar claims for infringement for new products and
newly manufactured versions of prior existing products made after
2331
the reissue or reexamination.”
2332
In Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., the Federal

2321. Id. at 1361, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
2322. 563 F.3d 1271, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2323. Gen. Protecht, 651 F.3d at 1361, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
2324. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
2325. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2326. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
2327. 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307 (2006).
2328. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 659 F.3d 1084, 1091, 100
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 252), aff’d, No.
2010-1548, 2012 WL 858700 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc).
2329. Id. at 1090, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260–61.
2330. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260–61.
2331. Id. at 1090–91, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260–61.
2332. 659 F.3d 1084, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, No. 20101548, 2012 WL 858700 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc).
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Circuit held that HemCon, Inc. had absolute intervening rights,
barring Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc.’s infringement claim
2333
Marine
against products manufactured before the date of reissue.
Polymer owns a patent directed to a polymer, p-GlcNAc, used in
2334
Marine Polymer sued
trauma units to slow or stop bleeding.
2335
HemCon, asserting various claims of its patent.
The district court
granted a permanent injunction and summary judgment of
infringement on all asserted claims, and a jury determined that the
patent claims were not invalid and awarded reasonable royalty
2336
damages.
HemCon requested a reexamination of Marine
Polymer’s patent, but the USPTO did not issue the reexamination
2337
certificate until after the district court entered final judgment.
Having already timely appealed the district court’s ruling, the Federal
Circuit determined that it also had discretion to consider HemCon’s
2338
intervening rights argument because “it is a pure question of law.”
The court first determined whether the scope of Marine Polymer’s
2339
Marine Polymer
asserted claims changed during reexamination.
did not actually alter any of the claim language of the asserted claims
during reexamination, but the court noted that the “critical question”
was not whether the language changed but whether the scope
2340
changed.
The patent examiner initially rejected the district court’s
claim interpretation and rejected all of Marine Polymer’s patent
2341
Marine Polymer
claims as invalid in light of the prior art.
countered that the examiner should adopt the district court’s claim
2342
construction and cancelled six, non-asserted claim terms.
Because
the cancellation of the six claim terms created “consistency” with the
district court’s claim construction, the examiner allowed the
2343
amended claims.
Thus, the court concluded that Marine Polymer
changed the scope of its claims by disavowal or estoppel, even though
2344
Marine Polymer did not amend the language of its claims.
2333. Id. at 1087, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
2334. Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
2335. Id. at 1088, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
2336. Id. at 1089, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
2337. Id. at 1090, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
2338. Id. at 1091, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. The court declined to determine
whether HemCon also had equitable intervening rights due to the “fact intensive”
nature of the necessary inquiry. Id. at 1095, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
2339. Id. at 1092, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2340. Id. at 1091–92, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (citing Laitram Corp. v. NEC
Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1346, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
2341. Id. at 1089, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
2342. Id. at 1089–90, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
2343. Id. at 1092–93, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2344. Id. at 1092, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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Marine Polymer maintained that the district court’s claim
interpretation was correct and therefore the reexamination did not
2345
The court disagreed,
change the scope of the patent claims.
finding nothing in the specification that would limit the claims in the
2346
way that the district court’s claim interpretation limited the claims.
Indeed, regarding two specific claims, the court stated that “[a]fter
Marine Polymer imported the district court’s erroneous claim
construction on reexamination,” the claims required that the
polymer exhibit no detectable biological reactivity under any of the
2347
four specified tests.
Previously, the claims required the polymer to
2348
exhibit no reactivity under just one of the four tests.
The court also rejected Marine Polymer’s assertion that HemCon
2349
waived its argument as to the proper claim construction.
The
court explained that a party “may raise specific claim construction
arguments for the first time on appeal” so long as they are “consistent
2350
with the claim construction proffered by that party below.”
Disposing of all of Marine Polymer’s arguments, the court concluded
that HemCon had absolute intervening rights and remanded for
2351
further determination of equitable intervening rights.
Judge Lourie dissented. Judge Lourie characterized as “unwise”
the court’s consideration of the reexamination without “the benefit
of the district court’s view on the effect of the reexamination
2352
proceeding.”
Moreover, Judge Lourie stated that an alteration in
the claim language on reissue or reexamination is a “threshold
2353
requirement” for intervening rights to apply.
Accordingly, because
Marine Polymer did not alter the claim language of either of its
asserted claims, Judge Lourie would not have applied the doctrine of
2354
intervening rights.
E. Walker Process Fraud
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
2355
Corp., the Supreme Court held that “the enforcement of a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the
2345.
2346.
2347.
2348.
2349.
2350.
2351.
2352.
2353.
2354.
2355.

Id. at 1094, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 1093, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 1094–95, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
Id. at 1096, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1096–97, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
Id., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
382 U.S. 172, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404 (1965).
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Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are
2356
In particular, a plaintiff who asserts Walker Process fraud
present.”
must not only prove the defendant committed fraud on the USPTO
2357
but also the standard elements of an antitrust claim.
The plaintiff
“must show that the defendant held monopoly power in the relevant
market and willfully acquired or maintained that power by
2358
anticompetitive means.”
Moreover, the plaintiff “must also define
the [relevant] market within which the defendant engaged” in the
2359
alleged anticompetitive conduct.
Absent this critical definition,
“the anticompetitive effects of an improperly obtained patent are
2360
A plaintiff may define the relevant market
impossible to measure.”
“by reference to the reasonable interchangeability in use among
competing products or by reference to the cross-elasticity of demand
2361
between a product and its substitutes.”
2362
In Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Commission,
the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a Walker
Process fraud claim because the plaintiff failed to define the relevant
2363
market.
The California Table Grape Commission holds a license
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to patents
2364
The plaintiffs, various
covering three varieties of table grapes.
California grape growers (collectively “Delano Farms”), filed a
declaratory judgment action, seeking to invalidate or render
2365
unenforceable the Commission’s licensed patents.
Delano Farms
alleged unenforceability due to inequitable conduct during
prosecution of one of the patents, which covered a variety of grape
2366
named Sweet Scarlet.
Related to its unenforceability argument,
Delano Farms also asserted a Walker Process claim against the
Commission, alleging that the Commission “has enforced a

2356. Id. at 174, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406.
2357. Id. at 175, 177, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406.
2358. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1351, 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340, 1367–68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1998)), reh’g en
banc denied, No. 2010-1546, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26139 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).
2359. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836 (citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177, 147
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 407).
2360. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836 (citation omitted).
2361. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
2362. 655 F.3d 1337, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 2010-1546, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26139 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).
2363. Id. at 1351–52, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836–37.
2364. Id. at 1340, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828.
2365. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
2366. Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
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fraudulently obtained patent in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
2367
Act.”
Delano Farms argued that the Sweet Scarlet submarket-grapevines
having specific characteristics as enumerated in the Sweet Scarlet
patent formed the relevant market by which to analyze Delano Farms’
2368
antitrust claim.
Delano Farms thus maintained that no other
grapevine variety served as a reasonable substitute for the Sweet
2369
The Federal Circuit characterized Delano Farms’ market
Scarlet.
2370
definition as a “naked assertion.”
Fatal to Delano Farms’ position
that there exists no reasonable substitutes for Sweet Scarlet was the
“undisputed” fact that other varieties possess “at least some of the
2371
relevant characteristics.”
The court clarified that Delano Farms was
not required to provide empirical or statistical evidence to define the
2372
But
relevant market at the current stage of the proceeding.
Delano Farms failed to raise any allegation with a “reference to
consumer demand” and failed to proffer any evidence that Sweet
Scarlet grapes form the basis of a market other than the issuance of a
2373
patent.
The court concluded that “the aspects of an invention that
may have led the [US]PTO to issue a patent are not per se
coterminous with the features of the patented product that may lead
2374
consumers to select that product over other similar ones.”
For that
reason, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
2375
Delano Farms’ antitrust claim.

2367.
2368.
2369.
2370.
2371.
2372.
2373.
2374.
2375.

Id. at 1350, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
Id. at 1351, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id. at 1352, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
Id., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.

